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LONELY SOUNDS: POPULAR RECORDED MUSIC AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 19491979

Christopher Rasmussen, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2008

Adviser: Benjamin G. Rader

Lonely Sounds: Popular Recorded Music and American Society, 1949-1979 examines the
relationship between the experience of listening to popular music and social disengagement. It
finds that technological innovations, the growth of a youth culture, and market forces in the postWorld War II era came together to transform the normal musical experience from a social event
grounded in live performance into a consumable recorded commodity that satisfied individual
desires.
The musical turn inward began in the late 1940s. Prior to the postwar era, the popular
music experience was communal, rooted in place, and it contained implicit social obligations
between the performer and the audience and among members of the audience. Beginning in the
late 1940s, technological, social, and cultural innovations, including new radio formats,
automobile radios, and an expanding recording industry liberated popular music from some of
the restraints of place and time. Listeners in the 1950s acquired expanded opportunities for
enjoying music in ways that were more private, mobile, and intensely personal. Not only did the
opportunities to listen alone expand enormously, but so also did the inclination.
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The postwar youth culture that grew up around the Top 40 radio format and 45-rpm
singles stood at the vanguard of this revolutionary change in the musical experience. For many
young listeners, rock and roll records represented a singular authentic experience. By the middle
1960s, these listeners believed that correctly listening to rock records not only revealed a unique
self but also reintegrated alienated individuals into supportive communities. The isolated nature
of the listening experience, however, poignantly frustrated such hopes.
The dream of social renewal through rock records collapsed in the early 1970s. In its
place came a more aggressive emphasis on self-sufficiency and personal control. In the
subsequent decade devices such as the Sony Walkman successfully colonized public space,
shielding listeners from other sounds while enclosing them in a private sonic environment of
their choosing. This revolution in the musical experience, I contend, reflected and contributed to
the pervasive sense of loneliness associated with the postwar era.
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Introduction

I'm in love with modern moonlight
128 when it's dark outside
I'm in love with Massachusetts
I'm in love with the radio on
It helps me from being alone late at night
It helps me from being lonely late at night
I don't feel so bad now in the car
Don't feel so alone, got the radio on
Like the roadrunner
That's right
In the lyrics of “Roadrunner” (1976) Jonathan Richman of the Modern Lovers captures
the main concerns of this study. One of these is the post-World War II angst associated with
perceptions of a declining sense of community or social connectedness. As he speeds down a
Massachusetts highway at night, we learn that the roadrunner is alone and lonely, but that, while
modern technologies may contribute to his malaise, they simultaneously offer him some relief
from his anguish. The enclosed car itself provides not only the close quarters of a womb-like
security but also its capacity for hurtling him down the highway at breakneck speeds serves to
enhance his sense of personal empowerment. Technology facilitates perhaps an even greater feat
for the Roadrunner. The car radio connects him to a world outside himself; it allows him a partial
escape from the awful sense of being totally alone in an alien world. “It helps me from being
alone at night. It helps me from being lonely at night,” he sings. “Don’t feel so alone, got the
radio on like the roadrunner. That’s right.”
Yet Richman suspected or recognized at some level that technology’s answer to social
disengagement was inadequate. Hence, he changed his relationship to musical performance. To
many fans’ and critics’ confusion, he purged his live performances of common rock elements:
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distortion, electric instruments, and eventually a supporting band all vanished when Richman
took the stage. What was left by the late 1970s was a reinvigorated interpretation of the rock and
roll of the 1950s, injected with Richman’s characteristic energy, insight, humor, and pathos.
Often appearing unaccompanied or with a percussionist on stage, Richman continued to release
records to a small following, but achieved renown as a live performer. As a performer, Richman
sought a direct, physical, and face-to-face connection with the audience, unmediated by pose or
technology. He never abandoned recording, but placed the technology and the larger industry in
a subordinate role to his performances. A Jonathan Richman record is more an invitation to an
event, than the end product. 1
This study examines the relationship of a particular form of modern technology, recorded
music, to post-World War II society. The same issues that unnerved Richman and led to his
drive to create an unmediated stage presence were reshaping the American musical experience
and social relationships between the years of 1949 and 1979. The musical performance, to
which recordings were supposed to be inferior copies, declined in significance, while the
recorded artifact grew more important. Since the turn of the century, popular recorded music
had been one of a galaxy of standardized commodities available for individual consumption, but
it was not until the postwar era that the record became the primary means by which American
experienced music. As the recorded artifact gained prominence, musical genres proliferated, the
recording industry expanded, and the market diversified, giving Americans the power to choose
personalized soundtracks suited to their individual tastes and styles. New consumer technologies
– from car radios to portable cassette players – allowed listeners to carve out their own private
sonic space in their homes or out in public. The changes in the American musical experience
1

Tim Mitchell, There’s Something About Jonathan: Jonathan Richman and the Modern Lovers,
London: Peter Owen, 1999, 9-13.
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mirrored similar changes in the national culture that encouraged a greater focus on selffulfillment at the expense of social obligations.
This study will focus on young Americans because popular recorded music played a
central role in the development of that group’s collective identity. The record-centric youth
culture was largely responsible for developing and popularizing the era’s personalized listening
styles. Just as novels and newspapers had facilitated in the construction of imagined
communities in other cultures, postwar American youth turned toward popular recorded music.
Recorded and the devices used to play it gave structure, meaning, and a voice to the youth
culture. The postwar youth culture, as opposed to youth cultures’ of earlier eras, is largely
incompressible without reference to the peculiar ways the young since the 1950s ritualistically
consumed, listened to, and ascribed meaning to popular recorded music. In their consumption of
recorded music the postwar youth culture constructed imagined communities that sometimes
bridged regional, class, gender, and racial barriers. These imagined communities, more than
anything else, however, helped to offset and manage the national culture’s centrifugal forces.
Unlike previous generations including their parents, the postwar youth did not associate
popular recorded music with the musical performance. A performance is best understood as a
social event, one with mutual obligations between performer and audience as well as among
audience members themselves. A performance inherently possesses connective, perhaps even
coercive, properties. Face-to-face, audience and performer are forced to confront each other and
negotiate the course of the performance. A performance exists only in one place in one time, and
performers and audience must agree that being in each other’s presence for an extended period
has an intrinsic value. A performer may change venues and play the same songs, but despite his
best efforts, there will inevitably be slight differences between two different performances. A
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performance then is a unique, an ephemeral, and a collective experience. The recorded artifact is
mass-produced, standardized, repeatable, and possesses the capability of being able to be
enjoyed in solitude. The ways the youth culture and eventually the national consumed and
listened to recorded popular music, combined with the way musicians produced music in the
recording studio, liberated the listening experience from the time and place and from the social
obligations contained within a traditional understanding of the musical experience.
As Americans gained greater technological connectivity via electronic media and an
increased quantity and variety of commodities to choose from in the marketplace, scholars have
found that they simultaneously faced increasing pressures of social isolation and loneliness.
Political scientists have noted with alarm signs of a decaying political culture, civic
disengagement, and the collapse of consensus in the postwar years. Media critics and
psychologists have pointed to television and its allegedly passive and silent audience with
growing concern. Sociologists and anthropologists have seen in the proliferation of suburbs as
evidence of a collective national effort to avoid others. Building on the foundations of a
longstanding critique of modern ways, scholars have continued a sustained analysis of the
electronic media and the growing social distance between individuals and groups. 2

2

Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1996; for the classic analysis of the effects of television on American
democracy and intellectual life, see, Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in
the Age of Show Business, New York: Viking, 1985; For a psychological analysis of the asocial
nature of television, see James P. Flanders, “A General Systems Approach to Loneliness,” in
Loneliness: A Sourcebook of Current Theory, Research and Therapy, eds. Letitia Anne Peplau
and Daniel Perlman, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982; For an interpretation of one Long
Island suburb as evidence of a national collective avoidance of conflict and others, see M. P.
Baumgartner, The Moral Order of a Suburb, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988; For
more general works the relationships between technology, culture, work, leisure, and loneliness
in postwar America see, Richard Stivers Shades of Loneliness: Pathologies of a Technological
Society, Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004; Daniel Boorstin Democracy and its
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Americans’ relationship to popular music, as Richman begins to suggest, was related to a
national move toward disengagement. In the postwar era, music disconnected from
performance, and was reduced to mere sound to be manipulated, captured, packaged, sold, and
consumed. The face-to-face presence of the performer vanished on vinyl, and the participation
of the audience was relegated to a commercial transaction. No longer did enjoying music signify
an event with social obligations but was instead wholly contained in the leisure economy and
under the control of the consumer. In a society with fewer opportunities for public displays of
sociability, this would appear to represent a profound loss. Yet, young Americans continued to
identify music with community and reconnection. Their understanding of the musical
experience as primarily a recorded artifact did not rule out, and in fact strongly emphasized,
music’s power to unite listeners into a truly authentic community. Thus Americans, for the most
part unwittingly, attempted to use a technology that seemed divisive to instead encourage unity
and reconnection. I will show that the transformation of the musical performance from an event
to a commodity designed for individual consumption provides a window to describe, analyze,
compare, and criticize American postwar social trends. Recorded music, the meanings listeners
ascribed it, the manner in which it was produced and marketed, and the way in which they
consumed it, represented both a potential cause of loneliness’ increasing prevalence, and a
positive response to the same.
This study falls within a vast literature concerning popular recorded music, youth culture,
technology, and alienation in the postwar era. The focus on loneliness, however, finds it at odds
with the dominant interpretations of the period’s youth culture and its popular recorded music.

Discontents: Reflections on Everyday America, New York: Random House, 1974, and Philip
Slater, American Culture at the Breaking Point, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
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Unlike television, most observers have identified radio and recorded music as social glues, not
solvents. Some have seen consumption of recorded popular music as a collective, if largely
subconscious, mode of resistance against an artificial and/or inhuman dominant culture. Others
have identified popular youth music styles such as rock and roll as authentic, albeit massproduced, folk cultures. A smaller group of contemporary critics of recorded popular music tend
to dwell on an alleged nihilism of particular genres, rock and roll again, or point to a damning
lack of traditional aesthetic sensibilities. 3
Overlooked or pushed to the side in these treatments are the ever-weakening social
context in which recorded music is created and consumed and the alternatives that recorded
sound and other technologies offered individuals seeking to manage their loneliness. Starting
with the Omaha broadcaster Todd Storz’s 1949 purchase of KOWH, one can glimpse the
growing chasm separating recorded music from live performance and begin to chart the
simultaneous rise of the postwar youth culture and market. In 1979, Sony introduced the
portable cassette playing Walkman, which placed individualized sound on the body,
3

Carl Belz, The Story of Rock, Oxford University Press, 1972; David Szatmary David Szatmary,
Rockin’ in Time: A Social History of Rock and Roll, Upper Saddle Creek, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
2000; Susan Douglas, Listening in: Radio and the American Imagination. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004; Theodore Gracyk, I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the
Politics of Identity, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001; Mark Katz. Capturing Sound:
How Technology has Changed Music. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; Zach
Albin, The Poetics of Rock: Cutting Tracks, Making Records, Berkeley, Calif.: University of
California Press, 2001; Marc Fischer, Something in the Air: Radio, Rock, and the Revolution that
Shaped a Nation, New York: Random House, 2007; Resistance Through Rituals: Youth
Subcultures in Post-war Britain, ed. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, New York: Holmes &
Meirer Publishers, Inc., 1976. George Lipsitz, “Who’ll Stop the Rain: Youth Culture, Rock and
Roll and Social Crisis,” in The Sixties: From Memory to History, Chapel Hill, NC.: 1994; Allan
Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education has Failed Democracy and
Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, 68-81;
Martha Bayles, Hole in Our Soul: The Loss of Meaning and Beauty in American Popular Music,
New York: Free Press, 1994.
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symbolically completing American’s understanding of and experience with popular music,
having transformed it from a communal and public performance to a personalized musical
experience. In between these events, is a history of a revolution in music and its role in
American life.
Chapter one, “Imagined Audiences and Make-believe Performances: Records and Radio
in the ‘Golden Age’” will survey the radio listening styles of the first half of the twentieth
century. The appearance of recorded sound in the late nineteenth century and radio in the early
twentieth altered the musical experience at both the production and consumption ends. These
technologies did not, however, create the lonely listening styles characteristic of the postwar era.
In providing a brief history of radio and its relationship to recorded music and its audiences, I
will attempt to show how Americans continued to identify the performance as the authentic
musical experience, despite the fact that the experience was mediated by an additional
technological layer. Nonetheless radio did encourage the development of imagined sonic
communities along with a desire for listener self-expression via music consumption. Looking at
major theorists of early radio, such as academics, public intellectuals, and marketers, this chapter
will show how commercial prewar radio shaped both radio’s sense of community and the
audience’s desire for self-expression. A listening culture had been in the process of development
since radio’s so-called “golden age” before World War II. Americans intimate relationship with
radio prepared the way for the lonely listening styles of the postwar era.
Chapter two, “The Top 40 Format: Records on Radio” and chapter three, “Communities
of Top 40: The Postwar Youth Market, Audience, and Culture,” take up the stories of Todd
Storz, the Top 40 radio format, and the emergence of a youth culture devoted to popular recorded
music. Storz’s major innovations followed the advice of the radio theorists of the prewar era: he
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played popular hits, hooked audiences with heavy repetition, and in a novel turn, broadcast only
recorded music. This last programming strategy fundamentally altered the American musical
experience. The young Top 40 audiences came to think that music meant the record. Storz
believed in and helped popularize the idea the recorded music was sound alone, a sonic
commodity that distributed in the same proportions that his unseen consumers demanded.
Storz’s Top 40 radio format swept the nation as a ratings winner by the early 1960s and was
responsible for placing the record at the center of the postwar youth culture.
In a media environment increasingly dominated by television, Top 40 sought out a
segmented or niche market of young consumers, and in the affluent postwar era, youth possessed
unprecedented buying power. Young listeners not only turned their sets to their favorite Top 40
stations, however, but they also imagined into existence an inclusive national community. As
with the physical reality of the high school, the imagined Top 40 community separated youth
from the adult world. It also provided meaning to the rituals of high school and the trials of
adolescence. Part marketing strategy, part media hype, and part youth invention, an identifiable
and coherent culture emerged in the 1950s. Top 40 stations, through their elaborate giveaways
and promotions, contributed to the creation of an imagined youth community by bringing their
young listeners in on collective jokes played on bumbling authority figures. The records on their
favorite radio station, as many a radio promotion reminded its listeners, were available for
purchase. Young radio listeners thus became record buyers, putting the sound they heard on the
air under their own personal control. At the same time, the musical experience, from listening to
dancing, became more solitary. Car radios and the popularity of the partner-less twist and frug
dance styles underscore these trends. In time rock records turned out to be the most popular of
all, and this style became synonymous with the emerging postwar youth culture and its

9
understanding of the musical experience. In mass media depictions, the youth culture moved
from being identified as a social threat or problem to being the most fashionable and consumersavvy segment of the nation. As a result, the practices of the young, including music
appreciation, began to reshape the sonic experiences and expectations of adults.
In chapter four, “Making Records, Making Money, Making Connections: The Rise of the
Rock Long Player,” I will examine the growth of the recording industry and show how the sonic
commodities on the market responded to the changing 1960s youth culture. The recording
industry’s dramatic expansion in this decade resulted from a combination of increasing affluence
and changing values of the youth culture. The youth culture became larger, more assertive, and
fractious. Stumbling toward a successful business model, record companies, ceded a great deal
of creative control over the recording process to young musicians who seemed more in tune with
the inscrutable desires of the youth culture. The move imbued long playing rock records with
great social and personal meaning and helped sell millions. Significant elements of the youth
culture came to identify long-playing records, as opposed to for-radio-play singles, as possessing
the qualities that would help to reconnect isolated individual consumers into an authentic
community. Some began to dream of communities founded in recorded rock and roll that
respected none of the racial, class, or gender barriers that separated their world. Dreams of
social renewal and personal healing became intertwined with the practice of listening to rock
records. An engaged listening style emerged that facilitated intense relationships between
studio-bound musicians and their unseen and unheard fans. These connections were
simultaneously more distant and more intimate. As the more expensive long player increased in
sales recording industry consolidated behind a handful of major firms that had the studio
sophistication and distribution network capable of delivering of the latest LPs to young the
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young consumers who demanded them. While feeding the young’s desire for authenticity and
community, the major companies grew ever more powerful and exerted a profound influence
over the national musical choice and experience.
Chapter Five, “Youth Culture of the 1960s: Pre-recorded Dreams of Authentic
Connection” will examine the rapidly changing youth culture of the late 1960s and how
segments of that culture went about seeking reconnection through recorded popular music.
Rolling Stone developed overnight in 1967 as a mouthpiece for an increasingly record-centric
youth culture, articulating a serious criticism of the latest recordings along with an editorial
stance that emphasized the connective power of rock and roll. According to Rolling Stone, the
artificial postwar American War of Life had corrupted traditional institutions and conventional
social interactions between families, neighbors, and strangers. Only popular recorded music of
the youth culture remained unsullied. The inclusive Top 40 format had established popular
recorded music as the common meeting ground connecting young individuals across traditional
barriers, but by 1967 Rolling Stone and a significant number of young people believed that Top
40 had sold out and had lost the social power it once possessed. These true believers placed their
faith in the records alone. Through its editorials, interviews, and reviews, Rolling Stone
articulated a consistent definition of the musical experience in which listening attentively,
presumably alone, to records on stereo equipment constituted a socially regenerative act. The
isolated listener put the needle on the record and embarked on a quest of personal self-discovery
that would ultimately allow him or her to take off the headphones and build a more authentic
community. Though the Top 40 radio lost its appeal for some young listeners, its lasting
influence permeated the seemingly novel developments in 1960s youth market and culture. With
listening to records at the center, the youth culture began developing public rituals to accompany
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its private pursuits. Concert-going, taking illegal drugs, and, of course, listening to records,
became community-building activities. The inclusive and satisfying community sought,
however, rarely materialized and frustration and despair characterized much of the late 1960s
youth culture, attitudes that would be decisive in shaping the listening style of the subsequent
decade
Chapter six, “Lonely Sounds: Sonic Self Sufficiency, Personal Control, and Social
Shields,” will conclude this study with an examination of the listening practices of the 1970s.
The grandiose promises characteristic of some elements of the 1960’s youth culture gave way to
an individualistic listening style in the subsequent decade that emphasized self-sufficiency and
personal empowerment. This listening style traced its origins to the early 1950s, when a small,
affluent, and male hobbyist subculture began constructing high fidelity audio “rigs” and listening
room sanctuaries. By 1957, the technical barriers that had sealed off the high fidelity subculture
from the national culture had begun to crumble. The consumer electronics industry introduced
and successfully marketed stereo as affordable and user friendly, and in the 1960s the youth
culture embraced long-playing records. As a result, the listening rooms and the obsession with
sound quality characteristic of fifties’ male audiophiles became common concerns. By the late
1970s a diverse collection of consumers – young and not so young, male and female, sought in
audio systems a sense of control and solace that they lacked in other areas of their lives.
Building their home stereos and installing cassettes and 8-track machines in their automobiles,
they completed the process of transforming the appreciation and understanding of the musical
experience. Music became an individual pursuit, devoid of any collective associations or
obligations. The introduction of the Sony Walkman in 1979 closes the story of popular music’s
postwar journey from a public and social event to private experience wholly under the personal
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control of the individual. This device, more than any stereo component that preceded it, allowed
for the fragmentation of public space into discrete units of popular but suddenly private recorded
music. Vulnerable individuals wrapped their bodies in music – which as often as not functioned
as social barbwire.

13
Chapter One
Imagined Audiences and Make-believe Performances: Records and Radio in the “Golden
Age”

At the end of each week in 1938 farmers in North Dakota journeyed overland, gathering
at a favored and isolated homestead wherein they would initiate a ritual central to their collective
identity. They tuned a radio to find their favorite program. “’Saturday night is the affair of
affairs up here…’” A letter writer to Rural Radio and devoted fan of “Saturday Night Barn
Dance” explained, “’Those who have no radio congregate at the homes of those who have and
what an enjoyable evening!’” For African Americans in the Deep South, Joe Louis’s fights
brought together a community of farmers for a related expression of group solidarity. Italian
ethnics in Chicago gathered around their radios to talk, laugh, dance, and, when not otherwise
occupied, listen. In the Golden Age, radio was a social hub for America’s diverse communities. 4
Historian Lawrence Levine has used such stories to argue that radio, recorded music, and
mass media in general, allowed for and encouraged audience participation and sociability.
Listeners were wise to commercials, talked back to haughty announcers, and used the medium
for their own purposes. In fact, consumer choice, as represented by song and program
popularity, revealed a level of audience participation in mass culture that explodes a simple topdown understanding. Radio listeners did not necessarily listen alone, and in the most popular
shows they heard echoes of their own desires. According to Levine, Depression-era soap operas,

4

Lawrence W. Levine, The Unpredictable Past: Explorations in American Cultural History,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 314-15; Lizabeth Cohen, “Encountering Mass
Culture at the Grassroots: The Experience of Chicago Workers in the 1920s,” American
Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1989), 16-17.
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popular music, and the disembodied voice of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 5 “fostered a
sense of community.” 6
Lizabeth Cohen has shown that rather than creating a homogenous national middle class
culture, early radio promoted working class and ethnic solidarity grounded in local
neighborhoods. Eighty percent of the radio audience tuned into local stations, and they usually
listened to their favorite station in groups between four and five. The chaotic broadcast
environment that existed before the passage of the 1927 Radio Act allowed for this kind of
microcasting that disappeared a decade later. Stations played music by musicians who were
known, often personally, in the Chicago’s ethnic neighborhoods. Radios were likewise the
“prime requisite in social clubs that catered to working class adolescents and young adults.”
Nationality hours, foreign language broadcasts and “Labor News Flashes” defined listeners by
place, ethnicity, and social class, strengthening community ties. Even with the rise of
commercial broadcasting after 1927 and the subsequent dominance of national networks, Cohen
maintains that radio continued to serve community interests rather than the individual
consumer’s and advertiser’s interests. The national market was actually a limited and middle
class market, one in which perhaps a majority of Americans neither wanted nor had the means
with which to participate. 7

5

Roosevelt intuitively recognized radio’s power. The network men who broadcast his “fireside
chats” called the president “the pro.” His natural manner was best heard when he stopped a
broadcast and took a sip from a glass of water, the sounds of which, including the ‘ahh’ went live
over the nation. “sure is hot in Washington,” Roosevelt commented. The “virtual community”
dates at least back to the early days of radio, Eric Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the
United States, Vol. II, The Golden Web. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 4-5.
6
Lawrence W. Levine, The Unpredictable Past 314.
7
Lizabeth Cohen, “Encountering Mass Culture at the Grassroots: The Experience of Chicago
Workers in the 1920s,” American Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1989), 16.
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Cohen and Levine documented radio’s connective qualities, but assumed that the
listening experience was relatively stable and unchanging. That people continued to listen to
radio in groups, however, might suggest the persistence of old patterns that had predated radio.
Certainly, the listening style in the postwar era was remarkably different than that of the 1930s.
Indeed radio was more than just an extension of an older understanding of music and
performance – it represented an entirely novel type of listening experience. With no visual
analog to the sound coming out of the box, the radio listener was forced to rely on the sound
alone. Radio, especially in its early years, required listener imagination in order to be effective.
The listener imagined the presence of the performers and, at times, the audience. The desire to
imagine a listening community into being was a distinct feature of prewar “golden age” radio,
and it demonstrates the strength with which Americans then associated music with performance,
with a social act. Later generations would have no such desire as sound alone would be
sufficient, and the mass of lonely listeners that Cohen and Levine identify as solely middle class
or as an outright fiction would become a pervasive reality. The novel listening style of the
prewar radio’s golden age was the first step revolutionizing of Americans’ understanding of and
experience with popular music.

A Comparison: Prewar and Postwar Radio listening

Following World War II, radio listening occurred regularly in automobiles, bedrooms,
beaches, and diners. Independent local stations dominated postwar radio, but these same stations
paradoxically catered to a national audience. The man most responsible for the dominant radio
format of the postwar era would have heartily agreed with Levine’s assessment that the
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popularity implied audience participation. Todd Storz, manager of the Mid-Continent
broadcasting company from 1949 until his death in 1963, believed that by playing the most
popular records over and over again, he was giving listeners what they demanded. Record store
and jukebox receipts, as well as the calls of listeners themselves provided evidence of this
invisible audience’s desires. To better understand the desires and habits of fickle listeners, Storz
journeyed to nondescript hotel rooms, drew the blinds, and turned on the radio. Significantly, he
did not surround himself with his friends, or turn on the set in his family room. Storz imagined
his listeners as isolated individuals, searching for connections and, occasionally, a surprise.
The popularity of the transistor, the ubiquity of the car radio, and television’s
colonization of the living room allowed for radio to be things other than a social hub – it could
be a companion to the individual. In almost every market Storz’s Mid-Continent Broadcasting
Company entered, his Top 40 format earned his station the rating’s top spot. The postwar radio
audience participated, but merely through their choice of radio station, or occasionally through
promotions and giveaways, and, even more indirectly, through record purchases. If they talked
back to the disc jockeys or chuckled at the inane commercials, it was much more likely they did
these things alone, outside the social and communal context of their prewar counterparts.

Recorded Sound and Radio

Most Americans from the late twenties on experienced popular music through radio, and
live performances formed the vast majority of most prewar broadcasts. This was not due to a
lack of the recorded alternative, as on might expect. Records, cylinders, and wires had been in
existence for nearly 50 years before radio became a common household item and were among
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the earliest broadcasts. Recording technology had made it possible for music to be separated
from a specific time and place and for an individual to enjoy music alone, yet its introduction did
not fundamentally alter the prevailing belief that music meant live performance. During the
Christmas season of 1924 Americans chose the radio in overwhelming numbers over the
phonograph. This suggests that listeners desired not merely access to “free” music, but the
experience of participation it seemed to offer. 8 Radio successfully mimicked the trappings of
performance, providing audiences the feel of the social event they associated with music that the
phonograph could not.
Popular and folk music in the United States had historically been understood as a social
event that entertained and allowed for artistic expression. In the nineteenth century Americans
from all regions, social classes, and ethnic groups participated in local musical performances.
Impromptu music making was almost as common as speechifying to turn-of-the-century
Midwesterners. 9 In New England, town bands received public funds and enthusiastic support in
the early twentieth century. 10 African Americans and poor whites in the South developed
vibrant folk styles that formed the bedrock for the most popular genres of postwar music.
From colonial times rural New Englanders had interwoven musical traditions into their
daily activities connecting individuals through music and dance into family, neighborhood, and
regional groups. In the nineteenth century, local dances where neighbors of all ages gathered
were regular events. In these “kitchen dances,” neighbors chose a home with a central staircase.
8
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This allowed the dancers move in a circle, dancing from room to room. The male fiddlers and
female organ player came from the neighborhood, and the hosts provided the food and drink.
The events often followed “work bees” in which the neighbors engaged in communal labor, such
as corn husking. New England dance songs in the nineteenth century included Anglo-American
ballads and, increasingly, the offerings from the music publishing industry. By the 1920s,
popular styles coming over the airwaves found their way into musicians’ repertoires. These,
however, did not displace local traditions, but provided another source of inspiration for the
syncretic musical style. The social and communal musical performance traditions of rural New
England persisted until the mid-1940s, after which the audiences splintered off, finding
entertainment and, perhaps, an equally satisfying activity in the privacy of their own homes. 11
The middle class quest for gentility did little to squelch folk musical traditions that
encouraged sociability and participation. Nineteenth century middle class Americans invested
considerable sums money in musical instruments, mainly the piano. The guardians of elite
culture at The Atlantic Monthly and Harpers sneered at the parlor piano, finding it little more
than a grasping affectation, which an “ambitious mama” would force on an indifferent daughter.
The evidence suggests, however, that these pianos were more than just window-dressing.
Manufactures led by William Steinway sold more than twenty-five thousand in 1867, with ten
used to every one that was new. The music publishing industry flourished alongside piano
making. Even if most of the girls at the ivories were “bangers,” the parlor piano got a lot of use.
Around the pianos across in the country an active musical life “was carried on mainly in the
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parlors, the club rooms, and the churches – private, social, and spiritual sanctuaries…” 12
Though generally serving the same social functions, the middle class parlor piano was
disconnected from the work life of its players and audiences. The musical experience by the
twentieth century had become, for better or worse, a leisure activity.
Recording technology and radio by themselves did not end long-standing popular and
folk musical practices, and neither did the growing commodification of music. The popular
music business had been profitable since the nation’s founding, and became increasingly
influential and organized by the end of the nineteenth century. Tin Pan Alley and its regional
equivalents sprouted in midwestern cities, such as Cincinnati and St. Louis. The extensive music
publishing businesses made millions of dollars selling tunes, mainly in devotional or popular
styles. The relentless tactics of song jobbers, the peculiar demands of composing for an
unknown audience, and changes in copyright law at the end of the century tended to make the
larger players in the business ever stronger and centralize the production of American popular
music. 13 By the 1890s, a system of payola, or pay for play, was entrenched. Paying well-known
bandleaders to perform songs was perhaps the music publishing industry’s only insurance against
inscrutable public tastes. Out of 200 songs only 1 ever became a hit and less than half broke
even. 14
Phonograph records did not dramatically alter the relationship between musician and
audience, despite the best efforts of record companies. Victor touted its phonograph and
expensive Red Seal line as superior alternative to attending a concert – “no need to wait for
12
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hours in the rain” when the music was in your home. The phonograph was also marketed as a
preferable alternative to the middle class piano, and, in an appeal that would become more
common later in the century, stress relief for nervous moderns. Though reporting revenue
approaching of $30 million in the early 1920s, record sales failed to replace sheet music sales as
the industry standard for determining a hit. The resilience of sheet music in the face of the
recording suggests that for most Americans, including those in the industry, music implied
performance 15
The arrival of the wireless not only unseated the phonograph from its position as the
primary technological music medium, but also led to noticeable sale declines in sheet music and
pianos. Radio’s dominance, however did not signal the death of performance, but at first adapted
performance. With radio’s reach over the air, performance was no longer tied to a specific place.
For its first thirty years, radio underscored the popular understanding that music was a social
event. Radio seemed to offer Americans a technological means by which to experience the
immediacy of a performance – to “be there.” For an increasingly urbanized and educated society
the machine reconnected some listeners to the older, oral tradition, albeit one that now had no
recognizable visual component. Listeners alienated by increasing social stratification and
bureaucratization had an opportunity to hear life in its original excitement or be comforted by
familiar, yet disembodied voices. 16 The key for a would-be successful broadcaster in radio’s
early years was to minimize the medium’s inherent spookiness. A 1923 article claimed that
broadcasting from remote sites, or “out of the studio” was essential to audience enjoyment
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because of, “the atmosphere of life that is transported.” 17 Thus the greatest strength of radio,
vis-à-vis the phonograph was its ability to approximate the varieties of a performance, with
security and excitement on either end of the emotional spectrum.
For most of the 1920s, radio was uncontrolled and stations rose and fell, competed over
frequencies, and this frenetic activity made for a chaotic and exciting listening experience in
which music, lectures, prize fights, and election returns could be found hidden in the static. All
of this, once the machine was purchased, was free and, most importantly, live. Phonograph
machine sales began a sickening slide (at least for the industry executives) in 1922 and did not
recover their 1921 levels until 1945. 18 The notable exceptions were race records, which held
steady. Had it not been for Bessie Smith’s recordings the mighty Columbia might have come to
ruin. 19 Many families reported delaying phonograph purchases specifically in order to purchase
a radio. The Depression years hit the recording industry hard, but damaged the radio less. While
purchases of phonograph records were still falling in 1933 (from already low levels), radio sets
had begun to recover. 20
Not all observers felt the radio represented an adequate substitute for performance, and
looked darkly at the future of public life in an age in which people preferred to sit at home with
the radio rather than venture out into the public. The British sage G. K. Chesterton suggested
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that a medical license should be required for broadcasting. Only the old and invalids had an
adequate excuse for sitting at home alone with the wireless. 21
Indeed, radio was not the same as a live performance, as radio personalities discovered.
To give an effective radio performance, vaudevillian Eddie Cantor had to in effect fool himself.
“What brought my first radio show to life and took it to the top,” he claimed, “was the
participation for the first time of a studio audience.” 22 The audience not only aided Cantor, but
when broadcasted along with the performer, the clapping and laughing also helped listeners
identify the proper cues and behave as if they were participating in an event. Radio’s ability to
fool a willing audience and sustain an illusion through sound is best seen in the success and
celebrity of Edger Bergen. Bergen was a ventriloquist.
Radio’s power to be there at the level of action contrasted with contemporary feelings
toward the phonograph. Common reactions to the early phonograph by listeners included
outward displays of grief and mourning. Tears were not unusual. Some of Edison’s ideas for the
phonograph included using the machine to preserve the words of dead loved ones in a way
similar to an album of photographs, an idea that must have resonated with his contemporaries.
The discs with their otherworldly pops and hisses seemed to dredge up old sounds, half-forgotten
memories, and dead voices, which could be an intense and bewildering experience of a type not
normally associated with entertainment. The sounds on the disc did not change and their
permanence contrasted sharply with radio’s ephemeral nature. Even advertisements could not
escape the phonograph’s perceived morbidity. RCA’s famous His Master’s Voice campaign
featuring Nipper the dog leaning into a phonograph ear became known worldwide for reasons
21
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RCA probably had not anticipated. The ever-loyal Nipper sits perched on what appears to be his
master’s shiny casket. Later advertisements cropped the picture so as to dispel what was
becoming an unsettling but widely accepted rumor. 23 The phonograph preserved and repeated
dead sounds, something that could never be associated with radio’s simulated performances.
Radio was alive.

Resistance to the Record: Early Radio Broadcasting

For different reasons and to varying degrees, broadcasters, musicians, federal regulatory
agencies, and the recording industry all opposed playing recorded music on the radio.
Broadcasters feared listeners would retreat from an inferior product if they used recordings,
while the New Deal consumer and worker advocacy promoted government restrictions on
recorded music. The recording industry, already reeling from the impact of radio, believed that
the broadcasting of its product for free was a violation of its property rights and thus a threat to
viability. Big recording and radio stars, such as Bing Crosby and Fred Warring, agreed with
industry policy, while less successful radio and local bands knew from painful experience that
every record played meant one less opportunity for a performance. After the passage of the
Wagner Act in 1935, musicians unions organized to resist the playing of records over the air.
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The networks derogated phonographs as “canned” music, and often prohibited
broadcasting discs. 24 In both 1930, NBC and CBS banned playing discs. Across the industry,
for every 128 broadcast hours every week, only 11 featured prerecorded sound. The networks
understood that their deep pockets could deliver regular performances of top stars. Thus it was
in their interest to maintain the accepted association that good music meant live music. Station
and advertising jingles remained as a dwindling preserve of recorded sound on air. 25
Reinforcing the networks’ anti-record bias, the federal government, in the form of the
Federal Radio Commission and its 1934 successor, the Federal Communications Commission,
took the position that broadcasting phonographs was not in the public interest. New stations had
to promise not to play pre-recorded music or be subject to licensing scrutiny when their initial
three-year license expired. Agency regulations dictated that any stations that dared broadcast a
record had to warn listeners that what they were about to hear was not live. The implication
being that recorded music was dishonest, a fraud perpetrated on an unwitting and trusting public.
In 1940 the FCC reduced its warning requirement from prior to every record to just once every
half hour and eventually phased it out entirely before the end of the war. Their official position,
however only served to underscore the more popular and preexisting notion that recorded music
was somehow not “real” music. 26
Record labels and popular musicians contributed to the anti-disc sentiment. Believing
that radio play would lead to a loss of record sales, record companies in the 1930s stamped their
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products with NOT LISCENCED FOR RADIO BROADCAST. The Tin Pan Alley-dominated
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) fought a running battle with
broadcasters to secure royalties for songwriters and publishers, attempting, with limited success,
to cash in on the radio bonanza by negotiating pacts with the National Association of
Broadcasters to insure royalty payments from advertising grosses. 27 James C. Petrillo, head of
the American Federation of Musicians led a years-long effort to eliminate all broadcasting of
recorded music. As president of the Chicago Foundation of Musician, Petrillo had long urged
musicians to never record their work. He pointed to the advent of sound in theaters and, later, to
disc jockeys in radio, as technological changes that had left the vast majority musicians on the
“human scrap heap.” 28
Court cases in 1940, however, established that prohibitions against recorded music had
no legal basis. After purchasing a record, broadcasters owed no further obligation to the artist. 29
The resistance to records had operated on aesthetic, legal, and economic fronts. Taken
collectively, these views held recordings responsible for lost jobs, decreased listening
satisfaction, and declining profits.
All of this is not to imply in any way that because recorded sound was rare the so-called
golden age represented an aesthetic triumph. Far from it. Itinerant song jobbers relentlessly
pushed onto radio bands Tin Pan Alley’s latest offering, making sure that they worked the song
into their repertoire as often as tolerable and beyond. The conventional wisdom in the music
business was that radio repetition created sheet music sales – the benchmark of success. A “hit”
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constituted 50,000 in sheet sales. Plugging, industry leaders believed, was an essential part of
reaching that magic number. By the 1930s some New York stations featured bands that played
the top hit multiple times every day. Hits were, as they remain, artistically safe and the practices
used in their promotion often amounted to outright bribery. Musicians and arrangers, however,
possessed considerable control over what finally came over the air and sheet music, unlike a
recording, was sonically flexible. 30
Regardless their artistic merit, the fact sheet music sales defined what constituted a hit
reveals in another way just how much music in the 1930s music remained a participatory
activity. As a set of instructions, sheet music encouraged performance and participation in ways
that a record simply cannot. A song was a hit when lots of people played it and interpreted it
themselves. When records became the dominant form of music, the song was set and became
indelibly associated with one artist. The audiences became passive listeners who were often
listening alone.
In a short time radio transformed from an amateurish mix of hack broadcasters and
enthusiasts into a heavily capitalized industry in which the national networks developed
sophisticated programming strategies, filling the airwaves with what they believed to by the
perfectly calibrated mix of music, news, comedy, drama, sports, and chatter. Though offering a
much more diverse entertainment and educational palette from today’s music and talk-oriented
radio, music still dominated golden age radio, accounting for two-thirds of all programmed

30

“The Popular Music Industry,” in The Psychology of Radio, New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1941, 71-109.

27
airtime. 31 From the start, music was the backbone of the new electronic medium, as well as the
chief form of communication and entertainment.

Radio’s Imagined Communities

Similar to print technology, the disembodied voices, sounds, music, and even static of
radio “inspired the imagination.” This is especially true of sporting events that required the
listener imagine a dynamic, three-dimensional world. 32 Depending on the skill of the announcer,
the radio sports fans could find themselves transported ringside or out in the sun, waiting for the
Bambino to swat one away into the stands. Susan Douglas has said the popularity of sports on
the lies in their call for “dimensional listening,” in which the listener experiences satisfaction by
creating a visual image in their mind’s eye. Even when not envisioning a world in three
dimensions, such as when listening to music, radio nonetheless appealed to the imagination. 33
Invisible performers populated imaginary ballrooms, or perhaps some song lyrics conjured a
cinematic scene, with the listener in place of the star. The lack of visual information only served
to enhance the intensity of the radio musical experience.
Similar to newspaper readers, radio listeners were often physically alone but knew, and
were encouraged to believe, that they were part of a conventional audience. One of the few disc
jockey programs that achieved wide popularity during the golden age, Martin Block’s “Make
Believe Ballroom,” specifically called attention to radio’s appeal to the imagination. In the
31
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mind’s ear, radio connected otherwise isolated listeners not only to the announcer, but to fellow
listeners as well, in a world of shared sound.
Benedict Anderson has argued that the nation first came into existence in the minds of
readers exposed to the mass media. 34 Newspapers and novels invited readers to imagine
themselves as connected to the millions of compatriots, not even a fraction of whom they could
meet, to say nothing of know and care for, in a lifetime. The nation was collective intellectual
achievement that, though exclusive in respect to other nations, blurred class, ethnic, and racial
lines, allowing for the formation of strong fraternal bonds. Anderson maintained that these
bonds proved so strong that millions in the last two hundred years have willingly died for their
respective imagined communities. 35
By providing an instant and simultaneous connection, radio operates differently than does
print. Marshall McLuhan has called radio a “hot” medium” in that it focuses on a single sense
and allows little room for back and forth participation, making it more difficult to establish
separation between the self and the medium. Radio works to collective individual listeners even
though they may listen alone. The imaginative exercise could be more accurately described as
auditory stimulation, with the broadcaster having much more control than an author over the
audiences’ potential responses. 36
With a book or a newspaper, the characters on the page do not mimic the objects, events,
and concepts they describe. Reading at best describes. Print technology is abstract, and the
reader assumes an analytical distance. Radio demolishes all distance. No one reads H. G. Wells

34

Ibid., 23-25 makes a similar comparison to Anderson.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1983.
36
Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York: McGraw Hill,
1964, 23.
35

29
and prepares for a Martian invasion, but a radio studio combined with the right voice and a
sufficient number receivers tuned in can create a public panic. Writing in the dark days of the
early 1940s, Theodore Adorno saw the sinister appeal of mass movements and the totalitarian
impulse emanating from radio towers. Radio’s dark side manifested itself in the, to his taste,
neurotic dance style of the jitterbug. 37 Whatever the case, radio simulation possessed a dual
appeal: its aliveness created excitement, and its imagined communities simultaneously provided
security.
Radio’s sense of security and imagined community came from a familiarity bred by
repetition. The announcer’s voice, live and in real time, sounded friendly and arrived at
regularly scheduled intervals. Playing the part of the host, he welcomed the listener in, to come
join everyone. Today, Paul Harvey and Kasey Kasem offer different versions of radio security,
inviting their audiences to comforting and familiar sonic worlds. In the golden age, a studio
audience often reassured the listener that he was not alone and helped him figure out how to
respond to the disembodied sounds. Owning a set was the invitation, and class, race, gender, and
age were not barriers. Radio was inherently inclusive, and, it would seem, made good on the
realization of the American creed. 38 This would mean that radio not only brought together white
North Dakota farmers together for an evening of “Saturday Night Barn Dance,” but that it
possessed the more impressive potential to unite the Dakotans with rural black Joe Louis fans.
A youth community being built around leisure consumption and the high school
experience also tuned into the radio closely, searching for hot dance music. In the Depressionera high schools and universities, dance was an important part of the social lives of the young
37
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and radio often provided the music. The swing style, popular among the young, dominated
commercial radio and was especially suited to paired-dancing. “To the young,” historian Lewis
Erenberg noted of Depression and war-era youth, “listening and dancing to popular bands was
‘almost as important a part of its daily habits as eating and sleeping…’” 39
This prewar youth culture was sensual and social, built around a form of music that
appealed directly to the body and that required the presence of others. The high school dancers,
along of course with the musicians, controlled the atmosphere and the rules of the dance. If
musicians were unavailable, the radio proved an adequate substitute as it was relatively portable
and because broadcasters hued to a standard that attempted to replicate the social nature of a
musical performance. Radio, and much less so records, were not required and merely a second
or third best option when the real thing was unavailable. In a 1930s survey, ninety-five percent
of teenagers said that they talked about dancing “sometimes” and 60 percent claimed “often or
very often.” 40
Erenberg has argued that swing music from the bands of Count Basie, Benny Goodman,
Artie Shaw, and Charlie Barnet offered the youth culture a modern, cosmopolitan, and inclusive
community. The music of African Americans was often interpreted by white ethnic and Jewish
players from the pluralistic cities and danced to by a wide-cross section of youth from the
suburbs and beyond. When Iowa-born Glenn Miller became a sensation, the music of the city
became safe for Middletown. “HINTERLAND GOES HEY,” proclaimed a 1933 Variety
headline. As swing became ever more popular and the Depression let up slightly, the exciting
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nightlife of swing could be found in nightclubs in locales as unlikely as Salt Lake City, Omaha,
and Akron, where the music and its value system to be experienced socially and bodily. While
Douglas and Levine point to the radio – it was dance that was at the heart of the prewar youth
culture. 41
Swing’s African-American origins may explain its socially integrative properties.
Historian Joel Dinerstein has noted that music in West African societies is a public ritual that
attempts to synthesize a collective value system along with all elements of a society through
performance. In New York and other American cities, African Americans responded to the
metropolis in a similar fashion and developed swing, which synthesized, and according to
Dinerstein, humanized the heretofore alienating rhythms of the machine age. Fast, precise, and
loud, big bands held out the promise of an inclusive national or international culture. 42 It is
easier to understand why listeners and broadcasters sought live performances, not records, on the
air when one considers the social and physical requirements of swing.
Yet experience is fleeting and records and radio have held captive the emotional memory
of the swing era. Most Americans have at one time or another felt the pull of radio’s tribal drum,
and it is rather unsurprising that a nostalgic tradition dominates radio history. A declension
model remains the norm in the remembering of radio’s great social promise, with either TV
ending the “golden age,” or some combination of corporate entities and social fragmentation
radio’s ability to transcend barriers. 43 The lack of visual stimulation or group coercion, some
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argue, allowed listeners to imagine connecting to people to whom it was otherwise socially
forbidden. One wonders, however, if the warm memories of radio’s past obscured some
troubling aspects of aural communities and technologically mediated social behavior. The real
community around swing, rather than its imagined alternative in radio, seems more worthy of
admiration.

Commercial radio, audience, and self-expression

Writing in 1937, the unjustly forgotten advertiser Kenneth Goode dismissed radio’s much
ballyhooed social promise,

Five million radio listeners, rich and poor, campus and mill village, don’t spend the
evening together! That would bring out the National Guard. Maybe the Marines…
Exactly the same rivalrous clashes, oppositions, competitions, and conflicts that exist in
nation, state, county, town, neighborhood, family, continue shamelessly unchanged,
whether or not the same radio broadcast happens at any moment loosely to conjoin these
nations, states, counties, towns, neighborhoods, and families into shiftlessly
kaleidoscopic congregations. 44

For Goode, listening to similar radio programs did not extend or deepen social
connections, but this benign illusion had certain benefits. It was one of the factors causing what
he believed to be atomized individuals, whether out on isolated farms or in crowded cities, to
tune in and hear the ads he and his colleagues had written. Thus radio communities were
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commercially, rather than socially, useful and transformed listeners into consumers. The
offerings of familiar songs, delivered with regularity, and an occasional burst of excitement – all
carefully calibrated – could serve the diligent marketers of Depression-era America well.
The adoption of commercial radio did not become a reality until the after the
Communications Act of 1934. A number of not-for-profit stations and programs had proliferated
in the 1920s, and the debate over who should control the public airwaves and what sort of
imagined communities should be privileged grew more intense following Roosevelt’s election.
Many hoped Roosevelt would reduce commercial control over radio. Disunion among educators
and not-for-profit broadcasters combined with presidential indifference and skilful lobbying from
the networks, however, won passage of an industry-friendly Communications Act, leading to the
creation of a generally compliant regulatory body, the Federal Communications Commission. 45
Since its appearance, Americans had invested great hope in radio. Radio could be used
as a tool for cultural uplift, education, political transparency, and social unity. These dreams
would be brought to nothing if, as then-Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, observed, “a
speech by the President is to be used as the meat in a sandwich of two patent medicine
advertisements…”. 46 By the thirties, however, the powerful national networks were squeezing
out local stations with their sponsored programming, and those sponsors were adopting ever
more aggressive advertising methods. The public, by and large, had little choice but to accept
radio as entertainment and ads. As a result of increasing bigness in the industry, previously
anonymous local talent, studio bands and musicians, became less common on the dial, replaced
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instead by name stars from vaudeville and the recording industry, such as Guy Lombardo and
Bing Crosby. 47
Understanding the desires of an invisible “audience” became the holy grail of American
advertisers and broadcasters. The networks and Madison Avenue put massive resources behind
some of the brightest minds in social sciences, to unlock the answer to who the audience was,
what it listened to, and how could they could more efficiently cater to or exploit it. Douglas tells
the fascinating story of Paul Lazarfeld, and his unlikely journey from continental Marxist
intellectual to American corporate researcher by mid-century. 48 In the 1930s, Lazarfeld, along
with Hadley Cantril and Gordon Allport, inaugurated the first professional studies of the
psychology and sociology of radio listening. They brought with them a desire to improve
broadcasting, a skepticism of the current network system, and a faith that through better audience
research, theory, and analysis they could held radio reach its democratic, cultural, and social
potential. Their greatest accomplishments lay in their ability to identify and separate audiences
into any number of groups with specific and contrary interests and agendas. Lazarfeld became
the father of niche marketing.
After Cantril and Allport published The Psychology of Radio in 1935, radio audience
research entered a distinctly scientific phase in which audiences were parsed and cataloged into
discrete entities. Though their findings were of immense interest to marketers and the networks,
these researchers and writers articulated a consistent skepticism about the structure of America’s
for-profit radio system. From the Psychology of Radio through the Lazarfeld and Frank Stanton
edited Radio Research, these early audience researchers pushed for more sophisticated
programming and criticized what they identified as lowest common denominator broadcasting.
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The Lazarfeld group contained within it differences, but successfully cobbled together a picture
of radio’s potential that fit with New Deal suppositions. “Radio offers,” Edward Suchman
declared, “an opportunity to those listeners who cannot afford tickets to the concert hall… It is
with these underprivileged but educated listeners that radio music can hope to achieve its greatest
success.” 49
Lazarfeld knew the work he and his associates at the Institute of Social Research engaged
in would be used by business interests who gave little thought to improving the “life of a
community with forward looking economic and social projects.” 50 Nonetheless, like Levine,
Lazarfeld believed that business interests could never completely dominate radio, because the
medium resisted systematic and centralized control. Lazarfeld made the critical observation that
programming from a top-down model would be unacceptable for commercial radio because it
would be ultimately prove to be unpopular and listeners would not turn on their sets. Radio’s
power to reflect and magnify an often-insipid popular culture, however, tempered Lazarfeld’s
optimism for radio.
If the medium became a mouthpiece to the growing advertising culture that had taken
root not only in Madison avenue, but also in everyday language and life, radio listening could
damage society and alienate the individual. An advertisement was not just a clever trick, but “a
dangerous sign of what a promotional culture might end up with.” Citing a 1941 print
advertisement for a brewery that pictured a man throwing away a newspaper filled with
European war horrors and seeking solace in a beer bottle, Lazarfeld wondered, “What will be the
result if symbols referring to such basic human wants as that for peace become falsified into
49
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expressions of private comfort and rendered habitual to millions of magazine readers as
merchandizing slogans? Why should people settle their social problems by action and sacrifice
if they can serve the same ends by drinking a new brand of beer.” 51 Lazarfeld identified the
advertising rhetoric, as Daniel Boorstin would later, as a pervasive and antisocial form of
communication that was common not only in radio ads but in American public life generally. Its
ubiquity made the advertising rhetoric particularly difficult to transcend. 52
Lazarfeld continued his research after the war and in 1948 along with Patricia L. Kendall,
published the awkwardly titled Radio Listening in America: The People Look at Radio – Again.
As with earlier research, Lazarfeld and Kendall focus on the national radio audience as a
collection of discrete groups. They seem oblivious, however, to some of the major changes then
occurring in the medium, including, the effect of increasing airplay of recorded music, radio’s
growing mobility – particularly in cars – or even the potential impact of television. 53 The
authors expressed disappointment with radio broadcasts’ declining quality and exasperation with
the choices made by listeners. Casting about for solutions, Lazarfeld and Kendall cited the state-
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owned British radio model as a realistic alternative, an example of wishful thinking in the years
when the specter of “creeping socialism” had become a national bogeyman. 54
Lamenting that radio was moving away from its public mission and toward a vulgarized
marketplace filled with economic men, the researchers, made the depressing find that popular
music appealed not only to the comic book crowd but also to classical music aficionado. 55
Popular music, if not preferred by everyone, was not intolerable to anyone either. Though not
fans of the “hit tune” these clever academics identified a use for popular music. Playing
something on the order of “Jeepers Creepers” would hook large audiences and trick them into
receiving more culturally uplifting fare. Of course, the intelligent program manager would have
to carefully calibrate the mixture of the popular and the worthy. “The best thing for the
broadcaster to do is to keep the volume of educational broadcasts slightly above what the masses
want. In this way he may contribute to a systematic rise in the general cultural level without
defeating the educational goal by driving audiences away.” 56
The dishonesty inherent in Lazarfeld’s tactic is striking, and it shows how he had come
full-circle from his earlier denunciations of the advertising industry. Instead of hooking the
masses with inane popular music for the purpose of listening to an equally inane commercial for
chewing gum, Lazarfeld merely substituted some vague notion of uplift in the place of the
chewing gum spot. Suchman had articulated a similar notion in 1941, when he presented radio
as a gateway medium for the minority of educated but poor listeners. Suchman, however, never
advocated tricking these earnest seekers. He had confidence that the works would speak for
themselves. In a short span, the high hopes of the radio researchers had fallen into cynicism and
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imitation. The best for educators or concerned parties could hope for was to follow the lead of
marketers and assume what they are programming was a commodity intended for the mass man,
an alienated ignoramus whose vital facts could be summed up by a diligent statistician.
Like his University of Chicago counterparts, George Fisk at the University of
Washington identified radio in the late 1940s as failing in its mission and not connecting
listeners. Fisk, however, drew attention to radio’s increasing portability and its effect on the
imagined community of listeners as potential solutions to radio’s social shortcomings. Poor
ratings systems, more than anything else, concerned Fisk, who believed stations were confusing
mere “hearers,” with active listeners. A housewife who had a set turned on to provide
background noise to her daily chores, should not be considered “listening” in any meaningful
way, and should not be counted as a valid ratings point. 57 Listeners, in contrast to hearers,
actively imagined their aural surroundings. To make sure radio served its public mission, better
ratings systems were needed so that broadcasters could cater to listeners. This was hardly a
conclusion that would upset advertisers. Listening, Fisk argued, was a habit, one that followed
listeners outside of the home, into their cars and on portable radios for summer vacations.
Counting this wandering and often solitary listener was of greater importance than merely
counting all homebound sets currently in use. “Basic audience trends today rarely prove that
people are not listening, but rather that they are not at home, which might not mean the same
thing.” 58 As Todd Storz would later, Fisk sought ways to increase listening over hearing so that
radio would have a greater impact, and, most importantly, saw the growth audience as the one
that was on the move, exploiting radio’s newfound portability.
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Taken together, Fisk and Lazarfeld argued that radio stay should stay true to its function
as defined by the FCC: to operate in the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Though
Lazarfeld took a more dim view of the public’s desires, both believed that program managers had
a duty to avoid “slavish adherence to popularity ratings.” 59 Unlike the University of Chicago
research team who pondered whether Great Britain’s model of state ownership was superior to
American commercial radio, Fisk saw no fundamental conflicts between commercial
programming, the public interest, and effective advertising. “If radio commercials are directed to
the logical prospects,” Fisk wrote, “the buyer gets more for his advertising dollar, and the
salesman gets a bigger and steadier customer, and the radio audience gets more helpful,
informative advertising. Everyone benefits!” 60 Fisk, more so than Lazarfeld, caught the
American mood in the post-war era.
Prior to and more astutely than these public-minded observers, the advertiser guru Goode
anticipated the major themes that would come to define the postwar Top 40 format. He urged
advertisers and program managers to abandon traditional formats, which would allow radio to
become more effective at selling products to individual consumers. Smashing conventional
network radio wisdom, Goode gleefully declared as few as seven or eight songs of dubious
artistic merit, not big budget programming brimming with talented musicians, won enthusiastic
audiences. He disdained expert music directors as well as music-savvy sponsors. “However
much he pants for Fannie Brice or deplores Seth Parker, an advertiser who happens seriously to
seek large scale popularity… might better comprehend the American radio as a mechanism built
solidly on the favor of the Bible-buying and song-recognizing millions.” These mindless and
alienated millions formed undertow of fear in the Chicago researchers Radio Listening in
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America, but for Goode and later for Top 40 were a cause for celebration. Admonishing
program managers, Goode said, “Strictly speaking, no musical director… should be allowed to
select a musical program, any more than any unvulgarized art director should be allowed to
dominate an advertisement for the eye.” 61
Four fundamental contentions held Goode’s conception of radio together: one, radio
listeners tune in for companionship and therefore seek the familiar and the repetitious. Two,
radio is an aural medium and music programming should predominate. Three, that there are no
concerns that should extend beyond popularity. Four and most significantly listeners use radio
as a means of self-expression. Goode noted that the desire for self-expression in radio primarily
manifested itself through music appreciation. Listeners enjoyed their favorite songs not because
they spoke to them, but rather because they spoke for them. In this he comes near to Adorno,
who argued that popular music listeners appropriated the musical object they heard over the air
and identified with it through a process he termed “pseudo-individualization.” 62 Listeners felt
empowered when they recognized a song on the radio, and at some level came to feel that they
programmed the station. Lucky Strike’s popular “Your Hit Parade,” Goode observed, asked
listeners to guess the ranking of the top three current songs. The program received an astounding
5,000,000 responses a day. Goode concluded that this meant that listeners wanted to feel like
they were engaging with their old friend radio while simultaneously asserting their own
individual desires. 63
Network radio captured huge audiences in the thirties, but not all advertisers believed the
battle won. Goode saw commercial radio as a market largely untapped, employing a metaphor in
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which radio was a vessel in a wild sea in need of a headstrong captain. 64 In typical misanthropic
fashion, Goode attacked the average American as a bible-thumping, ignoramus, driven to
exhaustion by work and culturally stunted by lack of education. In this insult, however, Goode
unveiled the workings of radio’s ability to provide a sense of self-expression.

Busily engaged in the mechanics of pumping information and entertainment to millions
of our less lucky countrymen, most of us working at radio are likely to forget that… easy,
instant, and riskless… the radio does emotionally for America’s millions just what the
telephone and the automobile do mechanically. All three – automobile, telephone, radio
– have one thing in common: they provide self-escape into a bigger more interesting
world…. In a very different way, but for much the same basic human reasons, radio, the
most unrelenting unilateral audience suppressor the world has ever tolerated, has become,
in a fantastic reversal of the regularly to-be-expected, America’s accepted medium of
mass-produced self-expression. 65

In 1948, just before the sunset of network radio dominance, ABC introduced a new show
to involve its listeners in a version of mass-produced self-expression – and they responded by
shooting it to the top of the ratings. Stop the Music became a phenomenon by offering listeners
the chance to name top tunes – played by a live studio orchestra – and win large cash prizes. The
band would strike up a popular song, which could be interrupted at any moment by the host
yelling, “STOP THE MUSIC!” A lucky listener could then win thousands if he or she correctly
identified the song fragment. The combination of giveaways, hit songs, and occasionally
unpredictable but always likable hosts proved a winning combination. As to the reality of
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audience participation: winning a top prize in Stop the Music was a 1 in 25 million shot. People
tuned in for the imagined community and the illusion of self-expression. 66
At no point does Goode address the public interest, and its absence is conspicuous.
Goode would have heartily approved of “Stop the Music,” and he takes it for granted that radio
existed for commercial purposes, implying that self-righteous do-gooders and government
regulators have tacked on an unnecessary hurdle for effective advertisers and broadcasters who
were merely attempting to give the public what it wants. The lessons What About Radio
expounds (and Goode is an expert in repetition) would all be applied by Top 40 station owner
Todd Storz in Omaha and by his subordinates in cities across the nation.
Goode’s only short sight is significant. He did not discuss recorded music, except in a
brief aside that advertisers would be wise to ignore audience surveys that expressed dislike for
mechanical music. 67 Throughout, Goode, like his academic counterparts speaks of bandleaders,
on-air talent, and musicians. Radio was still alive and music an event for Goode. He did not
take his argument to its logical conclusion, which would be to dispense with the expensive talent
all together and let a perfect copy be played in skillful repetition.
During the era in which radio’s social capabilities, as noted by Levine, were so much on
display, Goode pointed to the individual listener and self-expression as the twin keys to
understanding and exploiting radio audiences. Both Goode and Levine believed the radio market
was segmented, but Goode dismissed any notion of radio as a transcendent medium that crossed
social and racial boundaries. Focusing on the individual, Goode’s saw into radio’s future, when
the sound coming over the air was no longer so much an invitation to an event, but a tease for
purchasing a record.
66
67

Eberly, Music in the Air, 168
Goode, What About Radio?, 22.

43

World War II, Technological Developments, and Television

World War II punctuates the forties, leaving behind two decades with a bloody
interregnum, and radio, as with many other aspects of American life, entered a period of
uncertainty following the war. The war was the apotheosis and swan song for swing. Glenn
Miller enlisted in 1944, and swing followed wherever the troops went. For many troops, the
excitement, the freedom, the sexuality, and sociability of swing neatly encapsulated the ideal
American Way of Life for which they were fighting. The most popular songs were not rousing
patriotic numbers, but sentimental hits, like “White Christmas,” which Bing Crosby introduced
in nightclub setting in the film Holiday Inn, and hotter swing songs. 68
In 1940, however, the court ruling forced the FCC to abandon its opposition to canned
music. The networks probably would have dropped their resistance anyway as bandleaders and
members of the popular swing groups were being called into the service. By the end of the war,
over half of the programming on radio was recorded. 69 Radio and request shows followed the
15 million American servicemen to war, usually providing them with canned music supplied by
the recording industry on unwieldy, 16-inch transcription discs. 70 Many soldiers, however, did
not request music, but instead asked to hear the sounds of home, asking for car horns, train
whistles, and other recorded sound effects. Radio possessed an uncanny ability to comfort. 71
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While soldiers fighting in Asia, Africa, and Europe sought solace in sound effects,
factory workers at home and in Britain were subjected to the first sustained use of Muzak.
Though the idea behind musical wallpaper had existed since the twenties, it took a war to
convince industrialists that control over the sonic environment could induce higher productivity
and could generate a happier, more compliant workforce. Peace did not end Muzak’s spread.
Sprouting in department stores and conquering dentists’ offices across the nation, Muzak
allegedly soothed frazzled nerves and put consumers in the mood for shopping. Sound engineers
employed the latest in high-fidelity technology to engineer a sonic product as unobtrusive and
uniform as possible. Their efforts marked some of the most sophisticated ever in studio
manipulation to shape sound, practices that would transform the postwar recording industry and
music making in general. Muzak’s phenomenal growth – from 800 subscribers in 1940 to 7,500
in 1949 attests not so much to its success in providing therapy or encouraging consumption, but
rather to an increasing awareness among Americans of the plasticity of recorded sound and its
ability to provide a complement to almost any activity. 72
The technological demands of fighting and winning World War II along with the
expanding post-war economy led to several innovations in recorded sound and radio that
America consumers accepted and made commonplace in the 1950s. The breakthrough of the
portable pocket radio, tape recording, the long player and the 45-rpm record, and especially
television, combined to give rise to the new audiences and the changing listening habits
associated with the Top 40 radio format. Though dominated by the big military-industrial giants
such as RCA and Raytheon, the recording industry temporarily broke asunder as the
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technological developments ended network radio dominance and ushered in a golden age for
small, independent record labels, as well as a new genre: rock and roll.
One of the key features of postwar sound was its portability, which allowed for
individuals to listen to music anywhere and often by themselves. The portable pocket radio had
been a dream of young boys since the early days of radio, a dream fed by comic books and
experience with crystal sets. Small, cheap crystal sets were a staple of the prewar Boy Scout set.
They were portable and many of the boys who built them naturally assumed that miniature radios
would soon be standard part of the consumer radio market. Small firms such as Western
Manufacturing in Kearney Nebraska satisfied the demand for radio toys, but major corporations
had less success. Portable radios entered the market in the 1920s, and consumers rejected them.
Cumbersome novelties, the radios most often served as gifts to high school graduates. The pretransistor portable had technical – mainly battery – issues that the inhibited its popularity. Even
so, before the arrival of the first transistors in mid-decade, Americans had bought over 15 million
portables, though few received sustained use. Perhaps more significantly, in addition to its
technical problems, the portable did not make sense in cultural climate of 1940s. Listening alone
in public on a daily basis would have been inappropriate and strange. As the Levine stories
indicate, radio’s social properties were quite string in the 1930s. The prewar listener would have
been likely to have dispensed information and gather fellow listeners than to shield himself from
them with headphones. 73 Listeners would have to learn how to listen alone before the portable
radio made sense.
The transistor solved battery issues, decreasing size and increasing battery life by a factor
of six, letting a listener go for up to 30 hours before buying replacing an “A” cell. An
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achievement of the best minds, with the best facilities, and a large cash commitment, the
transistor emerged along with a fantastic amount of media hoopla from the Bell Labs in 1948.
Its corporate backers and proud scientists predicted it would revolutionize the industry. The
revolution took awhile. Transistors were expensive, and consumers had little patience with or
interest in the brittle Texas Instruments, Regency TR-1. 74 American manufacturers took note
and remained dubious of the portable. For the portable to finally take hold required a change in
the buying power of the nation’s schoolyards, the advent of a new and controversial sound, and
the intrusion of Japanese firms – in particular Sony – to produce and successfully market a
device that American firms regarded as a toy. In the 1950s, the portable radio may have
remained a device of the young, but it was hardly a toy in terms of sales. By 1960, sales of
portables were in the millions, transistor radios in the hands and pockets of countless Americans,
many of them young and most of those tuned to a Top 40 station. 75
The durable high fidelity record constituted another technological development that
shaped postwar popular music. The innovations that led to “microgroove technology” along
with the replacing of shellac with vinyl gave birth to Columbia’s long-playing record (LP) and
RCA’s 45-rpm record. The two competing products allowed for high fidelity recording, which
artists such as Capitol’s Les Paul and Mitch Miller used to establish the record as the principle
musical object in the United States, and, with the LP, extended play up to fifteen minutes a
side. 76 For Top 40 and early rock and roll, the 45 would prove most important, but in the
listening habits of the nation, the LP would emerge as the ultimate victor in the overblown
“battle of the speeds.” The LP ran at 33 1/3 revolutions, and possessed the added bonus of three
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times as much music. The cheaper and more durable 45 had a playing time of around five
minutes, which made it perfect for jukebox operators, for radio stations interested in the top hits,
and for kids on a limited allowance.
In 1948 Columbia president Edward Wallerstein introduced the LP, and his rival at RCA,
General David Sarnoff, responded with the 45. In retrospect it appears that Sarnoff and RCA
were willing to write off the classical and emerging high fidelity audience to Columbia and its
long playing record, but Sarnoff supported the 45 because RCA executives discovered that the
most popular classical selections were almost all under 5 minutes. 77 Though Theodore Adorno
would have probably agreed with this business acumen and implication concerning Americanstyle music appreciation, RCA lost the classical music buyers (a much more significant market in
the 1940s and 1950s than in later decades), and was left with the singles and youth market. In
the 1950s, however, this proved to be the high-growth market. In 1949, as radio was beginning
to spin more and more records, teenagers reported a collective buying power of $6 billion. In
1949 full 64 percent of teenagers in urban areas had radios of their own. In the 1950s, teenage
radio ownership steadily increased, approaching 90 percent by the close of the decade. While
total sets-in-use declined during the same time period, ratings for music programming rose.
Popular recorded music was fast becoming the glue that would bind together the postwar youth
culture. 78
Television had the most immediate effect on post-World War II radio and in an indirect,
but very real way, popular music. Long in gestation and finally emerging after a Federal
Communications Commission’s mandated three-year freeze on station licenses in the late 1952,
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television replaced radio at the center of the American home and showed itself to be an
extremely effective tool for advertisers. A testament to television’s marketing power, the Hazel
Bishop cosmetics firm reported annual revenues in excess of $50,000 in 1950 when it bought its
first television ads. Two years later, the company took in $4.5 million. 79 National advertisers
moved their dollars to television, and famous radio personalities, from Bing Crosby to former
Nebraskan and KFAB announcer Johnny Carson, along with the not-so-famous but important
technical and management personnel, followed suit. Staggered by the twin blow of revenue and
personnel loss, total network radio ad sales plummeted from a high of over $133 million in 1948,
to a just under $55 million by 1955. 80 Average station revenue likewise fell from $246,000 in
1947 to $194,000 in 1953. Adding to network radio’s woes rise was the rise the number of AM
stations on the air, precipitated by an FCC decision. From 1945 to 1955 the number of radio
stations broadcasting in the United States more than doubled, from under 1,016 to 3,987. Not
only was there less money to be made because of television but also the competition for scarce
national advertisers had become fiercer. 81 Radio would either disappear or undergo a radical
transformation.
At the start of the 1950s Americans were still turning to radio for music, but radio had
undergone significant changes. As a result of the war and the insights of some broadcasters and
industry leaders, the medium had become increasingly receptive to playing recorded music. The
machines themselves were more portable, becoming standard features in automobiles and, by the
end of the decade, in the pockets of listeners. While transistor technology pulled radio out of the
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center of the home, television pushed. As a result, music became more mobile, more personal,
and more an adjunct to other activities rather than the center of attention. In this context, radio
was increasingly less important as a medium that accurately approximated a performance. The
musical experience became further removed from a performance and its normal social context.
The postwar era brought about an expanding American economy and an affluent society
that reflected these changes in radio in the musical marketplace. Prosperity opened up a world of
consumer goods, and records, especially cheap 45s, became integral elements in the lives of
many young Americans. A surge in birthrates would give the young people of the postwar era
demographic clout. A larger percentage of this cohort enrolled in and graduated from the high
schools, which provided them with a stronger sense of cultural separation. Their alienation
manifested itself in their aggregate radio and musical choices: Top 40 and rock and roll,
respectively. The move out to the suburbs increased privacy for millions of Americans, who
could now pursue a variety of entertainment options outside of the public realm, or in the case of
children, outside the eyes of their parents. The most successful radio format in the postwar era,
Top 40, embodied, exploited, and shaped all of these threads.
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Chapter Two
The Top 40 Format: Records on Radio and the Liberation of Sound

On one of his rare days off, Todd Storz enjoyed making the short drive from Omaha to
Offutt Air Force Base, the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, where the nation’s
nuclear strike force awaited orders to attack the Soviet Union. Before scanning the skies for
bombers, he would take out and switch on a tape recorder. The machine captured the shrieks and
rumbles from above, delighting the technophile Storz. 82 He was not alone in plane watching and
listening. Roger McGuin, later of the folk rock band the Byrds and writer of the Top 40 radio hit
“Eight Miles High” was likewise an airport regular. Plane watching also featured prominently in
the 1969 movie Easy Rider. In the famous opening scene, recording studio wizard and allaround eccentric Phil Spector arrives outside of the Los Angeles Airport to initiate a drug deal
with two heroes of the counterculture. 83 Planes, modernity, and sound formed a recreational
nexus for those at the cutting edge of postwar youth culture. For Storz, however, plane listening
was no idle amusement, but an opportunity to study the raw power of modern sound. His goal
was to translate some of what he taped to his stations’ signals. B. Mitchell Reed, a famous Top
40 disc jockey, claimed that good Top 40 stations possessed something that could be heard in
every sound produced in the radio studio, “…[T]here’s an indefinable ‘X factor’ for any
successful radio station… You can hear it by going up and down the dial, it jumps out at you.” 84

82

Ken Greenwood, an oral history interview conducted by Brien Williams completed under the
auspices of the Library of American Broadcasting University of Maryland Libraries, 2000, 30.
83
Easy Rider, dir. by Dennis Hopper(Columbia Pictures), 1969.
84
Ray Herbeck, Jr., “Reed’s Career Parallels Rock Radio Evolution,” Billboard, June 17, 1978.

51
Storz’s Top 40 stations jumped off the dial on radios located in cities across the nation, as
the format he created spread rapidly throughout the second half of the 1950s. Storz’s focus on
sound engineering took Kenneth Goode’s Depression-era ideas about the radio audience’s desire
for familiarity, repetition, and self-expression to their logical conclusions. Storz created a sonic
brand. The Top 40 sound was unique and the format demanded a fast-paced, hyperventilating
style, implying individuality and excitement. Storz standardized his product, so that no matter if
you found yourself in Omaha, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, or Miami, you could tune in to a
familiar Top 40 station. Finally, he dispensed with all on-air talent other than the disc jockey,
and slashed the playlists to under-40 records a week.
His efforts to create a unique sound unlike anything heard at a performance mirrored
record producers such as Spector. Understanding that radio was a companionate medium that
listeners experienced simultaneously, Storz’s stations sought to develop a sense of connection to
the disc jockey and among the audience members, especially young listeners. In an age that
associated with conformity in the popular memory, his stations, by virtue of sounding like
nothing else on the dial, offered listeners an easy opportunity for individuation. Storz firmly
believed that his focus on sound was the reason audiences preferred his stations to others. The
Top 40 format did not attempt to simulate a performance, and more than anyone who came
before him, Storz succeeded in identifying music as sound, separating it from a social
experience.
The aloof boss of Mid-Continent Broadcasting’s strategy appeared on the surface quite
simple. He broadcasted the most popular records over and over again. Following a period of
experimentation at KOWH in Omaha beginning in 1949, he and his “brain trust” of young and
energetic assistants discovered a formula and in the course of the next decade programmed a

52
string of stations across the country with devastating results for his competitors. With two
notable exceptions, the Mid-Continent stations achieved dominant audience ratings in their
respective markets. 85 As imitators struggled, some successfully others not, to duplicate Storz’s
winning formula, recorded sound swept across AM dials nationwide. Abandoning the traditional
radio practice of relying on sponsors or networks for programming, the new format restored
control to independent station managers. To determine those records that were actually popular,
Top 40 station managers used market research, local record sales, and call-in requests. They
then figured out the most effective arrangement in which to broadcast these surefire hits. For
Storz, Top 40 represented popular democracy on air, with no need for the Federal
Communications Commission to act on behalf of public interest. To his listeners and the lucky
radiomen he invited to join him, the format was alive and a breath of fresh air in an otherwise
stagnant industry.
By the end of the 1950s’ critics and admirers credited Storz’s low budget/high ratings
programming innovation with saving or ruining radio, encouraging delinquency, increasing or
decreasing the power of the disc jockey, and killing radio’s “golden age,” among other things.
What they missed, perhaps blinded by Storz’s uniform programming style and populist ethos,
was how his Top 40 format transformed postwar radio into a giant marketplace for the records.
As the week’s forty most popular records pushed out most other sounds, Americans were given a
chance, indeed thousands of chances, to peruse the latest offerings of the recording industry. As
in other aspects of postwar life, Top 40 offered Americans more things, in this case more
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recorded music. Top 40 liberated radio and even more than that, sound from the performance,
from face to face interaction, and Americans enjoyed or at least tolerated music in their cars, in
their shopping centers, in their bedrooms, and increasingly in spaces by themselves.
This chapter argues that taken together, the Top 40 format’s reliance on recorded music,
disc jockey personalities, record promotions, segmentation of the youth market, and larger-thanlife studio-synthesized sound removed popular music from its social context. Once removed
from the social obligations of a face-to-face interaction, music became more plastic, and listeners
gained greater power over the musical experience. The Top 40 format also assisted in creating a
common youth culture, founded in music listening and consumption, that was dependent upon
the imagined communities found in radio and on records. The Top 40 format encouraged
Americans to think of music as an individual commodity that was portable and available on
demand. In dong so, they reduced music to a sonic phenomenon.

Storz and Radio, Pre-KOWH

Storz was born into a prominent Omaha family that owned the regionally successful
Storz brewery. At eight, he constructed his first crystal radio set, probably made by a firm in
Kearney, Nebraska. By sixteen Storz was a licensed ham operator of W9DYG, and he spent
many nights in his parent’s home searching for distant call letters and, perhaps, kindred spirits. 86
After finishing high school at the prestigious Choate School in Connecticut, Storz returned to his
home state to attend the University of Nebraska. In Lincoln, he made a name for himself at the
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campus radio station first by building up the station’s technical capabilities and then by running
afoul with the FCC. This would become something of a pattern in his later career. According to
friend Bill Palmer, Storz extended the station’s operating range far beyond the federallymandated1 ½ mile radius. “Eventually, FCC agents came around to investigate. It seems the
‘little’ University of Nebraska station was knocking off a commercial station in Ohio.” Storz
entered service after only a year in school never to return. He joined the Army Signal Corps for
the duration of World War II and with the war over determined to make a career in
broadcasting. 87
Storz began his career in commercial radio following the end of the war, beginning a
rapid rise. At a small station in Hutchinson Kansas, he worked as a jack-of-all-trades, doing
everything from announcing to sweeping the floor. In 1947, he returned to Omaha, taking a
position at KBON. Back home, Storz exhibited iconoclasm as a disc jockey, refusing to play
bop and swing in favor of more popular records, telling irate fans that if they did not like what he
was playing, they could switch the dial. He moved up to the regionally powerful KFAB,
exchanging disc jockey duties for a position in the Omaha station’s sales department. His life at
this point resembled that of a typical young radioman: rootless and wandering. Storz moved
from station to station, finding poorly compensated jobs where available, always looking out for
better jobs in other towns. 88
Storz, however, unlike other radio gypsies, had access to capital. In 1949, a then twentysix-year-old Storz asked his father to put some family money behind his radio ambition. Perhaps
to convince his father of his determination and seriousness, Todd mortgaged a farm in Iowa for
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$20,000 and secured a $25,000 bank loan. The elder Storz agreed, putting up $30,000 of his own
money and in July of 1949, father and son formed the Mid-Continent broadcasting company.
Having long pleased the public with alcohol, the Storz family moved to music. The new
corporation purchased Omaha station KOWH, along with its FM partner KOAD for $75,000.
Few people owned FM receivers, and like the World Herald, Mid-Continent would use the
station only for simulcasting its AM broadcast. KOWH was daytime only and operated on a
relatively weak 500 watts. Recalling his days at the University of Nebraska, Storz began
working to improve KOWH’s technical capabilities. This time, however, he filed for an FCC
permit before upping the broadcast power to 1,000 watts. 89
Formerly owned by the Omaha World-Herald, KOWH was a consistent also-ran in the
local radio ratings. It had been a part of NBC and later a smaller network, winning some prizes
for educational programming but otherwise going unnoticed both within and outside Omaha. In
two years under Storz’s management, KOWH would claim the top spot in the Omaha market.
The station was the “new” KOWH, as disc jockeys constantly reminded listeners, and it became
a sensation in Omaha beyond. When Mid-Continent sold the station to National Review
publisher William F. Buckley for $822,500 in 1957, the Storzs’ Mid-Continent recorded a profit
of nearly $750,000 – ten times the original investment. 90 By that time, Mid-Continent had
moved on to bigger, more lucrative markets, and Storz himself was looking to relocate to Miami.
Radio, far from being a casualty of the television age, was dynamic and growing.

Top 40 antecedents
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In becoming the boy wonder of radio, Storz was not without some guidance. Some
independent radio stations did play recorded music continuously before Storz dubbed his
acquisition the “new” KOWH in 1949. The so-called “music and news” format predated Top 40
by two decades, having been pioneered at WNEW in New York City and WIND in Chicago
during the 1930s. Disc jockey Martin Block had been hosting WNEW’s “Make Believe
Ballroom,” since 1939. By the 1940s, the WNEW had refined its format and featured a wide
variety of recorded tunes, ranging from 300 to 400, played in long blocks interspersed with
regularly scheduled newscasts delivered by strong radio personalities who exhibited an
awareness of public service. 91 The disc jockeys at WNEW chose music according to their
individual tastes, and the records selected varied, depending on the disc jockey manning the
turntables. Instead of a relentless pursuit of popularity, management discouraged the playing of
some of the most popular and controversial music, including rhythm and blues. Station manager
Bernice Judis was responsible for the programming strategy, and when the more raucous rhythm
and blues records were moving up the charts in the 1950s she warned her employees,” Effective
immediately: No more screamers are to be played.” 92 The formula worked and WNEW after
World War II was winning the most competitive radio market in the country.
WNEW disc jockeys exercised an amount of control that would have been intolerable to
Storz, who made sure that that his disc jockeys’ sophisticated tastes never interfered with what
records they spun. 93 The promotions and giveaways made famous by Top 40 stations in the
fifties were likewise absent from the New York pioneer. WNEW was the most successful
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independent (no network affiliation) in New York both before and after television, thanks in
large part to the station’s belief that radio’s function “is to provide a background against which to
get up in the morning, eat breakfast, go to the office or do the chores at home. It is best filled by
intelligent programming on the music-and-news model.” 94 Storz agreed, but he believed that in
order to fully exploit the format, a more scientific and aggressive approach was required. Storz
and his stations convinced skeptical advertisers that consumers listened outside the home while
actively engaged in other activities, and he brought to these multi-tasking listeners a consistent
and steady formula.
Shortly after purchasing KOWH, Storz sent a subordinate to New York to study
WNEW’s operations. Upon returning to Omaha, Gaylord Avery advised Storz to remove all
network programming and transcribed music, which Storz did, first in Omaha and then in every
market in which he acquired a station. More than anything, Avery’s findings reinforced Storz’s
pre-existing beliefs. Two studies on local listening habits in the postwar era, both from the
University of Omaha, led Storz to the to the conclusion that the psyche of the radio listener was
such that the repetition of popular hits was the best way to achieve a large and occasionally
attentive audience. The University of Omaha studies paid attention to car radios, radio’s
portability, and the effect of television on music. Popular music programs, the studies suggested,
did not translate well to television. In the 1950s when millions of televisions were being sold
each year, the automobile offered an opening for the enterprising station owner looking for a
viable radio audience. Records provided a cheap way to deliver the desired musical product. 95
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For Storz, the listener did not come in a family unit – that was television’s domain – but was a
wandering road warrior whose companion was his favorite pop music station.
Industry legends emerged in the 1960s to explain Top 40’s birth, and though disputed by
the men closest to Storz, they remain compelling. As the one iteration of the story goes, Storz
spent an evening observing barflies at the jukebox. One by one, these men would make their
way to the machine, drop in a nickel and out would come that same song that had already been
played many times before. This went on until closing time; people spending their hard earned
money to hear a song they just heard minutes ago. At last the long-suffering waitress, her shift
ended, searched out from her tips a nickel, and dutifully fed it into the machine, and – to Storz’s
amazement – punched in the record she’s been forced to listen to all evening. 96 True or not, the
story shows how repetition, records, and jukeboxes influenced the development of KOWH.
The jukebox not only served as a model for Storz, but during the Depression years, the
machines had kept the recording industry afloat. In 1934, its first year of operation, the
Wurlitzer jukebox sold 5,000 units, five years later 30,000, and by the 1940s hundreds of
thousands of record spinning machines were in use, saving the struggling recording industry. 97
The old shellac 78 records had a short life span of 75-125 plays, and popular shifting popular
tastes shifted rapidly, so the successful jukebox operator needed to stay abreast of popular
culture and buy thousands of discs. 98 As jukeboxes spread, record sales surged, and this was
especially true in the post-war era. Record sales hit the $325 million mark in 1947, settled back

96

Armstrong and fellow former Mid-Continent employee Harold Soderlund dispute this story,
which appears in MacFarland’s book and has become a radio legend of sorts.
97
David Morton, Sound Recording: The Life Story of a Technology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004, 99-100.
98
Estimate of 78 lifespan comes from, Millard, America on Record, 202.

59
to a $250 million a year later, before beginning a long and steady upward ascent. 99 The years
are telling – in 1948 radio recorded its highest revenue ever – just as television was beginning to
appear in American homes. The jukebox had keyed the revival of the record up to this point –
radio would do so afterwards. Popular tastes would still be paramount, but individual
consumers, not the juke operator intermediary, would buy most of the records.
The music publishing industry and the recording industry watched the rise of the record
with horror and delight, respectively. Record sales were fast replacing sheet music sales as the
benchmark of musical success. Both Columbia artist and repertoire man Mitch Miller and the
rock and rollers he despised benefited from the record’s ascendance, while songwriters came
under pressure as sheet music sales declined. In this context, the disc jockey became a king
maker of sorts, feared but rarely ever respected. 100 The shift in the power from New York
songwriters to record companies appeared to Tin Pan Alley a disturbing prospect – maybe more
disturbing was that the most influential radio stations were also not in New York’s network
studios, but increasingly in exotic locals such as Nebraska and Texas. Just as rock would move
the musical center of the nation South, 1950s radio pulled it to the center. 101
Top 40s Midwestern origins in part explain its emergence. The networks, until ABC
began raiding the Storz stations for managers after 1956, remained willfully ignorant of the
industry’s altered landscape. In 1951, network executives in Mutual and NBC were making
vague and, for their affiliates, unconvincing declarations about “revitalizing” radio programming
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in the face of the television leviathan. 102 This they did not do. As late as 1956, NBC was
promoting – to their affiliates horror – obsolete programs that featured popular musicians “in
person” and “live music,” 103 bringing showers of criticism from industry observers. 104
Independents, far outside of the media centers, had the space to innovate and experiment.
Gordon McClendon, a Texas-sized version of Todd Storz who created his own Top 40 empire in
the 1960s, fumed that the problem with struggling radio stations was that “they’ve been pushing
down the network lever so long, they’ve lost the spirit to do anything! The fact is, there is better
radio in the hinterland than in New York or Los Angeles.” 105 As the network programming fell
apart in the 1950s radio stations in Midwest turned America on to the record.
New York and especially Los Angeles would come to imitate the hinterlands, temporarily
reversing a long-established mass media dogma. Storz’s Minneapolis chief, Steven Lubunski
was lured away to New York and ABC in 1956, and in 1958 KFWB became a phenomenon in
Southern California by changing management and going to the Top 40 school. 106 The new
managers fired much of the staff and imported personnel from Top 40 stations. B. Mitchell
Reed, the station’s featured disc jockey, avoided the axe, and after the programming sea change
learned the Top 40 format from three of the newly imported Texas disc jockeys. “It had evolved
in the Midwest and this was the first any of us had ever heard of it,” he told Billboard in 1978.
“For every hour on the air, we had Top 40 schooling… It was tight, fast… [I]t meant knowing
exactly what you were going to say over an intro or the outro into your spots. And we used the
102

William Fineshriber, “AM and TV – To Each Its Own,” Variety, Jan. 3, 1956, 108; Niles
Trammell, “Formula for Future: Change,” Variety, Jan. 3, 1951, 111.
103
Advertisement, Broadcasting, Telecasting. July, 1956.
104
Dick Pack, “Poor Richard (Pack’s) Almanac, Being some Random Reflections on Radio and
Television and The Day After Tomorrow,” Variety, Jan. 4, 1956, 144.
105
“The Storz Bombshell,’ Television Magazine, May 195786.
106
Dick Lubunski, An Oral History Interview Conducted by Phil Eberly Completed under the
Auspices of the Library of American Broadcasting University of Maryland Libraries, 1996, 13.

61
Robert Orbin joke book for a lot of one-liners.” Though corny and mechanical, Reed claimed he
welcomed the new style that transformed him from an improvising but sloppy jazz jock to a Top
40 “craftsmen.” He learned how to communicate to the new radio audience, which Reed
assumed was younger than he was. Reed would eventually surpass his masters. In the late
1960s, he emerged as a celebrated FM disc jockey playing extended album cuts to that decade’s
altered youth audience. 107 Learning and being able to properly deliver the top hits was an
arduous process that required discipline to maintain a familiar yet exciting on-air persona.

KOWH – pioneer in repetition

KOWH created and refined the Top 40 format through research and experimentation.
Initially under Mid-Continent, the station broadcasts featured an hour of recorded classical
music, an hour of popular music, followed by another hour-long block of a different genre. The
idea was simple, play music that appealed to every listening group. The first year of operation
yielded a profit of $84. 108 That was unacceptable, and Storz and his lieutenant George “Bud”
Armstrong spent the next year, more or less successfully, attempting to figure out how to best
judge popular tastes and run a station as efficiently as possible. Lee Baron worked at KOWH in
1951, and remembers Storz and engineers “dickering around with [a jukebox] so it would play
records continuously…” 109 Storz eventually abandoned the goal of a fully automated station as
impractical, though the dream remained ever in his mind, guiding his efforts in Omaha and
beyond.
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Gauging popularity was difficult, but KOWH began moving toward a formula that
worked. Charts were poor indicators, and Storz did not want to try and break records – a dubious
undertaking at best. Instead, he and Armstrong relied on about seven or eight local record stores
to report sales of new albums. After some arm-twisting, Armstrong convinced jukebox
distributors to provide lists of coin returns. The receipts gave a Storz a reading on the Omaha
popular recorded music market and represented a major coup that consistently allowed the
station to outmaneuver its competitors. Nationally, KOWH remained wary of the trade
publications, but Storz did follow and for a time rebroadcast, the influential syndicated show
“Your Hit Parade.” According to Armstrong, national charts were only used as a reference to
see whether Omaha’s tastes tracked with the rest of the country. They usually did. 110
Storz added another key element to the format in 1951, when he hired popular disc
jockey Sandy Jackson away from Omaha’s KBON, a station at which Storz had once worked.
The Jackson hire was the first of many in which Storz lured young, dynamic on-air talent and
technical personnel to join his new operation. Jackson transferred his popular call-in request
show to his new home and ratings followed. As a daytime only KOWH had to find audiences
outside the youth market when children were at school. The likeable Jackson represented a way
into one major daytime audience. “He was the type that appealed to the housewives, you know,”
former KOWH employee Bob Sticht claimed, “and he had a fifteen minute segment of his show
at eleven o’clock called ‘Sandy Jackson the Grocery Boy’ and he did all the recipes, you know,
and they had sponsors of grocery stores and food products.” 111 Ever anxious to convince
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nervous advertisers that Top 40 appealed to more than just a youth audience, Storz went to great
lengths to document the presence of housewives in his audience.
Storz expanded upon the show and factored the records Jackson spun with a second list
of the top ten songs. Using this base of requests, record store receipts, and jukebox statistics, the
station began to play a base of around 20 songs in repetition mixed in with their regular music
library of pop standards. The evidence pointed to an inverse relationship between audience won
and number of records played. Despite Storz’s findings about the appeal of straight pop, KOWH
continued to play big band music, which had vacated the charts years ago, along with other
genres. Storz had not wholly committed to popular music and repetition. In 1952 KOWH had
become a hit in Omaha, but was not yet a true Top 40 station. 112
A review of the Friday program line-up from 1949 to 1955, when the format had been
more or less refined, reveals that dropping programs such as “Back to the Bible,” did not happen
immediately. The religious staple had a 10 a. m. to 10:30 slot – housewife time in the industry –
in the fall of 1950, before falling to 6:30 a year later, and was not totally dropped until 1952. By
1955, even “Make Believe Ballroom” and “Your Hit Parade,” programs that had inspired Storz,
vanished, having been replaced by local disc jockey shows. 113 In late 1951, the station had
established itself as a competitive in the Omaha market, capturing first place in audience share
some of the time. By 1953, despite its limitations as a low-wattage, daytime only independent,
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KOWH firmly entrenched itself as the number one station in Omaha. 114 In 1956, a dominant 39
percent of Omaha radio’s tuned in – a staggering figure for any station. 115

Refining the format in the Big Easy and Beyond

The term “Top 40” did not exist until 1953, when Storz’s Mid-Continent Broadcasting
company purchased and revamped a small New Orleans station for a mere $20,000. 116 WTIX
faced an entirely different challenge than did KOWH. New Orleans was larger than Omaha and
contained a more racially and ethnically diverse population, facts that simultaneously concerned
and excited the young Storz, who was anxious to see if his formula could work outside of its
Midwestern context. “That city is at least 50 percent Negro,” Storz told Television Magazine in
1957, “and there are large French and Hillbilly populations. Yet the pattern is working there on
our WTIX. We are operating successfully in the most diverse of markets.” 117 Storz was
unconcerned that New Orleans also offered many other entertainment options, especially live
musical ones with a distinctive regional identity. He understood that radio in the post-war era
was not a substitute or an approximation for a lived social experience: he was not in the business
of creating make-believe ballrooms. The record was the experience, and he was keenly aware
that a national demand for recorded popular music existed. There was a market, young and

114

The Development of the Top 40 Radio Format, 165.
Ibid., 164-69. The numbers for audience share by year for KOWH are as follows: 1949, 4.4
percent, 1950, 20 percent, 1951 45.2 percent, 1956. 39 percent. By 1956, KOIL, a rival Omaha
station that operated day and night had successfully adopted the Top 40 format and emerged as a
consistent challenger for the number one spot there, eventually overtaking KOWH in 1957.
116
“New Orleans Station Bought by Omahans,” Omaha World Herald, Aug 6, 1953.
117
“The Storz Bombshell,” Television. 88.
115

65
mobile, that was busily, if unwittingly, transcending regional boundaries through their listening
styles and radio station preferences.
WTIX won the battle for the New Orleans market by instituting some of the changes
made in Omaha: calling itself “the New WTIX,” using promotions and giveaways, cutting all
network connections, and by inaugurating one innovation that was not entirely novel: ending the
week with a countdown of the top forty hits. The New Orleans ratings leader, WDSU, already
broadcast a top twenty-countdown show in between soap operas. Always watching the local
Hooper ratings, station manager Armstrong recognized that the music got a much bigger
audience than the soaps, and decided that if twenty songs could be popular, for songs could be
two times so. 118 With twenty extra songs, WTIX’s countdown came on earlier and ended later
than its rival, giving the station a progressively larger audience each week. 119
The hits countdown formed the bedrock of records played throughout the week with
minimal additions or reversions to older pop standards. The average song length rarely exceeded
two and one half minutes, and the format policy dictated the disc jockeys play week’s number
one hit record at the top of every hour. By 1956 WTIX and other all Storz stations, including the
10,000 watt regional giant WHB in Kansas City, adopted a similar programming strategy, adding
at most ten songs to the Top 40, throughout the week. 120 Though WTIX and WHB, purchased in
1954, were responsible for refining the classic Top 40 format, Storz said “the basic ingredients of
success in our operation were cast in the die years ago as the tastes in radio listening began to
118
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change in the immediate post-war period,” and that the experience in Omaha at KOWH was
essential. 121
The format spread through the acquisitions of the four main Top 40 owners: Storz,
McClendon, Gerald Bartell, and Plough Pharmaceuticals Inc., but even within this group Storz
was preeminent. He was the first, and his stations instructed the others, particularly McClendon
and Plough. Similar to New Orleans, the Memphis market in which Plough operated WMPS
possessed a wealth of musical talent both on record and in person. WMPS manager George
Plumstead along with a group of Plough personnel made a pilgrimage out to Storz’s WHB in
Kansas City. The Plumstead group listened to the sound of the station and his subordinates
asked a series of endless questions about playlists, charts, and other Top 40 essentials. When
they returned, the managers reprogrammed the station and instant success followed. Plough
would reformat its other four stations within months. 122
All group owners, despite various programming differences, shared the format’s basic
tenets. First and most important was the limited playlist. 123 Forty records was an
approximation, but generally stations did not exceed this number and tended to stay below it.
Disc jockeys did not choose the records that went on the playlist. The program manager made
all playlist selections, determining the audience’s desires, based on available charts and surveys.
This could be hard bargain for some disc jockeys to accept, as Armstrong recognized when he
told his related a favorite dictum, “About the time you don’t like a record, mama’s just beginning
to hum it. About the time you can’t stand it, mama’s beginning to learn the words. About the
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time you’re ready to shoot yourself if you hear it one more time, it’s hitting the Top Ten.” 124
Though not active in programming, the disc jockey was to exhibit a distinctive “personality,”
revealed in short bursts of chatter about the record, news, weather, listener call-ins, or station
promotions. He provided the bridge between the songs and the commercials – which consumed
18 minutes of every hour – pushing the broadcast on at a breakneck pace.
Commercials, to be sure, were the reason for the relentless focus on audience, and were
well represented on all Top 40 stations. Top 40 disc jockey Bob Sticht remembered spinning
altered records, called “shorty tunes.” Engineers created a shorty tune by deliberately shaving
precious seconds, sometimes over a minute, off of a song. Shorty tunes allowed the station to
sell more advertising, and to trick listeners into thinking they were hearing more music. Sticht
said that when Top 40 stations received a song over three minutes in length, it went to the
production room for choice edits. 125 In a way, almost everything on the Top 40 station was a
commercial, the songs advertised for the recording industry and the various recorded jingles did
the same for local businesses.
The one exception to the commercialized broadcast came in the Top 40 treatment of
news. Descended from the music and news format, Top 40 upped the excitement on the news,
having disc jockeys shout the AP headlines over the air at 5 to the hour, adding whatever
Hollywood gossip, local scandals, and weather developments available and that time allowed.
Top 40 stations became known for doing local spot news, which was cheap and easy, covering
accidents and crime. Storz’s stations regularly made the news for their own activities. In one
memorable incident, a KOWH employee was outfitted Dick Tracey-style with a watch recorder.
He went incognito to illegal gambling clubs where some of the city’s most powerful men played.
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A minor scandal ensued that was quickly forgotten, but the news stories on Storz’s penchant for
controversy and willingness to pose as an adversarial station remained in minds of young
listeners and sponsors. Above all, Storz wanted to keep the sound fresh, or as fresh as a limited
playlist allowed. 126

Record companies, Rock, Race, and Top 40

The synergy that developed between Top 40 radio, the recording industry, and local and
national distributors was essential to both the success of the new format and in altering the
nation’s musical expectations. WTIX, like other Storz stations employed record giveaways to
demonstrate to the recording industry the vast and unusually responsive and loyal audiences his
stations held. Smart record labels, including many newly established and upwardly mobile ones,
worked closely with Top 40 stations to plug their product. When independent record label
Atlantic’s rhythm and blues star Chuck Willis released the long playing album “The Late Chuck
Willis,” 127 WTIX program director Johnny Barrett chose the song “My Life” and had his jocks
give it the single treatment, making the record the station’s “Pic Hit” of the week. The station
offered to give away 30 free LPs to selected listeners. Enthusiastic listeners inundated the station
with over 16,000 letters. The overwhelming response induced Atlantic to release the song as a
45-rpm record. As a favor to the station, the label invited WTIX to be involved in the disc’s
subsequent promotion. Soon WTIX disc jockeys and local distributors were out at record stores
hawking the product. 128
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As much as the above example demonstrates how record labels and radio were
interconnected in the postwar era, it also illustrates the power of the disk over performance.
WTIX and Atlantic were not trying to promote a star or stoke expectations of an upcoming
Willis performance. As the album title makes clear, Chuck Willis would not be performing “My
Life” again in this one. The record was not intended to be a pretend performance. It existed in
its own right, and was to be enjoyed on the listener’s terms.
Seeing the success of chart reading Top 40 stations and hoping to cash in, department
store giant (and soon to be nationally recognized for its segregated lunch counters) Woolworth’s
began to use Top 40 station prognosticators to choose which records they should stock. In
Dodge City, Kansas, disc jockey Ernie Forrestor not only programmed KGNO, but by late
summer of 1958, was telling Woolworth manager Jim Houle where and how to display each of
the best-selling 75 albums, many of which undoubtedly included African American performers.
Forrestor went even further, asking his listeners to guess which would be the top album of the
week – the winner of the contest would get free Elvis Presley Dog Tag Jewelry. The rock hero
recently turned GI was off in the Germany, not as far away as Willis, but always as close as a
radio or record player. 129
With the most popular records now at Woolworth’s, young, white Americans had an
easier time purchasing the latest rhythm and blues and rock and roll releases. Rhythm and blues
had been growing in popularity among white youth since the early 1950s. The African American
style was similar to the blues, but featured a more upbeat and electrified sound. Perhaps in a nod
to its growing popularity outside of African American circles, Billboard in 1949 changed its
classification for these records from “race” to “R&B.” Early-fifties jukebox operators were the

129

“Woolworth Store Orders From the Cash Box Top 75 Chart,” Cashbox August 23, 1958, 21.

70
first to notice the rising demand for R&B. Astute disc jockeys soon followed and, by 1954, at
least 700 of disc jockeys across the nation devoted all their airtime to the rising style. 130
Distributors of R&B records wanted to take advantage of this increased exposure and their wares
began appearing in the farther reaches of suburbia, as Billboard pointed out, “Where it was
previously necessary for a teenager to go out of his immediate shopping neighborhood and buy a
rhythm and blues recording, it is now the neighborhoods that are adding to their coffers thru
stocking r&b records…”. 131
In this instance, Top 40 acted as an integrating force, putting black performers’ records
on the air and introducing new styles to white adolescents. The old radio dream of a national
community that transcended race, class, and region seemed possible. The fact that the music was
now offered outside of black record stores, however, meant that affluent white youth had less
reason to venture outside the suburbs, making physical, face-to-face contact less necessary.
Instead this imagined community offered imagined integration via radio and recorded music.
Top 40’s success and the popularity of R&B and later rock records caught the
mainstream and industry press off guard, and both were quick to denounce or dismiss radio and
youth music styles. From 1954 through 1959 the press sounded multiple death knells for blackinspired rock and its disc jockey enablers. Headlines from the era stand out as evidence of angry
confusion, “Rock and Roll Runs into Trouble: More Youngsters Ignore that Primitive Beat (Is it
a passing fad?),” asked The New York Daily News. The integrating possibilities of Top 40 and
recorded music featured prominently and The Daily News gave a surprisingly positive
assessment of the North Alabama White Citizen’s Council’s efforts to ban rock and roll from
130
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jukeboxes. The industry, out of step with a changing market, initially came out as anti-rock, but
showed a bit more measure in its ambivalent accounts that weighed potential profitability against
impending social breakdown, acknowledging that “BIZ BIG BUT SO ARE KIDS RIOTS.” 132
The big biz, the industry assumed, would remain. The riotous kids would calm down pass, and
Rosemary Clooney would assume her rightful place amongst the popular music best sellers.
Some of the industry’s problems with rock and roll had to do with the prominence of
independent record labels in its early success. A single could be financed by as little as $1,000.
The independents were usually closer to popular tastes, but the majors deep pockets helped them
recover. They offered big money contracts and lure away artists initially discovered by the
independents. Elvis leaving Sun for RCA is the most obvious example of this. The major labels
also bought rock songs made famous by black artists to be re-recorded by white ensembles. 133
Some radio stations passed on original hits, opting to wait for the inevitable cover versions
featuring white musicians signed to major labels. This made station’s lest susceptible to
criticism in areas where groups such as the North Alabama White Citizen’s Council held sway.
Even with the racist animus working against youth music and black musicians and, implicitly,
the independent labels that produced the records, the majors lost ground. From 1948-51, Victor,
Columbia, Decca, and Capitol placed over 75 percent of the hits, but from 1954-58, the majors’
hold on the hits had fallen to 36 percent as 3,000 or so record labels crowded the field. 134 Partly
because of the success of local, Top 40 radio stations, small, independent record companies
enjoyed a golden age in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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Top 40, along with the 45-rpm record, made the boom in independent recording a
possibility and the two fed off of each other’s growth. Small, local stations with no network
affiliation were much more willing to play an independent record – if it showed any potential –
than were nationally programmed networks. Regionally popular independent rock musicians,
such as Kansas’ the Bluethings, could count on Storz-owned Oklahoma City’s KOMA’s 50,000
watts helping to promote their singles. 135 Focused on their own markets, local stations aided
some regional artists while simultaneously contributing to the growing national popularity of
rock and roll records.
The connection between the independent boom and Top 40 can be seen in the movement
between the two businesses. Sam Phillips was a disc jockey before he became the Sun Records
chief, and Bill Haley, of “Rock Around the Clock” fame, left radio for rock and roll stardom.
The life of the independent record owner, traveling on tight budgets with a trunk full of records,
trying to convince program managers and jocks to give their product a chance, replaced the song
jobber of an earlier era as the archetypal music huckster. 136
The independent spirit associated with rock and roll comes in part from its business
history but more from its interracial musical roots. This musical heritage made some stations
wary of it. Tom Clay, a Buffalo New York jock, remembers that managers at WWOL did not let
him play songs recorded by black artists, forcing him to wait until the inevitable white cover
version came out, a practice that was not uncommon in the 1950s. 137 Race music, however, had
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become a more accepted part of the postwar era radio for a variety of reasons. In 1941 ASCAP
songs were taken off the air during dispute over royalties, and to fill the void, radio created their
own licensing company Broadcast Music Incorporated. Lacking big name songwriters, BMI
focused instead on country western and African American artists who had been ignored by Tin
Pan Alley. Though ASCAP songs were back in a short time, the damage had been done, and by
1950, BMI songs dominated the airwaves, which made it possible for more African American
records to be heard. 138
Susan Douglas has argued that heroic white disc jockeys, such as Alan Freed and Murray
the “K” Kaufmann, helped integrate the airwaves but that the commercially safe Top 40 format,
by limiting disc jockey choice, stifled pop music’s integrating force. 139 Douglas’s interpretation
ignores the fact that Top 40 emerged simultaneously with the era’s hero-jocks and that the
allegedly sterile Top 40 stations, by and large, spun many of the same records. The hero disc
jockeys did not prefer rock and roll – most listened to jazz – but like Storz played what he
believed the audience demanded. Even WWOL in Buffalo eventually gave in to the charts and
allowed Clay to play the most popular records, whether the musician was white or not. Again,
the capitulation at WWOL to popularity was not unique. If anything, Top 40 and the AfricanAmerican owned Motown label pursued similar goals – both sought the largest audience and in
the process played or produced recorded music that crossed racial boundaries. 140
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Cultural pressure did exist, however, and embattled disc jockeys were subject to payola
charges and potential jail time. Even the wildly popular Murray the K took pains to present
himself as an enemy of out-of-control teenagers and a friend of authority figures. In one of the
more transparent efforts to deflect growing hostility to rock and roll, Kaufmann, television’s
Dick Clark, and a host of other popular disc jockeys began a collection to send underprivileged
New York City youth to screenings of Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments. 141
Storz gave little thought to the social consequences of his programming strategy; he was
not in the business of “uplift,” whether it be sending kids to Biblical cinematic epics or in
squelching the careers of black recording artists. His stations spun any and all popular records
on demand. 142 Again and again, Storz maintained that his methods generated the audiences
advertisers sought by playing the records the public desired. The charts and the carefully
constructed formulas dictated the broadcast, not aesthetes, hyperventilating parents, or
segregationists. In response to his critics, Storz claimed that if Chinese music suddenly appeared
high on the charts, he would be the first to broadcast it, and most likely in heavy repetition. 143
Storz’s commitment to the market put record buyers at the controls of his stations at the
same time that the average age of the record buyer fell. Top 40 was immediately connected to
the emerging youth market, and helped popularize one of the era’s most important cultural
artifacts; the 45 rpm record. Storz’s success showed that a new market that was national in scope
existed for Top 40 radio. His stations along with the Top 40 stations of his competitors would be
central in the cultivation of the youth culture that grew up around postwar radio.
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Sound Alone: Music as Sonic Commodity

Rock and roll’s propulsive, electric sound made for exciting listening and broadcasting,
leaving a mark on the employees who manned the turntables in the format’s early days. “KOMA
had this big 50,000 watt transmitter,” former program manager Deane Johnson said, “and our
studios were there sitting at the transmitter and when you’re playing a rock song that thing was
pounding and the lights would go with the music, sort of like a strobe.” 144 Storz employees
down the line – most of them young men – shared Johnson’s feelings that they were part of
something new and exciting. To Storz this was not a happy accident but the result of a conscious
strategy to capture for radio distinctly modern sounds and broadcast them.
Unlike the roaring jets that fascinated him, Storz’s management style was quiet – he
listened. Dick Lubunski who ran Storz-owned WDGY in Minneapolis described his boss as
hands-off, with exception to the station’s sound.

If he came to town, he would usually come a day or two ahead of when you though he
was coming and he would do listening, careful listening, and then you would say, ‘Oh
Todd, I didn’t know you were here.’ ‘Yeah,’ he said, ‘I’ve been listening. What’s the
matter with you guys? You don’t have any promotions going and you’re playing all the
wrong music… He was interested in the product. 145

One of the reasons Lubunski might not have known Todd was in town was that he
preferred to show up unannounced and check into a hotel room, where he could spend all day
listening to radio, analyzing all the stations on the dial. 146 Storz sitting alone in a hotel room
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like a Cold War era spy with a wiretap reveals much about how he conceived of his audience and
his employees. He knew, as studies showed, most people listened to music at home – and from
his actions it appears he believed they listened alone. He knew too that a simple turn of the dial
could spell ruin for his station, and with more and more Top 40 outfits going on the air (a
reformatted for Top 40 KOIL would overtake KOWH in Omaha in 1957), Storz’s obsession to
distinguish his station’s sound should not be surprising. His method of doing this amounted to a
form of sympathetic listening. Sequestered in a non-descript room, one of the creators of the
youth culture tried to place himself in the environment of his audience. Alone and with great
variety of sonic options, Storz searched the ether for the jet-airplane sound that would jump off
the dial and call him into communion with his fellow listeners.
Following linguist Walter Ong, a group of anthropologists, historians, and ethnographers
have argued that the sonic experience tends toward the participatory, the social, and the
ritualized. Summarized broadly, this group maintains that whereas sight and reading encourage
an analytical and objective detachment, sound and music involve the listener and require active
participation. 147 Responding to the postmodern and McLuhnian contention that modernity
represented the triumph of the visual sense and the ever-present “gaze,” the literature on sound
turns the focus to the ear as the forgotten sense of the modern world and as one that provides a
link back to pre-modern and oral ways of knowing. The literature tends to, although with
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endless caveats, bestow upon sound connective and utopian qualities that can counteract the
allegedly separating and oppressing nature of vision.
Storz endeavored to create a certain kind of oral community in Top 40 by harmonizing
his station’s sound with that of the records that were defining the emerging youth market and
culture. The sound was not pre-modern but hypermodern, electric and fast-paced. Storz and his
chief engineer, Dale Moudy engineered a device from a Hammond organ that created a reverb
effect similar to the echo sound heard on early rock records, 148 such as Elvis Presley’s Sun
recordings. The device gave the Storz-owned station and its announcers a booming voice, and,
at the time, a unique, identifiable sound no matter what they were saying. In addition to
homemade innovation, Storz purchased cutting edge equipment to make his auditory dreams
realities, and his stations replaced the old 78s with 45s faster than did their network counterparts.
Friend and advertising representative Harold Soderlund described Storz as “an engineer at
heart.” 149 In this respect, he was similar to Elektra’s Jac Holzman or A&M Record’s Herb
Alpert, postwar record company executives who used technical skills, sensitive and sympathetic
ears, and business acumen to build and then transform small record companies into industry
giants.
Running a Top 40 operation in the 1950s and early 1960s required an engineer’s skills, as
the station had to produce most of the sounds outside of the actual records they played. The
stations recorded the jingles, advertisements, and public announcements in house. Acetate discs
by virtue of wearing out quickly and demanding constant re-cutting, gave to Top 40 stations a
freshness that unionized network affiliates lacked. The engineering-minded Storz and the other
Top 40 group owners were known for their willingness to invest in the latest technology, and
148
149

Author interview with Richard Fatherly 6/14/2006
Radio’s Revolution and the World’s Happiest Broadcasters, Fatherly, 1998.

78
they were among the first to switch tape cartridges, which unlike acetate discs lasted for years
before wearing out and could be erased easily and re-recorded. Ironically, this improvement
tended to freeze in time the sound of the Top 40 stations. 150
The sound of the records and of the station itself connected Top 40 listeners in an
exciting, modern, and fast-paced imagined community. Unlike a performance, physical
interaction was unnecessary among the audience or between the audience and the disc jockeys.
Walter Ong has argued that the electronic media, though they seem to resurrect the intimacy of
orality, can be more accurately understood as offshoots of literacy. Ong used the example of a
town crier versus a pamphleteer in distinguishing oral communities from literate ones. The crier
connects the audience by the sound and space they share, while a group given pamphlets bows
their heads in silence and reads on their own, at their own pace, listening to their own voices in
their own heads. The pamphlet audience read, and Top 40 radio listeners heard, as individuals,
and the sounds like the words of the pamphlet are portable. 151 Though simultaneous, the radio
listener hears alone and in this mind imagines the community to which he belongs. The
performances that constituted most prewar broadcasts could never repeated and implicitly
encouraged the audience to social behavior. The communal sounds over Top 40, however, were
available for individual consumption at the local record store and encouraged a very different
sort of behavior.
Storz’s ability to distribute a salable modern sound led him, predictably, to dabble in
recording. Unlike Holzman, Dick Clark, Herb Alpert or other successful independent record
producers of the era, Storz was not enthralled with artists or the creative process. He was known
for making fun of musicians, and looked down on the work that went into making the hit records
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that his stations popularized. 152 In a 1959 attempt to diversify Mid-Continent, Storz made feelers
into the recording business. Apparently inspired by the runaway success of Alvin and the
Chipmunks, Storz purchased the master for the single – “Deck the Cage With Boughs of Holly,”
by Parakeet and Canary, and had his stations test the album, Tweety and Sweety. The record did
about as well as one would expect a novelty would, and Storz never made a name for himself
producing musicians or their cartoon birds equivalents. 153 He was much better at programming
records and working with sound than he was programming artists.
The Top 40 sound represented an achievement in planned spontaneity that focused the
listener’s attention solely on the auditory experience at the expense of the visual or social.
Partnered dancing, which had been central to youth culture in the prewar era, declined as the new
listening styles associated with Top 40 and records colonized the youth culture. The decline in
partnered dancing, however, underscores the ways in which the young consumers were not
conformists of the mold feared by critics of mass culture. The songs, if one purchased the
record, were received and interpreted alone or in peer groups and sparked a more intense and
personal relationship between listener and music. Listening and even dancing became individual
activities as the social requirements and obligations associated with a live performance faded.
The later fragmenting of the popular music and rock music genre into a bewildering array of
subgenres follows directly from the methods of listening and appreciating Top 40 radio.
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Chapter Three
Communities of the Top 40: The Post-war Youth Market, Audience, and Culture

A year to the day after the 1952 “Flood of the Century” struck Omaha, Todd Storz’s
“new” KOWH broadcast emergency orders sandwiched between field reports of a swiftly
overflowing Missouri River. Switchboards jammed and earnest volunteers crowded City Hall.
An outraged Nurses’ Association demanded to know why the city had not called them to duty.
Had they tuned in twenty-five minutes prior to or following the storm broadcasts, civic-minded
health care professionals and anxious property owners would have heard disc jockey Sandy
Jackson explain that the whole exercise was a fake. KOHW had re-broadcast the previous year’s
warnings about an impending community disaster.
Unique among Storz’s many and occasionally spectacular radio stunts, the fake flood
prank offered listeners no prize. It demonstrated, rather, that the station possessed a sizable,
attentive, and trusting audience. Unlike other Storz promotions, no employees ended up in jail,
but as usual local outrage from the predictable authority figures followed all the same. Like a
merry prankster or class clown, the station defended its trickery as a necessary measure in the
new atomic age; “the program was not designed to scare anyone, but to keep people awake to the
ever-present threat of emergency.” 154
Prior to the hysteria that swirled around rock and roll in the last half of the 1950s, the
most controversial aspects of the Top 40 stations were the sensational promotions and
giveaways. These Top 40 staples played upon powerful and pervasive fears of out-of-control
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youth. By the 1950s, delinquency had become one of the central anxieties of a decade that
possessed many. Leftist critics of mass culture, such as Dwight MacDonald, along with
conservative defenders of law and order saw commercial radio stations’ scavenger hunts, prize
contests, and related shenanigans as signs of cultural decline. The popular press joined in as
well. Time crowned Storz “the King of Giveaways” in 1956, accusing his stations of
perpetrating dangerous publicity stunts and for possessing a low regard for their audiences’
intelligence. Echoing market researcher Paul Lazarfeld’s attitude, Time described the one-way
nature of Storz’s relationship to his audience: “When his listeners are not being told about a new
giveaway, they get a steady serenade from the disk jockeys, broken only by stunts and fiveminute news broadcasts. Storz permits no cultural note; he allows his stations only 60 records at
a time, lets them play only the top 40 tunes of the week, well larded with commercials.” 155 The
free enterprise system, usually not a target in the Cold War, came under suspicion when the
young became consumers.
The unseen young audience tuning into Top 40 radio suggested a potential to blur lines of
class and race, uniting youth into its own separate category. The conglomerate youth culture
feared to be taking root in the nation’s overcrowded comprehensive high schools manifested
itself in a vast and growing collective buying power that, critics lamented, worked ever toward
the lowest common social denominator. African American rhythm and blues along with rock
and roll dominated youth radio, while white working class DAs and pink and black ensembles
appeared on the bodies of middle class high school students. Dating shifted from a sometimes
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cruel but ultimately harmless adolescent social pecking order toward a “going steady” style that
in matters of intimacy seemed to differ little from marriage. 156
Whether they were downwardly mobile delinquents or passive followers of mindless
trends and socially destructive fads, the young became a focal point of national concern. The
postwar young were “other-directed,” members of a pathetic and “Lonely Crowd,” and, at times,
psychotic thrill-seekers. 157 The growing postwar economy, changing technology, and the social
milieu of the high school provided the tools with which young Americans crafted their
distinctive collective identities, while changes in marketing and demographics would give them
greater cultural and social power. In all of this, radio and the musical experience were central.
The furor over Top 40 promotions accomplished two goals, it revealed and then
accentuated a commercially significant generational cleavage. The positive reaction of the Top
40 audience combined with the negative publicity from the popular press convinced advertisers
that a youth market and perhaps even a common youth culture existed with its own peculiar, and
exploitable, ethos and rituals. Top 40 promotions that led to traffic jams, brawling, and
ransacked public libraries did nothing to dispel the pervasive fear of juvenile delinquency in the
early post-war era, but skillfully and ironically played upon adult anxieties, and raised the
awareness of advertisers nationwide. As marketers came to understand that the youth market
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was viable and influential in adult consumption, old fears faded, replaced by mainstream images
of hip and fun-loving youth. As the targets of this marketing blitz the young came to see
themselves as part of a group that was cut-off from and in some ways superior to the adult
culture. The music marketplace as heard on Top 40 radio was the strongest pillar supporting the
postwar youth culture. The youth culture listened, drove, and danced to recorded sound,
providing their everyday life and most banal activities with recorded accompaniment. Recorded
music’s portability let it to escape the control of adults and youth inscribed their own meaning
onto the record grooves.

Alienated Youth: the High School and the Market

The notion of a separate youth culture was not new to the postwar era and neither were
age-specific fashion and musical markers designating generational boundaries novel. A midnineteenth-century youth culture emerged in New York’s Bowery neighborhood, distinguishing
itself from the larger working class culture in ways not dissimilar from mid-twentieth century
youth. Operating within a coherent working class culture, the Bowery Boys bound themselves
together not through workplace associations and fraternal organizations but through stylized use
of leisure time and public space. With ample “bears grease” to slick down his hair, the frockcoat wearing, slang-talking Bowery Boy constructed an identity in the ready-made world of
fashion. Mixing and matching symbolic items, phrases, and poses from the different classes and
types that frequented the neighborhood, the Bowery Boy constructed an identity through pastiche
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and consumption. Through the skillful and understood use of symbols, this youth culture
suggested new possibilities of social interaction 158
Youth culture in this way can be more accurately understood as subculture, a distinction
that owes much to the theories and observations of a group of British sociologists known as the
“Birmingham School.” Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson, Brian Roberts, and John Clarke have argued
that alienated groups within cultures created subcultures, through a process of symbolic
restructuring of leisure time and activities. When the young were the alienated group, the
subculture was by definition a youth subculture. As was the case with the Bowery Boys, most
subcultures took shape within working class culture. Bohemians and avant-garde artists of the
nineteenth century, however, represent a middle class variant of the same phenomenon. The
stylized leisure culture functioned as a response or a solution to problems and crises that faced
the class within which the subcultures operated. 159
The leisure economy held special meaning for working and middle class youth
subcultures because it reflected some of the anxieties concerning declining social status or
meaninglessness of productive labor. For example, a working class corner boy in tee shirt and
jeans awaiting the prospect of a service economy job, gloried in “doing nothing” with his friends,
while the middle class beat dropped out of the competitive struggle for professional recognition
and into a quest for a transcendent experience. 160 In respect to different class experiences,
working class subcultures tended to be social in nature and use as point of references places and
activities associated with the working class. The middle class youth subculture was
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individualistic in nature and appeared as a political and ideological response. In either case, as
the subcultures operated in the realm of leisure and symbol rather than productive activity, all
youth subcultures offered a “magical resolution” to class crises and alienation. The eventual
failure of the magical solution often led to the subcultures eventual demise or to continual
frustration of its members at lack of change in their class or the larger society. 161
Identifying adolescents as a separate American class has its origins in the changing work
ways associated with the industrialization and urbanization, which led to the removal of the
young from economic activity and into schools. At the turn of the century, G. Stanley Hall
identified the high school years as a transitional period, one in which peer groups assumed
greater importance. Rebellion was natural and identity in flux. Though primarily concerned
with young men, Hall maintained that the “storm and stress” of adolescence was the crucible
through which all needed to pass in order to reach maturity. Later, Margaret Mead identified the
anguish of adolescents as a peculiarly American, rather than a strictly biological, dilemma, one
that could and should be assuaged by ceding the young more power over their lives and reducing
the negative social consequences to youthful experimentation with different roles. 162 Though
they disagreed about the intrinsic nature and value of adolescent suffering, both Mead and Hall

161

John Clarke, “Style,” in Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain,
ed. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, New York: Holmes & Meirer Publishers, Inc., 1976, 188190.
162
My understanding of Hall owes much to Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A
Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1995, 101-110; Daniel Thomas Cook, The Commodification of Childhood: The Children’s
Clothing Industry and the Rise of the Child Consumer, Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press,
2004, 137; and Jon Savage, Teenage: The Creation of Youth Culture, New York: Viking, 2007,
63-73; for Margaret Mead, I relied on “Selection from Coming of Age in Samoa, in The
American Intellectual Tradition: Volume II 1865 to the Present, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997, 198-204.

86
carved out for the young a separate identity with goals and experiences distinct from adults and
children.
Throughout the twentieth century – with a brief exception during World War II – the
number of adolescents attending United States high schools grew, giving more and more young
people a sense of themselves as apart as well as an opportunity to construct their own identity.
Less than a third of all eligible teenagers were in school in 1920, a figure that rose to nearly
three-fourths by 1940 and was almost at 90 percent by 1960. 163 The teenager, however, was
always more of a market phenomenon and came into existence in parts.
The fun loving, consumerist teenager was initially a girl, and the fashion, recording, and
film industries of the 1920s were the first to target the young female consumers. Department
stores in major cities noted girls shopping without their mothers. Sensing a potential market, the
fashion industry responded by segmenting lines to appeal to the emerging market. The film,
music, and publishing industries followed suit, targeting girls during the interwar years. All
wanted to make headway into the purchasing habits of the nation’s future homemakers and
primary consumers. A dynamic interaction between girls and these industries existed by
the1940s that was never top down. Demand increasingly drove the prewar youth market. By the
end of World War II, young female consumers were exerting considerable control determining
which commodities and behaviors defined the collective teenage experience. While
psychologists and sociologists fretted about delinquent boys, leaving them on the margins and
within Hall’s world of storm and stress, “advertisers, media, educators, parents, and girls
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experimented with the related but distinct concept of the ‘teenager.’” 164 After World War II, the
delinquent and teenager identities fused, generating the deep, but short lived, national
ambivalence toward youth.
In the 1950s United States, youth became a metaphor for social change and their peculiar
world a portent of things to come. The overflowing high schools tested postwar consensus,
mixing working class students with their middle class counterparts, and held the potential, after
Brown v. Board of Education to do the same with race. Changing courtship practices had
teenagers abandoning the fiercely competitive and relatively formal “rating and dating system”
for “going steady.” Boys and girls not only spent more time with each other – often in the
privacy of the family automobile – but they also entered the courtship system based on “going
steady” earlier and thus into its ritualistic consumptions practices younger. 165 In addition,
increasing affluence elevated the value of leisure time, making its use central to identity
formation and a masculine counterpart to the feminine ideal of enlightened consumption could
be found in the pages of Esquire and by the mid-fifties, Playboy.
Beginning with Paul Goodman, intellectuals sympathetic to the emerging youth
subculture and hostile to the postwar consensus identified the young as alienated, having been
ground down through inhuman educational and occupational institutions of the postwar
“system.” Goodman saw the delinquents and idlers allegedly stalking the halls of the nation’s
high schools as damning evidence of an “abundant society” that was “simply deficient in many
of the most elementary objective opportunities and worth-while goals that could make growing
up a possibility.” Maturity, in the affluent society, was not longer possible or desirable. The
164

Kelly Schrum, Some Wore Bobby Sox: The Emergence of Teenage Girls’ Culture 1920-1945.
New York: MacMillan, 2004, 19.
165
Beth Bailey, From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth-Century America,
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, 48.

88
unnatural bureaucratic and mechanical order produced youthful cynicism, meaninglessness, and
detachment. 166 Radio promotions, like KOWH’s fake flood warning, in this context appear as
reflections of the youth’s frustration with living in an absurd society rather than a collective
outburst of joy and energy. As maturity appeared more and more absurd and the youth culture
more and more attractive, a considerable number continued to identify with the youth culture
long after leaving the years traditionally associated with adolescence.
The pervasive anxiety with high school educational standards, best exemplified by James
Conant’s well-publicized 1959 sociological review of the comprehensive high school, took the
opposite tack of Gilbert. Conant advanced a program to help American educational system meet
the challenge of the Cold War that would have ratcheted up the problems Goodman had
identified in Growing Up Absurd. Released following the launch of Sputnik, Conant believed
that a merger of small high schools into ever larger, more diverse institutions would allow
educators to address the myriad needs of the young. 167 Conant’s rational and measured response
came in the midst of national hand wringing, but his enthusiasm for bigger schools did little to
address the potential social a more efficient and bureaucratic high school order might produce.
Goodman’s analysis would influence 1960s student movements, and the language of the
Port Huron statement reflects the dismay over aimlessness and lack of community resulting from
the system. Though Conant and others who advocated school reform would find little in
common with Tom Hayden, they, like the student leaders, implicitly placed in youth and the
social and intellectual institutions associated with it, tremendous importance for the future.
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Youth was, in such analyses, isolated scrutinized, and believed to be either the salvation or
damnation of the United States.
This is not to suggest that a monolithic youth culture was emerging. High school
administrators worked tirelessly to mute group differences, discouraging school fraternities and
sororities or combating working class gangs, but social differences from the adult world
invariably manifested themselves in the halls of the nation’s high schools as middle and working
class students tended to segregate themselves as did black and white students. The promise or
threat of youth solidarity –whether on radio or in the national magazines – was often more image
than reality. William Graebner has pointed out that the potential for youthful racial coexistence
and understanding in Buffalo, New York existed, and that its eventual dissolution into mutual
acrimony and white flight was an unfortunate but avoidable process that cities across the nation
repeated. This was one major conflict that began in the schools and spread throughout the
communities. 168
Nonetheless, along with conflict came mutual emulation across, class, gender, and racial
lines. In the areas of fashion and music, emulation tended – despite official pronouncements
lauding the upward mobility of American workers and efforts to identify the middle class culture
as the national culture – to move from the bottom up the social ladder. Elite and middle class
fears once confined to the working class or to African Americans, became universalized and
were believed to be lurking within youth generally. Thus all youth became a threat and even if
these tendencies were latent, youth had become in the minds of many an alien social entity. 169
The rise of the crew cut and intense fixation with American “softness” following the launch of
Sputnik can likewise be read as a fear that boys and girls were growing up too much alike. The
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potential of the mass media to unite young people into a single entity, regardless of class, race, or
gender, gave it especial importance in this regard.
James Gilbert’s analysis of delinquency fears in the 1950s argues that the development of
a separate youth culture cannot be understood without prior reference to the new economic
position of adolescents in American society in the post-war era. The 1950s saw a dramatic
change in “relationship between adolescents and the modern economy, or for that matter,
between every individual in America and the consumer market through which he or she
increasingly asserted an identity.” 170 Affluence meant, among other things, that one could,
through enlightened consumption, manufacture one’s personality, and that the leisure economy
replaced productive activity as the primary site for identity and social formation. Everyone was
now a Bowery Boy. Television created a simultaneous national market, and Gilbert identified
the new and dominant postwar medium as responsible for the peculiar cross-class solidarity of
postwar youth.
Television, however, was not the electronic connector of choice for the young. “They are
addicted to radio (‘top tune’ programs) and the 30-minute phone call. They are not taken with
television and tend to be fairly discriminating viewers,” Look explained to worried adults in one
of the more sympathetic treatments of 1950s teenagers (the sympathy was tempered with a
suspicion that the young might very well represent a different species of American, taller than
their parents and so well-scrubbed they “glistened”). 171 Television, located in the center of the
home, was not under teenage control, but the mobile radio was, making it the key technology in
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the development and exploitation of the youth market. Unlike other staples of youth culture,
including hot rods and teen periodicals, gender, race, or class did not segment Top 40 radio. The
hit tune was, as Todd Storz maintained, the common meeting ground, with the potential to
transcend social class, gender, and race in a way no other medium could.

The Top 40 promotions – Youth Culture as Youth Market

Giveaways and promotions that poked fun at fears of delinquency and put teenagers in on
a collective joke relied on notions of a bumbling and out-of-touch adult society. They were the
most visible ways that the Top 40 radio stations encouraged a sense of youth’s separation. The
majority promotions rewarded listeners with cash prizes or records, and were contained within
the leisure economy. Whether a disc jockey threw dollar bills at grasping hands or hid them in
library books, the goal of the participant was access to the youth culture via cash that would then
be used to purchase the proper commodities and experiences that would place one in the youth
culture.
The gold standard of Top 40 promotions, the scavenger hunt, became part of Storz’s
repertoire early on, first appearing at the Omaha station. In 1951 KOWH personnel hid money at
various locations throughout the city. In between songs and commercials, frantic disc jockeys
broadcast hints as to the whereabouts of the cash prizes, and equally frantic listeners rushed
across town in their cars. Near downtown a traffic jam snarled for blocks, stranding angry
commuters and catching the attention of the police. Storz tried to provide some semblance of
order. He directed traffic from his car until he noticed police lights and then attempted to escape
onto a side street. Officers pulled him over and demanded, “do you want to stay on Farnam
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[Street] or do you want to go to jail?” Playing hero to his audience, Storz opted for jail, where he
was released on a minimal bond. Omaha youth had a spokesman. 172
Less than a year after Storz landed in jail, police arrested KOWH disc jockey James
O’Neil after he climbed a tree in Omaha’s Turner Park and began throwing money at passerbyes. His fellows back in the studio had broadcast his whereabouts and activities, drawing a
sizable and increasingly aggressive crowd. As before, traffic bottled up near the park. Police
hauled O’Neil off only to have KOWH broadcast pleas to its listeners to bail him out. They
responded, swarming the central Police Station and jamming traffic there. 173 O’Neill was not
released, refusing to be bonded out, a rebel with a cause or at least an audience. As with the
Farnam Street giveaway, the money-throwing exhibition showed that automobile listeners were
ready to join in on the fun whenever their favorite radio station invited them. KOWH was on
their side – it was the institution that stood for youth culture and leisure, in the form of popular
records. KOWH promotions rejected the condescension and banal didacticism offered by the
schools, print media, and television programs.
Perhaps the most revealing episode occurred in 1956, when KOWH hid six checks worth
ten dollars each inside books in the Omaha Public Library. A “mob” rushed the library,
grabbing and swinging books to jar loose the checks and rifling through card catalogs, destroying
90 volumes and inciting “chaos” in the stacks. Similar to the phony flood, KOWH offered the
tongue-in-cheek explanation that the giveaway was intended to encourage library patronage.
Unconvinced, the library demanded and received compensation. Some confused treasure hunters
made their way to another bastion of official middle class culture, the Joselyn Art Museum,
where the director explained that the museum had no checks hidden behind the pictures or
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furniture adding “but I’m glad to see you… We have some wonderful exhibits. Wouldn’t you
like to see them?” Disappointed, the treasure seekers departed. 174 The pranks, absurd gestures,
and publicity stunts of later rock musicians, record company marketers, and the Youth
International Party bear a striking resemblance to Top 40 promotions. The adult “squares,”
unable to get the joke, responded with confusion and buffoonish anger, while the kids could
laugh and feel, for a moment, solidarity and superiority.
Along with municipal officials, the FCC frowned upon such activities, especially in the
wake of the 1956 Time article that drew attention to Storz’s Top 40 promotions. Network radio
affiliates complained to the regulatory body that giveaways directly contradicted the FCC
mission to operate in the public convenience and necessity. Desperate to finalize a deal for a
major station in Miami, Storz pledged to an increasingly hostile FCC that he would not use
promotions and giveaways if allowed to acquire WQAM. The FCC approved the sale following
a 4-3 vote. 175 Though a part of the overall programming strategy, promotions did not guarantee
long term-success, and WQAM’s subsequent dominance in promotion-less Miami revealed they
were not essential. Advertisers by the mid-decade had begun to awaken to the possibilities
presented by the youth market.
Storz directed most promotions and giveaways at the automobile listener, who he had
earlier identified as the key segment of the post-war radio audience. Suburbanization built on
post-war prosperity and the Interstate Highway Act reshaped American cities, and one of the
many consequences was that more and more Americans spent a good portion of their days in
cars. The transistor transformed the car radio from expensive luxury into an almost standard
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feature by the 1960s. In 1946 nine million cars possessed radios, a figure that climbed to 50
million in 1953. 176 Top 40 group owner Gerald Bartell coined the term “drive time” for that
mobile morning and afternoon audience, but it was not only the adults who were a captive
audience. By 1961, half of all high school senior boys had their own cars, and an even larger
number access to, and in fact expected regular use of, the family car. 177 Not only did General
Motors and Ford sell millions of automobiles each year – 352 different models hit showrooms in
1961 178 – the number of cheap used cars similarly skyrocketed, making private transportation
ever more available for young people, especially young men.
The car functioned as a private space in which the much-maligned teenager could escape
supervision to race or neck (or perhaps both). 179 The hot rod subculture among boys and young
men personalized and made even more powerful and noisy Detroit’s mass-produced
automobiles. 180 Fears of driving teens, hot rodders or not, went hand in hand with the
delinquency scare. National magazines highlighted the dangers, pointing to highway fatalities,
lower grades, and pregnancy resulting from youth’s access to cars. Anxiety about cars and
driving in general ran high in the 1950s as suburbanization, longer vacations, Interstate
highways, larger automobiles, and prosperity made driving and congestion more common and
thus more dangerous. The national magazines singled out neurotics, women, “rugged” American
men, and even fat drunks, for blame, but teenagers remained the focal point of automotive

176

Peter Fornatale and Joshua E. Mills, Radio in the Television Age. New York: The Overlook
Press, 1980, 20.
177
Susan Douglas, Listening in: Radio and the American Imagination. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2004, 253.
178
Harold Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950s: An Economic History, New York: Norton,
1963, 160.
179
Beth Bailey, From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth Century America,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, 86-87.
180
Grace Palladino, Teenagers: An American History, New York: Basic Books, 1996, 101.

95
fears. 181 The magazines understood one thing at least: the car had become of even greater
importance to postwar American youth culture by offering the young control over space outside
home and school. “We wouldn’t care if the cars had no wheels,” said one 1963 college student
grateful for the privacy afforded by cars, “just so long as they had doors.” 182 What magazines
and scolds may or may not have taken note of was the young driver’s constant companion: not
the opposite sex, booze, or high speed, but the radio.
Storz man Ken Greenwood remembered being at WHB in Kansas City, the brainstorming
ways to prove that this culture and market was paying attention to radio. “We were sitting
around, and I don’t know who started the idea, but it kind of grew and we thought, God, if we
could have a scavenger hunt and we could give clues on the air and people would drive around
looking for something in their cars, wouldn’t that be a wonderful thing?” This was the meat and
potatoes of Storz promotion strategy: lead listeners around the city on serpentine tour questing
for cash prizes. Similar to other Storz escapades, the Kansas City incident resulted in negative
but lucrative publicity.

Well, WHB did what they called a “Scavenger Hunt.” It terminated in Luce Park, which
was a big park in Southeast Kansas City, and one of the guy’s responsibilities was at the
last moment to put a turtle in a pond that had WHB written on the belly of the turtle.
They ran them across the ASPB Bridge and they ran them all over town, and by this time
there was a horrendous crowd of people trailing around, listening to the radio, and
looking for clues. The clues finally sent them to Luce Park, and of course they tore up
the park, and the particular pond where the turtle was deposited. There wasn’t a cattail
left in that pond, and it was just bedlam. That was on a Sunday. The next day, the
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Kansas City Star came out with the headlines that said: “Local Radio Station Closes
ASPB Bridge,” or “Raises Pandemonium in Kansas City,” or something – a very, very
tough story. We took that story, clipped it out and used it to sell with for at least the next
year as perfect evidence of all the people who were listening to radio in their
automobiles. 183

Playing friend to adolescents struggling to develop an identity was a byproduct of what
Greenwood reveals was the goal of promotions, convincing advertisers of the commercial
viability of the Top 40 audience. Aware of the general fears surrounding the young and the car,
Greenwood cleverly employed these to sell the station. The repeated abuse of the public space
for the benefit of a private organization, however, is more than curious. Storz maintained that by
playing the top hits, his stations were serving the public, giving them what they wanted. Yet it
becomes apparent that public spaces – ones actually where families, friends, and even young
people gathered – constituted the private playground of the Top 40 station. From libraries, to
parks, to roads, Top 40 station promotions took particular glee in abusing public space,
mobilizing its denizens to scour the sprawling urban landscape in dangerous and fast moving
steel boxes, watching for clues, not traffic, and listening to the top hits over and over again.
Critics such as Goodman argued that this behavior, though unfortunate, was
understandable for a generation that had “grown up absurd” in postwar America. The Top 40
scavenger hunt offered a rare opportunity to parody and symbolically refuse the artificial
lifestyle the young confronted at school and in the future. Though they acted as a group, the Top
40 audience took on the appearance of a crowd, or in some cases mob, connected by only the
most tenuous of bonds. The longer one looks at the situation, it more difficult it is to figure out
who the joke was played on or what the point was.
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At their worst, the promotions revealed atomistic and mutually hostile individuals
slamming into each other in pursuit of cash rather than companionship. At WTIX in New
Orleans, disc jockey Bob Sticht wound up to jail after climbing a building and throwing dollar
bills at the intersection of Canal and Carondelet streets, yelling “I hate money!” Down on the
street below, confused pedestrians pocketed the bills, and as the crowd grew. Police nearby had
initially looked upon the scene with bemusement, with some even grabbing cash themselves.
The situation, however, spiraled out of control and fights broke out. The police finally ended the
mayhem and arrested the disc jockey. WTIX wasted no time and broadcast that Bob Sticht was
in need of bail money, which was promptly supplied. Sticht remembered the incident and
Storz’s strategy fondly, “They brought the people in on everything.” 184

Understanding and Defining Postwar Youth Markets

Young drivers not only had radios tuned to Top 40 stations, but also possessed bulging
wallets, something Storz and others had long suspected. By decade’s end Life measured the size
of the teenage market be $10 billion. In a photo essay illustrating the universe of consumer
goods available to affluent youth, the magazine placed a pair of dancing teenagers on top of a
pyramid of commodities. Two cars anchored the fun-filled pile, and phonograph machines,
transistor radios, and rock records figured prominently. While appealing, the article and photos
nonetheless emphasized the bewildering and voracious appetites of the new generation raised in
prosperity. Fear of the young, though present, was waning. The featured female teenage
consumer of Look possessed brilliantly white teeth, many friends both male and female, and a
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stunning array of commodities. This was no dirty delinquent, but was an attractive figure – and
not only to other teenagers. 185
Similar to Todd Storz’s impact on local merchants, Madison Avenue legend Eugene
Gilbert helped turn national advertising opinion from dismissive or fearful toward a celebration
of youth. Gilbert received national coverage and industry accolades for his campaigns targeting
teen audiences and for his crusader-like zeal in convincing the public beyond Madison Avenue
that youth culture was a harmless market creation. His career paralleled Storz’s. Both arrived at
their respective positions in the late 1940s and by the early 1950s emerged as iconoclastic
defenders the young advocating a populist, market-friendly explanation of why youth culture
seemed so foreign but was in actuality within the American tradition. Gilbert penned articles
such as, “Why Today’s Teenagers Are So Different,” and “Rock and Roll Can’t Ruin Us,”
culminating with his book Advertising and Marketing to Young People, an attempt to demystify
the teenage consumer, youth culture, and behavior. He summed up the crux of his argument in a
1959 article for Life, “Today’s teenager is an independent character… [T]he fact is, he can afford
to be.” 186 The teenager was hardly the mindless and predatory criminal described in an early
1950s Time article, “Rebels or Psychopaths,” but a cheerful and discerning individualist who
knew what he wanted and was able to purchase it. 187
Playing the role of a more respectable sort of Top 40 disc jockey Gilbert posed as yet
another spokesman for the young while pioneering new approaches to exploit the same. By the
1960s, criticism of the youth market as non-existent or as capable of only consuming comic
books and candy bars had been soundly discredited. The numbers won over advertisers. In
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1964, Sponsor noted that even formal menswear could be successfully marketed on Top 40
radio. 188 The kids had cash and were buying a whole host of consumer products as well as
influencing their parents’ purchases of automobiles and more substantial durable goods. 189 The
fear of the 1950s had been replaced in the 1960s with a “celebration of both the economics and
culture of youth.” 190
This reversal would soon find its way to society at large and James Gilbert has pointed
out the irony in the decreasing concern over juvenile delinquency with the rapid and dramatic
rise in juvenile crime in the early 1960s (to say nothing of outright generational rebellion on
campuses nationwide in the later years of that decade). 191 Americans accepted youth culture as a
permanent part, and in some ways at the forefront, of mainstream culture. The youth culture and
market would continue to develop, mutate, and fragment in the subsequent decades, preceding
similar changes in national culture.
That the role of defenders and protectors of a generation born in unprecedented affluence
fell on the shoulders of men like Storz and Gilbert remains a fascinating development.
Abandoned by the Mass Culture critics as passive and empty vessels and regarded with a mixture
of affection, confusion, and fear by their parents, teachers, and political leaders, American youth
found their own space in their cars, their schools, or on their feet armed with transistors. The
marketers in search of the youth market – outside of radio and some of the clever independent
record labels – pursued it clumsily but doggedly as the fifties gave way to the sixties. Confused
by what according to studies was a cautious and conservative “faceless mob” Y&R president
Edward L. Bond Jr. advised his advertising brethren to “treat youth with authority; protect them;
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control them; tell them what to do. Basically they’re insecure and afraid to take risks. Reassure
them in advertising copy.” 192 Storz, Gilbert, or Jac Holzman, president of Elektra Records,
would have howled at such an assessment. Or ignored it all together. They were busy keeping
their ears to the ground, avoiding the assumptions that misled the bigger firms. So it was that a
typical youth commodity, popular recorded music, became a defining element of this new,
acutely self-conscious generation. Like other aspects of youth culture, the use of recorded sound
as identity marker would go mainstream in the subsequent years.
The great spokesmen of youth, the disc jockey, came under withering fire from mass
media for leading astray an “other directed” youth culture. Disc jockeys spent much of their
spare time defending themselves, arguing that they were hardly the trend-setting provocateurs
they were made out to be but themselves the followers. To the delight of the major labels and
cultural critics, disc jockeys such as Alan Freed were ruined by the payola scandal, and others,
such as Dick Clark, forced to divest themselves of lucrative business arrangements.
Print media targeting teenage girls as consumers existed prior to Top 40 and had
developed a sophisticated strategy to deflect criticism in the early postwar era. The first and
most successful of the teen magazines, Seventeen, began publishing in 1944, rapidly selling out
its first two press runs of 400,000. Posing as a guardian of upper middle class virtue and taste,
Seventeen advised its readers in a reassuring, friendly, yet authoritative tone, guiding them
through the minefield of American girlhood. Tackling boredom (advice includes “Shampoo
your hair and experiment with new hair styles while it’s all malleable with lather”), sex, and
fashion Seventeen was successful in part because its skilled writers usually took these issues
seriously and addressed them with sympathy. Following G. Stanley Hall, Seventeen explained
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that adolescence was a transitional phase and that difficulties were inevitable, but that attentive
readers would emerge in tact.
Seventeen also addressed its young readers as consumers, keeping them up-to-date on
what to wear, watch, and listen to – the largest section in any 1950s issue was the “what you
wear” feature. The production values and sophistication of the advertisements rivaled any of the
major adult and family periodicals. This approach compares favorably with Top 40, though the
tone of Seventeen remained, at least throughout the 1950s, that of a wiser and sympathetic older
sister.
Like Storz would later, Seventeen publisher Helen Valentine aggressively sought to
convince advertisers of the buying power of the teen market, in this case that of upper-middle
class girls. A year after Seventeen’s 1944 launch, She hired a professional research team out of
Princeton, New Jersey, behavior unknown in fashion magazine to discover the desires,
demographics, and untapped demand in of American girls. The survey was called “Life with
Teena,” and it showed that 66 percent of readers expected to be full-time homemakers, while
over three-fourths influenced parents’ buying decisions. Clothes, however, were the big selling
point, with nearly two-thirds percent expressing strong interest in clothes and 87 percent telling
the researchers that they advised their friends in making selections. Valentine would emphasize
the other-directedness of her audience, telling advertisers that they only needed to reach and
convince a couple of trendsetting young girls and the other directed market would follow.
Believing that the market could be reached and could be manipulated, however, were two
different things. 193
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RCA was a frequent buyer of space on Seventeen, hawking its portable radio and records
players. In one spot, a young woman is shown waking up, breakfasting, applying makeup,
walking through town, getting ready for bed, dancing with a man (no other dancers are seen
perhaps reflecting the shift to steady dating in the 1950s) always accompanied by a 45 Victrola
turntable attachment. The ad was strategically placed next to a Seventeen article detailing ways
to “Make Money for Christmas.” 194 Another RCA spot displayed two couples in bathing suits
clowning around with portable radios. A smiling girl crouches down, balancing a radio on her
finger, while a shirtless boy standing above her balances a smaller radio on his head. The ad tells
the reader to “play it sweet and cool. Just leave this ad where Mom or Dad is sure to see it.
They’re sure to catch on!” 195
The first ad speaks to the role of music as commodity and companion. The portable radio
had by the 1950s become an everyday artifact, not a strange accessory, and now it was being
marketed as a fashionable accessory for the on-the-move young woman. In the photos the radio,
and turntable attachment, share the same frame with the woman – it is implied that with a
portable music player, one is never alone. The music is hers and is not shared with anyone,
except the sharp-looking young man dancing with her to records. The dancing photo is the only
explicit reference to the place of records in youth culture, but the other photos imply, by the
absence of parents and others, the portable’s special place in the development of individuality
and as a symbol of individual choice. All of her experiences are enhanced by the portable, and in
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the case of the dancing episode, the portable becomes a prerequisite for gaining admittance to the
pleasures of adulthood.
The second spot shows youth culture in its more traditional guises – fun and playful
sexuality. The kids, attractive and half naked, will be having fun long after Christmas if they
bring the music with them. Recognizing both a more indulgent parenting style and the insider
approach of Top 40 promotions, RCA reassures its readers that even though the $69.95 may
seem a bit steep, they can, with little effort, influence their parents Christmas decisions. The
phrase “They’ll catch on!” can be read two ways. One is that the kind parent will recognize their
child’s craving for portable radio. The other is that the parents, though generally out-of-touch,
will be unable to resist their own desire for an RCA and the allure of the fun-loving, ever young
lifestyle it and their children represent.
Outside of the advertising copy, Seventeen, however, sought to educate, rather than
excite, the adolescent senses. It rarely reviewed rock records, preferring an elucidation on “the
wild, barbaric rhythms of Profkofiev’s Scythian Suite” to one on the differently wild rhythms of
Elvis Presley. 196 Some readers questioned their favorite magazine’s neglect of a decidedly teendriven phenomenon, but Seventeen nonetheless maintained a low-level anti-rock position. 197
Typical of its condescending stance, the magazine enlisted a Barnard College undergraduate to
explain to younger readers that rock and roll was all right for kids, but for college students “the
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intricacies of chamber music or progressive jazz,” were more appropriate than “odd squalling
and moaning grunts of the latest rock and roll favorite.” 198
Seventeen took an indirect line of attack against rock music and the culture of Top 40
radio and 45 rpm records by promoting a traditional, performance based musical experience as a
superior alternative. “The Magic is You… in Music” argues that teenage girls should take up
instruments as a means to combat social isolation and better get to know themselves. “When you
play a musical instrument, it gets you past many a situation where possibly shyness (and who
isn’t a little shy) and lack of experience (and who isn’t a little bit unsure, some time or other?)
may put you at a disadvantage… You develop a kind of social ease and knowledge of acceptance
in your group, and this confidence is worth a great deal in how others may value you,
particularly the fellows.” An image of music’s connective power comes in the form of a teenage
girl discovering a piano in pine forest and conjuring up a sublime version of “Clair de Lune” for
her entranced friends. A sock hop it was not, and the author realizes that the piano in the pine
forest may seem a little unrealistic and states that anything, no matter how amateurish (including
rock and roll) with verve and energy can produce similar social benefits as long as the player and
audience participate. 199
When the magazine published an “open letter” to parents worried about delinquency, it
reinforced the magazine’s role as protector and educator, but it alienated some readers. “…The
article was ridiculous!... To me, she sounds like a ‘ma-ma’ baby… My parents like rock ‘n roll.
I drive a car, and my dad was glad to teach me how. This is more ‘true to life’ than that silly
letter.” 200 The reader assumes that cars and rock and roll are central to teen identity and
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independence and resents Seventeen’s insistence that they are inappropriate elements for the
well-adjusted, but still maturing, teen. Significantly, the reader’s tone is not one of righteous
indignation but scoffing. She writes that the magazine’s position towards teen drivers and rock
and roll is “silly” and “ridiculous.” Seventeen is not menacing; it is doddering. Anyone with a
radio set can hear the vibrancy of the youth culture of rock and cars that the magazine discredits.
Young women do not go paddling off in canoes in search of pine forests and Debussy, but do
motor around with the radio tuned into Pat Boone accompanied by steady boyfriends. 201
Unlike the conflicted Seventeen, Song Hits Magazine, had no problem trumpeting the
arrival of youth culture, crowning Elvis the King of the Baritones 202 and plugging a wide range
of rock stars in its pages. Song Hits Magazine consistently included pieces that not only justified
but glorified teen popular recorded music choice, and indicated that an autonomous youth
culture, not disc jockeys or even Elvis himself, were responsible for creating youth culture.
Reviewing the “Cat’s” first movie, Love Me Tender, the anonymous copy described the Elvis
Presley phenomenon, “His fans number in the millions. They are well organized, and they have
one mission in life – to keep Elvis on the top, to buy his records, to have the nation’s d.j.’s spin
his records and to make him America’s number one star attraction.” 203 Elvis records may have
been cool, Song Hits told its readers, but it was the young consumers who held the real power.
As with Top 40, Song Hits sponsored many contests, including a “win a date with Elvis”
promotion in which a lucky fan’s 100-word essay explaining, “Why I want to Meet Elvis,” could
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land them a chance to meet the Cat. 204 Though the contest included boys, the copy made clear
the preferred gender, and the winner, Andrea June Stevens was later shown in a photo essay
illustrating the various phases of her dream date. In a photo would have shocked the editors
Seventeen, a grinning Presley feeds his adoring fan a hotdog. Another photo shows Elvis
sleeping, head on Stevens’s shoulder. 205 The mixture of sweetness, star worship, and playful
crassness, resembled the Top 40 jokes, with the difference being Song Hits played upon fears of
delinquent sexuality.
It was not always this way. The Song Hits of 1950 contained the normal number of “HeMan” body building sets and pimple cream ads, but it also included Seventeen-style
editorializing. In an essay allegedly penned by Frank Sinatra, Old Blue Eyes warns the nation’s
girls about the dangers of peer pressure and phoniness, advising them a la Hamlet, “to thine own
self be true,” otherwise they would end up unhappy and in bad situations (one of which was
appearing unattractive to Frank and guys like him). Apparently, this particular variety of being
true to oneself involved understanding and obeying community standards of sexual modesty.
Using too much make-up, focusing on fashionable dress, and other sins of unchecked
consumerism and behavior not in accord with traditional girlhood would prove psychologically
and socially damaging. Moralizing along these lines, especially if it came directly from the
idols, was strictly forbidden six years later. 206
The second prizewinners’ of the Elvis dating contest, most of whom but not all were
female, received a full Elvis Presley album. This sort of prize was not unusual; Song Hits
preferred to give away records and turntables, good for business for a magazine devoted to the
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recording industry’s products, but these commodities were also in demand and esteemed by Song
Hits readers. In one typical contest, the prizes included three RCA turntables and one RCA
radio. The top prize was the portable RCA radio/turntable combo, “the Skipper,” which “plays
on batteries – anywhere. No cord is needed.” The high fidelity but homebound Mark IV was no
match for mobile-recorded sound. 207 The choices in prizes reflected recorded music’s role in
youth culture. Recorded music at its best was mobile and offered a means by which one could
self-identify as young through records and purchases in the marketplace.
A consistent Song Hits defense of rock and roll was, like Storz’s defense of Top 40, to
appeal to sales figures. The marketplace appeal was inclusive, many of the artists Song Hits
championed were African American, such as Little Richard, Fats Domino, and the Five Satins.
It also proved, at least to the editors, that an autonomous market no longer needed to be
instructed as to what it wanted to hear. Writing in the familiar patter of Top 40 disc jockeys,
Song Hits told its young consumers that they could and should continue to defy the scolds and
critics by seizing the record charts, “Every day, new R&R songs are breaking into the pop charts.
From this we can safely say the ‘Beat’ music is movin’ and groovin’ along. You just keep
buying the records and supporting your favorite artists the way you have and Rock ‘n Roll will
be here to stay.”

Sock Hops and Twisting: Social Aspect of the Postwar Youth Musical Experience

Dancing remained a part of youth culture, and at sock or record hops in high schools,
public buildings, and country clubs, popular disc jockeys from Top 40 stations armed with a box
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of records entertained eager couples across the country. Historian William Graebner has
complained that sock hops represented attempts by unsympathetic adults to inoculate middle
class children against the dangers of listening to working class musical styles without
supervision, but the events were some of the few that allowed young people to dance to their
own music. 208 In any case, they represented one decidedly social way of experiencing the
recorded music that Top 40 radio stations and their fans had popularized.
At the sock hops, teenagers could dance together to music they had been listening (and
perhaps dancing) to alone, a prospect that they evidently found desirable. At their height in the
mid-fifties, Storz disc jockey Bob Sticht did two to three hops each week, but complained that
though popular, the events paid poorly. 209 Clearly, the kids, and perhaps the clever authority
figures Graebner suspects of wanting to undercut the raw power of rock and roll, felt compelled
to experience music as part of a performance-like event in which they responded directly to
sounds, sights, and the presence of others, and have all of the above ritualistically structure their
social behavior. The most popular dance styles, however, indicate that the hops incubated new
understandings of the purpose of dance and the role of music in youth culture.
Writing a decade after the sock hops’ initial popularity, Lucille Blum observed that
young dancers of the late 1960s preferred discotheques and records to live performances. Blum
argued that at the discotheque dance served a therapeutic role. Dancers could simultaneously
pursue individual identity in a group context. The fast and generally unstructured movements
they executed did not reflect so much group solidarity or mutual understanding, but provided a
sense of freedom and individuality on the dance floor that was perhaps lacking in their more

208

William Graebner, Coming of Age in Buffalo: Youth and Authority in the Postwar Era,
Temple University Press, 1990, 39.
209
Bob Sticht, University of Maryland Oral History, 20.

109
structured roles at school, home, and work. 210 This style of dance, connected to dances reliant
on recorded music, has its roots in the Top 40 both on radio and on television.
Dick Clark, the television disc jockey, helped popularized the do-it-yourself dance style
of the 1950s sock hop on the long running “American Bandstand” ABC picked up Clark’s
Philadelphia show in 1957, less than a year after it had become a local sensation. “I don’t
know,” Clark demurred when asked about why the show appealed to so many adolescents,
before explaining, “we use recorded music. Anyone can get records. There’s a lot of
unrehearsed dancing by teenagers, and that’s not secret. So there’s just me, about forty records
and a hundred and fifty kids doing what comes naturally. That’s all.” 211
The show became a “weekday religion” for teenagers by 1960, spreading the resilient
“twist” even to skeptical adults. In 1958, Hank Ballard recorded the “Twist,” and the record sold
respectably, but it was the dance associated with it that became a national phenomenon. For
reasons that are not clear, Ballard refused to lip sync his record on Clark’s show. One of Clark’s
Philadelphia friends at Park-Cameo studios found a capable mimic in Ernest Evans, later rechristened “Chubby Checker” to record a cover version. The record proved a freakish
phenomenon, hitting number one in 1960 and again 1962. The affable Checker was more than
happy to twist away on Bandstand. The dance itself required a few minutes to learn, a fair
amount of space between the twister and anyone else, but not a partner. The partner-less twist
became the dominant popular dance style of the day. 212
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By 1961 the twist had become somewhat passé among teenagers in the know but was
exploding in popularity among adults, leading Buddy Deane of Baltimore’s WJZ-TV to
conclude:
that great portions of the public currently accepting the dance as a ‘new’ innovation are
not those who are the normal everyday record buyers influenced by radio and TV disc
jockeys or automatic coin machines…Rather these are adults, or at least sophisticated and
ultra conservative teen-agers, virtually untapped previously potential customers for pop
record sales or as audiences for disk jockey programs… This I firmly believe…points to
a tremendous but unrecognized buying audience for pop records in our normal attempts
to reach what we have referred to as the ‘great mass.’ 213
While it is unlikely that he ever referred to it as a “great mass,” Clark connected with his
audience and proved an able spokesman. He had a hard time in high school and understood the
social isolation many of his young audience experienced everyday. “For the first year and a half
[in high school], I literally crept around…. I learned a lot from being self conscious and shy that
there are a lot of people around who have the same feeling.” Records helped Clark cope with
isolation and through his passion for them he constructed an identity that allowed him to reach
out to others and eventually to make millions of dollars. Beginning in his early teens he
collected records by the hundreds and by 1958 possessed over 15,000. This astonishing total did
not even include many of the old 78s he had lost or thrown away when he switched to vinyl 45s
and LPs. Clark looked at the growing number of adults watching his show as a positive sign that
youth culture was achieving mainstream acceptance. “We are pleased that adults enjoy watching
us… but even more, it means that the adult population is beginning to see for itself that the music
and dancing of teenagers is good, clean fun.” 214
The television viewers of Bandstand did not dance with each other, but participated
symbolically by moving with the images on the screen to the beat coming out of the speaker.
213
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After the twist swept the nation, the “great mass” of dancers rarely embraced, but stayed rooted
in place. The postwar dancing experience mirrored the postwar listening experience in that it
focused attention on the self while paradoxically functioning as a protection against loneliness.
The key component was the record. Clark was a record collector who spun broadcast them over
television and encouraged kids to dance to them. The records were readily available to the
audience and the fun and camaraderie so evident on the show as easy as a trip to the record store.
Sound commodities in the leisure economy provided the key to connecting to others, but it was
also understood that recorded sound could be enjoyed and experienced individually
Some sociologists in 1954, following the “Lonely Crowd” argument, combed popular
music lyrics for evidence of loneliness and attempted to determine whether lonely young people
were turning away from the social pressures of their other-directed lives and to their music for
sonic solace. The results were somewhat inconclusive, but left the sociologists to believe that
adolescents, given little guidance on how to interact with opposite sex found in the banal lyrics
of popular records a language suitable to their stunted desires. 215 Revisiting the issue in 1966
showed that when rock became the dominant genre, the age of the average popular music listener
had fallen to under 18, the sociologists found that the lyrics in popular recordings had shifted
from a preoccupation with love to themes (though these still accounted for over 50 percent of all
pop songs) to a focus on independence and misunderstanding. The individual ego was in danger
of dissolution, according to the sociologists, and was asserting itself against the school or
officially sanctioned youth institutions in song lyrics. The young music consumer wanted to be
free to join the youth culture that was growing ever more prominent. The archetypal teenager
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did not want to rebel or express repressed sexual yearning, the sociologists maintained, rather, he
found youth culture more appealing than the alternative, and in recorded sound discovered a
forum in which to live out fantasies of power and peer acceptance. 216
A more straightforward 1960 analysis of teenage music preferences reported that radio
was by far the most common means of listening to music, followed by the phonograph. The
report also showed that middle class American youth listened to more music than did their
working class counterparts, and were also more likely to listen to music as background for other
activities. The listening styles emerging from the Top 40 crowd were thus more connected to
middle than to working class culture, and the variety of subculture that was emerging was
individualistic, as the Birmingham School would have predicted. The study did not take into
account portable radios, but indicates that both groups did most of their listening at home. The
jukebox was a distant second, and live performance ranked last. Though little was inferred from
these findings (the author speculates on the merits and pratfalls of using pop songs as teaching
tools), they show how young people found music to be a private affair, but one that at least
symbolically reaffirmed peer group connections. 217

No More Make-Believe, No More Ballroom: The Liberation of Sound from Performance

Before he began his earnest imitation of Storz’s Top 40 format, broadcaster Gordon
McClendon was known as “the Old Scotchman,” and regionally famous for recreating baseball
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games on the air from Western Union teletype, a practice that was widespread among
independent operators. 218 A skilled radio announcer could pull off the trick, and audiences
would settle into following a pretend game. The likely apocryphal story that Martin Block
stumbled into the successful golden age disc jockey show “Make Believe Ballroom,” when a
performance was cancelled and the quick-thinking Block, armed only with his records, instructed
his audience to pretend there was a ballroom illustrates a similar phenomenon in music listening.
Top 40 stations, however, no longer attempted to fool their audience into joining a performance.
The new radio did not simulate an event, but rather the ownership of a sound and the various
social association with that sound simulated. The stations sold youth, energy, and a safe haven –
along with implying what one could do while listening and what the music revealed about
oneself. The promotions proved an audience existed not only to advertisers, but also convinced
young people they were part of a larger and terrifically exciting cohort. 219 What was more, these
ineffable and transitory qualities were made permanent, easily accessible, and individualized by
the limited playlist of the popular hits. To join one needed a set, and if this logic of sound
ownership is followed to its logical conclusion, one needed a record player and a room of one’s
own.
Sociologist Ken Barnes once described the unique pleasure of turning the key, igniting
the engine, and then hearing on the radio a song you loathe. Flipping to another station and then
another, until at last you strike gold. The song coming out the speakers is yours and you crank
the volume and sing in the safety of your car. That music could be one’s own personal property
– or if not actually a possession at least psychically so – demonstrates how listeners have
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internalized the shift of music from social event to thing. Along with self-expression, the Top 40
listener likewise possessed great power, scanning the airwaves and choosing the station that
matched her own personal idiom. 220
Three things stand out in Barnes’s appraisal of Top 40. First, the music is incidental.
One does not get in a car in order to listen to music. Rather the music comes along for a ride,
and as Storz realized, is a companion. Second, the experience is private. The public road does
not intrude upon the private space of the car. In increasingly compartmentalized lives, Michael
Bull has argued that recorded music in cars gives the listener power to domesticate urban, public
space with private sound, placing herself at the center. Mobile recorded music “enables
consumers to create intimate, manageable, and aestheticized spaces in which they are
increasingly able to, and desire to, live.” In this interpretation, mobile and private sound is a
survival and aesthetic strategy designed to ameliorate the centrifugal forces of urban living. 221
These three elements speak to the appeal of radio and recorded sound to the young in the1950s
and beyond.
He may not have realized it, but Storz built upon the intellectual foundation of Theodore
Adorno, that erstwhile critic of recorded and popular music. In removing any pretense or
pretend from the broadcasting of records, Storz’s top 40 stations reveled in the music as pure
sound and ultimately as a thing. Top 40 radio liberated the record (at least temporarily) from
nostalgia and the “dead” moniker that Adorno said made phonograph albums comparable to
photographic ones. Generally pessimistic about the uses of recorded sound and radio, Adorno
believed that music as thing was best suited for a form that was repetitious and beat-driven. For
220

Ken Barnes, “A Fragment of the Imagination: Top 40 Radio,” Facing the Music, Simon Frith,
ed., New York: Pantheon Books, 1988,” 8-9.
221
Michael Bull, “Thinking about Sound, Proximity, and Distance in Western Experience: The
Case of Odysseus’s Walkman,” Hearing Cultures, New York: Berg, 2003, 177.

115
example, dance songs that could be listened to alone and turned on and off at any point in the
middle of the song without losing any of the composition’s impact were an appropriate genre. 222
Dispensing with the magician’s act of using radio as a device to fool the listener into
thinking she was getting the same thing as a performance, Top 40 provided the space for
recording artists and labels to innovate with plastic possibilities of recorded sound. The format –
which was always dependent upon “filling a void” and responding to local market conditions,
began to fragment in the 1960s. New musical niches and styles emerged – although few were
specific to place – as music become more and more identified with self-expression. By the late
1980s, the number of radio formats claiming descent from top 40 was in the dozens, with the
term Top 40 itself replaced by the less-than-inspiring “contemporary hits radio.” 223 Shortly after
Storz’s death in 1964, the format he created lost its primary place in the youth culture to album
oriented rock stations operating on the FM dial, where the rule of record was even more
prominent. In the 1970s, Top 40 became a nostalgic radio relic and disc jockey Kasey Kasem’s
comforting and pleasant “American Top Forty” became a syndicated national hit, recalling an era
when forty songs supposedly united a listening audience. 224 Though the format itself was gone,
Top 40’s basic ideas have only grown stronger in the subsequent decades and continue to
structure contemporary radio. Radio, with notable exceptions, remains relentlessly commercial;
station group owners invest heavily in market research, and rely almost exclusively on recorded
music.
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When rising incomes allowed Americans like never before to enjoy the “good life,” in
private, the hopes educators and public-minded intellectuals pinned on radio had little chance. In
the context of the Cold War, the good life was a nerve-racking blessing. As Storz was taking
over the Omaha radio market, the city’s daily newspaper blandly declared that new transistor
technology would lead to a push button war and cheaper television sets. 225 Innovations in
electronics could not be separated from the conflict with the Soviet Union: 45 rpm innovator
RCA received an ever-increasing share of its revenue via defense contracts, and the two thirds of
the electronics industry’s growth came as a result of military spending. 226 Anxiety underlay the
celebration of individual choice in the marketplace.
The good life could also mean the disintegration of old neighborhoods and the decay of
proud cities. Storz’s childhood home on Omaha’s “Gold Coast” had lost its cachet even before
he bought KOWH. Bedroom communities, in Omaha’s case the west side of town,
mushroomed, leading to sprawling suburban areas covered in concrete, traversable only by
car. 227 Highways and cars replaced public transportation and the familiar dreams repackaged
from the early days of radio that television’s educational promise was unlimited faded with
astonishing speed. The television networks excelled at creating entertainment programs that
delivered audiences to advertisers. As with radio, little distinction was made between the public
and the consumer.
The notion of a cabal of profiteers subverting radio’s public mission in the 1950s,
however, is difficult to sustain because the most commercialized form of American radio, Top
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40, began as a local and independent phenomenon, driven by an idiosyncratic visionary. Top 40
had developed against the tide of the industry, which the networks dominated in the early 1950s.
Skeptical advertisers needed to be convinced first that teenagers could buy more than bubblegum
and that other consumers were actively listening. A common Storz trade advertisement claimed
that housewives tuned into Top 40 stations while the kids were at school. Advertisers were not
alone in their suspicions of the power of the youth market. Major records labels, including
Columbia and the early Warner Brothers Music, downplayed the success of Top 40, which rarely
spun records from their extensive catalogs.
Beyond its role as a spokesman for the young, however, Top 40 liberated music from its
original context in performance. As a record and only a record, sound floated free, as did
Americans in the post-war era, who were becoming increasingly mobile and unshackled from
traditional social arrangements. Leaving aside aesthetics or notions of progress, economic or
otherwise, music as a thing possessed the potential to isolate listeners. In subsequent decades,
Americans bought more and more records that radio had introduced over the air; built
sophisticated high fidelity systems, and sought identity and meaning in a commodified world of
sound. The aesthetic experience, and surely the sonic one, could be intense, but it could also be
lonely.
A short history of the evolution of KOWH following its sale to William F. Buckley in
1957 helps place the format’s social ethos in context. Buckley’s management changed the call
letters to KMEO in 1959, along with the format, dropping Top 40, which was losing out to rival
KOIL and its superior facilities. Realizing he had bought an overvalued station and that his
preferred classical formula was a market loser, Buckley cut his losses and sold both the AM and
FM stations to Starr Broadcasting. By 1967, Starr had moved its focus to the FM dial and
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reprogrammed KOWH-FM first to a subscriptions-based format in the belief that, though
advertisers might not support a classical music station, wealthy listeners would. Unsuccessful,
Starr experimented with the popular country western, but again failed to connect with
audiences. 228
In 1970, after months of sometimes tense negotiations, a group of primarily black
investors known as Reconciliation Inc. purchased the AM and FM stations. For the first time in
Omaha broadcast history, the African American listeners of North Omaha had a station that
addressed them directly. Headed by St. Louis pitcher Bob Gibson and professional basketball
player Bob Boozer, Reconciliation Inc. immediately changed the station’s format. 229 In contrast
to the giveaways and promotions that the well-heeled Storz believed the public demanded,
Reconciliation Inc. sponsored community events like the three-act play “Black is Beautiful” at
the city auditorium. At the event, not unlike a sop hock, junior high and high school students
performed while a disc jockey spun records. The “phonograph records came to life,” as the
students acted out the drama to the sounds blasted over the PA system. 230 Aside from direct
involvement in the community life, this KOWH also sponsored relief drives for West African
nations, asking their audience to give money rather than the normal radio promotion that
promised treasure and a ticket to the mass consumption for a lucky listener. 231 KOWH had
come a long way.
Storz once observed that, “radio stations are licensed by the FCC to serve ‘in the public
interest.’ Isn’t it logical that if we have over 40 percent of the available audience… that we must
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be succeeding in upholding our obligation and commission to the public?” 232 KOWH under
Reconciliation Inc. came nowhere near a 40 percent market share. Storz’s public was a different
entity than that which the FCC or Reconciliation Inc. addressed. It was a group of independent,
unconnected consumers because radio was “a purely voluntary listening habit,” in which
individuals chose or chose not to participate. 233 Storz’s voluntary society connected individuals
together through shared commodities, in this case 45 rpm records. In the changing cultural
milieu of the 1960s, in which popular, albeit long playing, records assumed an ever more
prominent role, Storz’s vision of the American listening public would become entrenched, and,
oddly enough, a cause of celebration in the counterculture. In the meantime, however, the
musical grab bag of the Top 40 format would be replaced by ever-narrower form of
broadcasting, segregating genres, time periods, and races to different frequencies.
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Chapter Four
Making Records, Making Money, Making Connections: The Rise of the Rock Long Player

What’s happened to recorded music?” RCA Victor Vice President George Marek asked
the Overseas Press Club in 1961. In a series of subsequent off-the-cuff remarks he answered
himself and spoke for an entire industry. Marek called attention to the records of the youth
culture that had upset industry assumptions and united young people across class, racial, and
even national frontiers. The youth culture and its propensity to purchase millions of records,
while making RCA fantastic sums of money, had also made the business environment more
daunting and raised troubling questions about the future of the record business and even the
future of music. American popular recorded music had conquered the world, peacefully uniting
peoples even across the so-called Iron Curtain. “I don’t know if this has helped out our
international relations, but Elvis (RCA’s best-selling musician) has a big following in Russia
where they tape his records from the radio and cut records on photo plates.” Marek marveled at
the power of the record to build community. “We don’t get a cent of royalties, but you’ll have to
admit there’s a certain one-worldness about it.” Where containment had failed, the music of the
young may succeed even ending the Cold War. 234
Though Elvis sales no doubt paid for a good portion of his salary, Marek nonetheless
voiced alarm at the sounds under which the world was choosing to unite. “We have a trade
paper called Billboard and if you look at the best seller charts there in Norway, England and
practically any other place, you see the biggest sellers are Paul Anka, Ricky Nelson, and Elvis
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Presley is the No. 1 artist everywhere – if you can call him an artist.” 235 Marek revealed a
surprising level of embarrassment over the source of his wealth. Elvis was extraordinary, but he
was probably not an artist. His records were, first and foremost, a social phenomenon and one
that was slightly dubious in terms of its cultural value.
Riding the waves of a rising youth tide, Marek simultaneously rejoiced and balked at the
brave new sonic world and its raucous, recorded culture. Like his colleagues at the other major
labels, he benefited from and was bewildered by the powerful response of young audiences to
rock and roll. He represented an industry-wide ambivalence, common in 1961, which would
disappear by the end of the decade. By 1970, youth culture would not only be accepted and
celebrated by the recording industry, but its values would permeate the industry itself. This
made sense – or at least should have to those selling the records. Recorded music had assumed a
central position in the youth culture, first in the form of Top 40 radio and increasingly in the
recorded artifact.
The Elvis singles that Russians captured off the air would give way to magnificent rock
long-players, serious and seriously expensive-to-produce (and top selling) expressions of the
youth culture. The recording industry was essential in producing and distributing youth’s
popular music for mass consumption both in the United States and around the globe. It likewise
assisted in shaping the contours of the new listening experience, but the industry in turn was
shaped by the youth culture. Youth culture would transform the making and selling of records
and the industry that emerged in the 1970s a very different entity than before. The story of the
1960s is how the industry began to first take seriously the economic potential of the youth
culture and then merge with it. Youth culture first went mainstream in the recording industry.
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Rise of the Long Player

The long-playing record proved to be most important product in fostering the industry’s
relationship to youth culture in the 1960s. Developed by Columbia in 1947, the fifteen-minute
per side playing length meant that the long player was primarily thought of as the record for
older, more affluent, and more sophisticated listeners. It only began gaining popularity among
the young in the 1960s, and this change in the young’s consumption habits would lead to a series
of record-breaking sales years in the 1960s. By mid-decade, the long-player attained a
sacrosanct position in a recording industry that had only a few years before hailed the 45-rpm
single as the mysterious and unpredictable route to success. The rise of the LP reconsolidated an
industry that the single had threatened to fragment. The big companies possessed the facilities
and equipment to meet increasing technical demands, the money to pay the huge sums rock
musicians commanded, and, as always, the national reach and administrative structure to better
distribute their product. The new listening style was intimately linked to the growth of some of
the largest firms in the nation.
The rise of the long player changed the way musicians made music as well. Producing
records for the rock audience transformed the recording process. Producers no longer sought
merely to capture and document a strong performance but to compose different sounds into a
sonic image. Record making became a compositional, rather than a documentary activity in
which the producer, musicians, and engineers used tape and multitrack technology to rearrange
sounds and songs to create novel sonic images that were often impossible to perform live. This
shift not only changed the meaning of musicianship, but it also gave young musicians
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unprecedented power and wealth. The focus on creating a stand-alone record encouraged a
paradoxical relationship between musician and audience that simultaneously increased the
physical distance while at the same time fostering intense intimacy.
Throughout the 1950s, the major labels had been slow to adjust to the growing power of
the youth market and its demand for singles and rock and roll music. Billboard noted in 1961
that the trend toward more producers and more labels scoring hit records was entrenched. 236 The
single-buying youth market awed and worried Billboard and the industry, which questioned the
rock and roll’s longevity. 237 Warner Brothers executive Stan Cornyn explained that his
superiors and their counterparts at Columbia became confused and in a dynamic market sought
security. Warner Brothers retained a strategy that emphasized an extensive catalog of diverse
genres – sold on LP – as the key to success. “Now I think back, it’s odd that so little attention
was given to singles and Top 40,” Cornyn wrote. “All these industry hot guys, who’d managed
the mightiest labels, treating hit singles like they came nineteenth on some agenda, down near
warehouse insurance costs. My bosses, seasoned executives, were just dancing on
quicksand.” 238 Innovative and talented individuals at Sun Studios, Atlantic, Motown, and A&M
and others profited from the majors’ out-of-date business models and their success at selling to
the young single-buying consumers increased the independents’ share of the market into the first
years of the 1960s. 239

236

Bob Rolontz, “Columbia and Victor Firms Place Most Records in the BMW Charmed Top
50,” Billboard, December 25, 1961, 4.
237
“Gradual Shift to ‘Good Music’ Creates Quandary for Pop Labels,” Billboard, August 21,
1961, 1; “Juke Box Altering Singles A&R: Col, Decca-Coral, Vassar, UA Gear Singles to Ops”
Billboard, July 17, 1961, 1; Cap Chart Action Marks Singles Rise, Billboard, September 18,
1961, 1.
238
Stan Cornyn, Exploding: The Highs, Hits, Hype, Heroes, and Hustlers of the Warner Music
Group, New York: Rolling Stone Press, 2002, 25.
239
Millard, America on Record, 229.

124
Of the upstart record companies that emerged in the 1960s, A&M remained independent
the longest and enjoyed the most success. In 1962 trumpet player Herb Alpert and East Coast
record promotion man Jerry Moss combined the first two letters of their surnames to form A&M,
and over the next three years transformed the label from a one-hit phenomenon into one of the
industry’s leaders. Starting out as a novelty act that sold hit singles, the label quickly morphed
into one that primarily sold LPs by decades end. Desiring a greater share of the profits than they
had received from a minor hit on Dot Records, Alpert and Moss released 45 rpm single, “Lonely
Bull” on their own. Using studio overdubs and bullfighting noise to suggest a Hispanic
atmosphere, Alpert carefully layered trumpet track over trumpet track to produce a unique,
mariachi-like sound that would score many subsequent hits. Following the path blazed by other
hustling independent label owners, Alpert shipped the single out of his garage and Moss traveled
the country to promote the record to radio station program managers and disc jockeys. Despite
the A&M’s limitations, “Lonely Bull” sold 700,000 units.
From 1964 to 1965, revenue exploded from $600,000 to $7.6 million, and in 1965, Alpert
formed a performing band to capitalize on the success of the studio-created Tijuana Brass
albums. The touring band became one of the top nightclub attractions in the nation, focusing on
college campuses and major metropolitan areas. The label began expanding its administrative
structure in 1965, when it hired industry veteran Tommy Lipuma as the Artist and Repertoire
chief. Among Lipuma’s duties would be listening to and evaluating the tapes from hopeful and
sometimes desperately lonely amateurs that flooded the label after the Brass hit the big time. 240
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A year later, the Tijuana Brass topped long playing record sales in the United States, besting
even the Beatles. 241
A&M triumphed in part because of its innovation in the studio and in part because of its
understanding of the market and cultural climate. Alpert’s Tijuana Brass did not in any
conventional sense exit until Alpert formed a performing band in 1965, and like Storz, Alpert
identified and sought out an audience ignored by the majors. The band exploited and revitalized
what the industry called MOR, or “middle of the road.” The MOR product, as A&M conceived
it, should not be marketed solely toward older listeners, but rather should adopt some of the
trappings of rock to find a middle ground between generations of listeners. “…[T]he group is not
so frenzied-and-freaky groovy as to alienate the over-thirty-year-old,” Look enthused, adding
that “the boys in the Brass, while they are not male moppets, are not elderly either.” 242 The
Tijuana Brass would not sell itself to a monolithic youth market, but rather to a subset of that
market. Though appearing to bridge the generations by offering music that appealed in both
mainstream and youth cultures, the Brass can better be understood as discovering and
segmenting an audience in between the two.
A&M’s vision of the MOR genre meant that the Tijuana Brass, similar to rock bands,
saw the young, or a certain type of young person, as an important element to its audience. In
support of the band’s 1966 tour, A&M bought advertising in nine university newspapers as well
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as men’s magazines, such as Playboy and Esquire. It attempted to reach girls reading Seventeen
along with the young women readers of Cosmopolitan and Glamour. 243
At least in Lincoln, Nebraska the MOR media blitz paid off. Lincoln’s Pershing
auditorium sold out, and for the first time in the venue’s existence offered standing-room-only
tickets to accommodate intense demand. 244 The industry had long been aware of the profligate
record-buying habits college students but only recently had it begun to pursue college students
with great intensity. Jumps in enrolment, like the 1,000 extra students coming to Florida in
1966, encouraged universities to begin booking popular music acts, drawing the attention of
Billboard and record companies. 245 A&M listened closely to its audience, accepting unsolicited
tapes, answering fan letters, and as the sixties ended, diversifying its roster beyond MOR to
include rock artists. Its responsiveness to a changing market driven by young consumers helped
it to develop a strategy that enabled a successful transition from single-producing label to one
capable of producing high selling long players.
The quicksand of singles and radio play that temporarily froze the majors and enlivened
small companies such as A&M eventually turned solid when rock LPs became items of youth
devotion. Even as the singles-based Top 40 radio empire conquered the airwaves with 45-rpms
in the 1950s, LP sales flew under the radar, growing at a surprisingly brisk clip. In 1950 LP
sales stood at $189 million, a figure that mushroomed to $603 million by 1960, partly as a result
of the high fidelity phenomenon. Though a single was often necessary to break an album, the
industry rediscovered to its delight that greater money lay in selling twelve songs rather than
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two. After 1965, a majority of A&M’s revenue came from the sales of Tijuana Brass long
players, rather than singles, and the label swiftly moved to sign album oriented rock acts,
including anti-MOR recording figures such as Captain Beefheart and Melvin Van Peebles. “All
companies are experimenting,” A&M artists and repertoire chief Allan Stanton said at the end of
1968. “You have to come up with the album from left field.” To further its LP production
capabilities, A&M constructed three new studios. 246
For the industry as a whole, in 1968, album sales accounted for 82 percent of record
sales, having increased over 16 percent in a year in which singles sales remained flat. 247 Singles
were becoming less necessary to break an album. Record store clerks reported in 1966 that they
no longer trusted Top 40 radio stations to play what young people were actually buying. Instead
they relied on requests from the young buyers themselves along with their own experience when
deciding what and how many new releases to order. 248 To profit from an affluent youth culture,
a firm had to listen and cater to it. A new and mysterious network in the 1960s youth culture,
operating below Top 40’s signal, was connecting the young. As a result, power shifted away
from Top 40 program managers and fell directly on musicians, the recording industry, and its
marketing machine.
Elektra, which became a significant industry player in the latter half of the 1960s, was
another independent record label that benefited from the growth in LP sales vis-à-vis singles.
Throughout the 1950s, the label specialized in folk albums, aiming at an older, more educated,
and more bohemian audience than Top 40. As the folk fad of the early 1960s spawned a number
of big selling artists, such as Peter, Paul, and Mary and the Kingston Tri, president and owner Jac
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Holzman attempted to play the Top 40 game for his college audience. Rushing out singles,
influencing disc jockeys, and signing and maintaining rock bands (the Lovin’ Spoonful was one
that got away), proved moderately successful, but he was unable to top the charts. Holzman
even tried his hand at running a radio station, but felt overwhelmed and quickly sold his interest
in a Hartford, Connecticut station. “So I returned to the core, which was always records.” 249
Holzman did not return to his folk foundation in Greenwich Village, but reoriented the company
toward Los Angeles, where A&M was already achieving great success and where a number of
ambitious or desperate musicians would end up. 250 Known for its electric rock, not folk, Los
Angeles would become the center for the recording industry in the 1960s.
Elektra’s first rock record, the Paul Butterfield Blues Band sold well, and the label scored
its first big hit with the band Love and its 1965 debut album. In the turbulent business climate of
the 1960s, Elektra’s growing success provided a model for major labels searching for rules of
operation. 251 Elektra became an industry sensation in 1967, when it recorded and released the
first Doors record. Following its rise to the top, Elektra stumbled forward, scoring big hits but as
a result finding itself unable to cope with the demands placed on its small administrative
structure until the overwhelmed Holzman sold out. That the ramshackle Elektra could serve as a
legitimate business model for Warner’s, which dominated the industry by the end of the sixties
and bought Elektra, demonstrates the degree of uncertainty about how to tap the lucrative but
fickle youth record buying market.
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The strategy, at its essence, was to make long playing records, though not necessarily
with cuts designed for Top 40 radio play, allow musicians wide latitude in the recording process,
and make extensive use of the technologies available in the studio for the production of novel
sounds. The intent, or hope, was that the records the rock musicians wanted to make would be
better suited to the tastes of an audience that was rapidly changing.

Youth in the Saddle, in the Studio – The Recording Industry, 1965-69

In pursuit of the mysterious audience, A&M Records screened all unsolicited tapes sent
to its Sunset Boulevard offices. None of these tapes ever led to A&M signing a new act, but the
practice allowed the label to keep an ear to the ground and maintain a tenuous connection to its
largely unseen and unheard audience. Rock and roll patriots, anti-rocking ballad singers, and exband leaders all sought out the ears of A&M artist and repertoire man Lipuma. The lack of a
counterculture element in the submissions is not surprising considering the MOR audience
Alpert and Moss originally coveted. This was a significant market; the top selling singles of
1966 included Staff Sgt. Barry Sadler’s backlash hit “Ballad of the Green Beret.” 252 Lipuma,
however, declined each and every submission he received with grace and with what must have
seemed like somewhat empty encouragement. A&M legal counsel urged Moss in a series of
pointed memos to halt the practice and return all correspondence unopened, but Lipuma and
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apparently Moss and Alpert, believed the listening and, in many cases, a response worth the legal
risk. Lipuma ignored all warnings from legal counsel. 253
Holzman had maintained close personal relationships with his folk musicians at Elektra,
and this experience would help him navigate the psychedelic terrain of 1960s rock industry.
Even the savvy Holzman, however, felt insecure about his ears and taste and maintained a
company “freak,” talent scout Danny Fields, on the payroll. His most prominent producer, Paul
Rothschild, cultivated the practice of “hanging out” with the rock talent in Los Angeles, a craft
that David Geffen would turn into a lucrative art form over at Asylum Records. 254 Hanging out
and gaining trust required giving concessions to rock musicians over aspects of record
production.
Holzman turned over authority in the recording process to his musicians partly because
he had trouble understanding his intended audience, partly because he had always allowed a fair
degree of artistic autonomy, and partly because rock musicians demanded it. Rock musicians
had grown up on 45s and Top 40 radio and approached recording rather than performing as
central to their career. When the San Francisco-based Grateful Dead, hardly a studio-bound
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band, signed a-then unprecedented $10,000 advance with Warner’s in 1966, the band insisted on
a contract stipulating that they had choice in producer, control over cover art, as well as over
song selection. These were rights established and older stars such as Dean Martin had never
received. 255 Following the Dead signing, fellow San Franciscans, the Jefferson Airplane saw its
singles begin to rise on the charts. An industry rush to sign San Francisco bands ensued. During
the so-called “Summer of Love” in 1967, confused and excited A&R men threw hundreds of
thousands of dollars at the counterculture rock scene, signing most of the major acts. By
permitting rock bands to fill up their album sleeves with their own art and endless, self-indulgent
acknowledgments, the records labels unwittingly aided the notion that the musicians were
speaking directly to their audience, a communications that was essential to the rock and roll myth
and the fostering of a community through records. 256
As in other aspects, Elektra was at the forefront in changing the recording process.
Musicians – now called artists – no longer entered the studio and attempted to capture a good
performance aided by recording experts. With the Doors and others, the roles of musicians,
producers, and engineers folded into each other and the recording process became a collective
creative and technical enterprise with the studio an instrument. Two of those responsible for the
shift at the ground level, were engineer Bruce Botnick and producer Rothschild. In recording the
Doors, Rothchild recalled his approach as,
I didn’t want a Doors record to sound like anybody else’s records…if you create your
own sound, if you’ve got something unique, the best thing you can do is to keep it as pure
as possible, so that it’s not copyable. For example, [guitarist] Robby Krieger was
enchanted with the wah-wah pedal, which Jimi Hendrix is associated with. But you
could buy that off the shelf, and it immediately made any guitar player sound like any
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other guitar player. Instead I said, “I prohibit you from using off-the-shelf-material.
Create it. Invent it.” 257

The Doors took to Rothchild’s lessons and the former UCLA film students’ subsequent
LPs would take months to produce as they played filmmakers, splicing and overdubbing
instrument and vocal recordings. Studio composition allowed for producers, engineers and
musicians to record multiple performances, called tracks, and then mix and match them to create
the song. Thus the songs that appeared on the record were a result of songwriting,
improvisation, careful planning, and happy accidents, all caught on tape. Engineers, producers,
and the musicians would then carefully manipulate the captured sounds and tracks in a
sometimes-tedious enterprise that could take months to complete. The final process resulting in
the master was called the mixdown and did not require the presence of the musicians, though
they often insisted on being present. 258 Studio composition, unlike song writing, emphasized
sound over structure, and unlike performance, did not demand traditional notions of virtuosity
from the musicians. Studio technique, which only a few years earlier had meant microphone
placement, became a complex technological and collective enterprise. 259
Students of the studio credit Les Paul and Mary Ford as the first popular musicians to
fully take advantage of tape overdubs and studio echoes in their 1951 hit “How High the Moon,”
but this sort of studio composition was not widely practiced, and indeed quite impractical, until
the 1960s. The rock producer Phil Spector, and his signature “Wall of Sound” revealed the
practice’s commercial and artistic potential, which continued with the Beatles, the Beach Boys,
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and Jimi Hendrix, among others. Studio composition was never limited to rock, as Alpert’s
career demonstrates, but for a style born in the studio and distributed on record, it was
appropriate that rock musicians were at the forefront of the new techniques. 260
Among the independents of the 1950s and early 1960s, tape technology had been crucial
to their ability to make cheap hit singles and would continue to be important for rock bands
engaged in studio composition. Atlantic, in particular its engineer Tom Dowd, was known for
being among the first to invest in multi-tracking technology. 261 Dowd claimed that Atlantic was
promoting 8-track equipment “before people knew what that meant… We were recording the
Coasters, Bobby Darin, and Ray Charles on 8-track back in 1957.” 262 Being ahead of the trends
was good to Atlantic and in 1968 the label was scored 23 certified gold records, more than any
other record company had ever compiled in a one-year period. 263
Tape technology allowed for the construction of novel sounds and planned spontaneity
that simple recording did not. The album increased in importance vis-à-vis the performance, and
audiences became accustomed to consuming studio-generated sound that often could never be
replicated on stage. Even Avalon ballroom-favorite Jefferson Airplane became enamored with
studio composition, frustrating an anxiously waiting Rolling Stone when the band spent months
recording its second long player. 264 Though the changes in recording and the rise of the long
player eventually benefited the major labels, they did not initially encourage them.
Studio composition’s demands burned out some of its pioneers. The difficulty of
working with petulant artists in search of sonic perfection fatigued Bruce Botnick. Despite the
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great success he enjoyed as a rock engineer, he left popular music to record exclusively for the
film industry. “Only later on did we discover the fun of dragging it out,” he remembered
sarcastically. “An album that should have taken two or three weeks to do would take eleven
months or longer. I just ran out of enthusiasm.” 265 Engineers and studio executives would have
preferred a shorter recording session, because of the headaches and the costs involved,
respectively. The impetus for change came from the musicians and the young audience.
The requirement of “hanging out” with musicians altered the corporate culture at the
studio offices as well. While never IBM, the major labels were not known for retaining the
services of company “freaks” or assistants named “Tinkerbell.” “Inside Warner Bros. Records,
around 1967, the executive look grew slightly shaggier,” Stan Cornyn explained. “Top
executives, those craving entente with their artists, heads of hair were less frequently harvested.
Beards sprouted like an epidemic of ragweed.” 266 Nehru jackets and sideburns were suddenly de
rigueur. Publicist Connie de Nave, so at ease promoting 1950s and early 1960s pop groups, gave
up on trying to figure out the LP era. “I stopped making decisions for about two years and relied
on my house flower child because she would tell me what was going on in the mainstream – I
saw but didn’t understand – and then I would make my judgments on what was going down.
This happened at every company.” 267
Even the pages of Billboard had come not only to grudgingly accept but also to celebrate
and adopt (on its own terms) the promise of the counterculture. The industry had been feeling
the youthquake’s vibrations in LP sales since at least 1965, and by mid-1967 Billboard was
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breaking form in its attempts to report on and explain what before had been rather mundane
market trends associated with an age bracket. Gone was all trace of condescension or pretense of
objectivity. “Significantly,” an unnamed correspondent wrote about the famous 1967 Monterey
International Pops Festival, “it was not the performances on stage which made the greatest
impression on most of the veteran observers of the concert and pop music scene: it was the
festival concept itself…those wiling to accept its philosophies as an alternative to extinction.”
The review strayed so far from Billboard orthodoxy as to identify some bands, particularly The
Mamas and the Papas, as “too popular.” 268 Suspicion of the mainstream was now part of the
mainstream in the music business. While certainly prospering from the purchasing decisions of
the youth culture, industry men did not seem to be disingenuous in their approval of the new
community for which it called.
As Jimi Hendrix and Big Brother and the Holding Company climbed the charts, the
industry mainstay ran editorials aping the attitude and at times rhetoric found in Rolling Stone.
“In this holiday season of December 1968,” Billboard declared, “love lies bleeding.” In
uncharacteristic leaps of illogic, Billboard linked racial polarization, the Vietnam War, conflict
in the Middle East and Africa, to the decision by a few United States’ department store chains to
not sell the Rotary Connection album Peace. The Chess Records campaign for the album
featured a decrepit Santa Claus and had upset some merchants. “The Cadet ad was not drawn up
in a moment of frivolity,” Billboard intoned. “It represents concern over the state of humanity.
It tells it like it is. To regard Santa today as smiling and happy is at once a cruel and deceptive
mockery.” 269
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The magazine also pondered how long a group stuffy, unhip, and old men, also known as
the United States Congress, could ignore the social, technological, and economic “revolution”
brought about by rock before they updated antiquated copyright and antitrust laws in the
industry’s favor. 270 Newly groovy and self-righteous executives embraced youth rebellion as
Dick Clark’s had earlier embraced 1950s rock and roll, and for much the same reasons. It made
money and was endlessly exciting. It also stoked the vanity of executives. What could be more
gratifying than to learn that the product one is responsible for making is regarded as a solution to
anxiety, alienation, and loneliness? The 1960s recording industry rolled hipness, public service,
and profitability together as the youth culture and even the counterculture melded with the
corporate culture. 271

Connecting to an Unseen Audience: Intimacy and the Long Player

The LP’s popularity altered the relationship between audience and performer. Listeners
in the late 1960s increasingly encountered musicians alone in their room through records. This
made the relationship both distant and intimate in new and exciting ways. Despite the communal
values held among the musicians and fans in the Greenwich Village folk music circles, Holzman
envisioned the record listener as alone with the expertly crafted record. Lacking visual cues or
“agitated fans” to induce a standardized response, the record forced the listener into a more
intimate and satisfying relationship with the essence of the musical experience: the sound itself.
Audiences at performances perhaps having internalized the practices associated with isolated
270
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listening seemed, contrary to the stereotype of rock crowds, increasingly subdued. The young
people at Shea Stadium for the final live performance of the Beatles did not scream or storm the
stage as they had a year before, but listened to their heroes play “Paperback Writer,” and
“Yesterday.”

272

Record companies began marketing albums as instruments of individual

transcendence and sonic head-trips. “You can hold it in your hands…but…not in your mind,”
Cadet Records claimed of the Rotary Connection’s self-titled debut album. 273
Making objects that possessed or were believed to posses the power to directly connect to
a listener to an artist and thereby produce an overwhelming experience was no mean feat.
Recording was no longer a snapshot of a band in peak performance, but a creative endeavor in
which musicians and engineers sculpted and rearranged and manipulated discrete sounds into
“sonic images.” The challenge, as historian and former sound engineer Zach Albin has noted,
was to create a musical experience on record that the listener would return to, again and again,
“to the exact set of expressive gestures – a project that seems to run counter to the very nature or
performance.” 274 Making good long playing rock records put a premium on the intensity of the
isolated listening experience.
Fan letters to Herb Alpert exhibit the power of this experience from the fan’s perspective
and his responses the bewilderment of the musician. Before the creation of the Tijuana Brass
Fan club in the fall of 1966, Alpert normally responded to fan letters via his secretary with a
simple form letter, but some letters merited his personal attention. Fourteen-year-old Kate
Eheinberger wrote to “the best trumpeter in the world” explaining, “I’m here all alone with just
my ‘Whipped Cream’ album to keep me company (I wish I had all your albums but where’s the
272
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money?)” She explained that she had recently quit piano lessons and dreaded a dull future in
which she believed she would most likely be reduced to teaching high school – probably algebra.
This tragedy could be averted, however, if she received encouragement from Alpert. She
promised him that she would “knuckle down and really try hard” at piano and join a combo
similar to, but certainly not on the same exalted level as, the Tijuana Brass. After a good deal of
pleading, she concluded, “Please give me this. Let’s drop the subject. Whatever happens, I still
love you and your music.” 275
The girl found great meaning in her experience with the record, just as Holzman’s ideal
demanded, and had established some sort of personal connection with an imagined Alpert. The
intense affection for Alpert seems odd both because he was not in any sense a conventional teen
idol, and because it was coupled with an equally intense despair. Eheinberger described her life
as disappointing and lacking either a more meaningful, two-way connection (the request for
“encouragement”) or a band of her own in which she could belong, she feared she would remain
alone. Her isolation would trap her both in a traditional gender role as a teacher while keeping
here stuck within the youth world of the high school. It would be a life that offered little chance
at realizing her potential as an individual or to satisfy her desperate need to belong. Listening to
the Tijuana Brass helped relieve some anxiety and loneliness, but her consistent, negative
comparisons between her musical abilities to those of her favorite band also made it hard for her
to continue to believe that she should be playing music. One finds it difficult to imagine Alpert
recorded the upbeat and mildly naughty “Whipped Cream (and other Delights)” with this sort of
audience reaction in mind.
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Letters to mass media figures in the early twentieth century also exhibited a tendency
toward intense devotion directed at favored stars. In a review of fan letters to a prewar movie
studio, Leo Rosten was impressed by the number who “unburdened their ambitions and
unhappiness” on the screen stars, pleading for any sort of acknowledgment or words of
reassurance. Other letters made bizarre requests, asking for a “piece of gum you have chewed”
or offering to switch places with a star’s dog. Rosten’s data showed that persons under 21
penned over 90 percent of such letters, with almost that same percentage being female. 276
Stage actors did not receive this sort of adulation, suggesting that it was not the
performance or performer, but the medium generating the intensity. In the main, however, fan
culture among prewar American girls served as a socializing experience. Girls decorated rooms
and lockers with pictures and drawings of favored stars, saw movies together, and requested and
traded photos from the studios. The studios benefited by learning through their mailbags, which
stars were marketable and which were not. “Creating their own movie fan culture at home and
school,” Kelly Schrum said, “offered teenage girls a pleasurable way to interact with stars,
dreams and with each other.” 277 The girl writing to Alpert, however, does not fit into this
description of teen fandom. Alone and writing to a man who was not a teen idol, Eheinberger
represented a new phenomenon.
Alpert’s response indicates that he was genuinely concerned. His name, not his
secretary’s, graces the letter, and though he includes the standard fan reply form, he adds an
additional paragraph. Urging his young fan to continue her piano playing, Alpert stresses that
personal satisfaction and social rewards will follow a life of amateur music making. As for her
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love of the Tijuana Brass, Alpert mentions that “we will continue to make the kind of music you
and your friends will continue to enjoy,” despite the fact that the girl explicitly stated that she
listened to “Whipped Cream” alone. It seems Alpert would feel better if she were not alone with
his record. Alpert indirectly engaged the girl’s loneliness and her fear that she lacks the talent to
pursue a career as a professional musician by insisting that personal, social, and musical
satisfaction do not depend on whether one makes records or not. 278 The gap between audience
and performer allowed for the audience to consume records in ways that were quite different
from the ways intended by the musician. As a result of this distance, intense and imagined
connections to took hold
Another group of letter writers had come to know Alpert and the Tijuana Brass through
the record by joining with the band in imaginary performances. An amateur maraca player
named Harold Carranza, detailed not only how he enjoyed accompanying his record player but
also revealed his fantasy of joining the actual Tijuana Brass on stage, requesting “the pleasure an
honor of playing in you band” for one night. Carranza expressed gratitude to Alpert, crediting
the Brass records for helping him to develop a unique maraca shaking technique. Like
Eheinberger, Carranza listened alone, but unlike her he also participated. Joining the band meant
something far beyond the mere pleasure in music. Carranza wanted Alpert to hear his unique
personality that came through in his playing technique. He seemed to understand that his request
was most likely a fantasy never to be realized, yet he nonetheless felt obligated to write it down
and send it to A&M Records. The desire to let the performer know he was there suggests the
resonance of a conventional understanding of the musical experience.
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Alpert responded swiftly, explaining that the Tijuana Brass’s schedule was unfortunately
too tight for him to add an additional maraca player. Again, Alpert seems to have been touched
and confused by the fan’s devotion and apparent isolation. Alpert signed off with the salutation
he reserved for personal correspondences and thank-you notes, “Ole and Best Wishes.” 279 The
studio-centered popular music that emerged in the 1960s increased the distance between
musician and performer yet simultaneously made possible imagined, intimate, and intense
connections.
A&M believed that other commodities, beyond records and their sleeves, could be sold to
its emotionally charged audience offering another connector to the band. It pursued a strategy, at
first haphazard then more streamlined, to market a wide variety of Tijuana Brass and Herb
Alpert-themed products. These would allow for listeners to access their vinyl friends in a variety
of media. A&M rejected a proposal to create franchise-based “Tijuana Taco Stands,” and
considered but ultimately declined requests by a tie manufacture for “Tijuana ties.” 280 As its
success mounted, the company sought professional guidance and contracted with Licensing
Corporation of America. LCA suggested a long-range approach to licensing, pointing to its
success in licensing James Bond movie tie-ins and its extensive work marketing comic book
superheroes-related products as evidence that it could reach the young (and apparently male)
audiences A&M had in mind. It cautioned A&M not to flood the market, but to choose only
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those products that their audience would accept. “Just as Herb Alpert is world famous for his
novel and imaginative music, we would attempt to achieve this same reputation for licensed
merchandise,” LCA explained in a letter accompanying the licensing contract. “This means the
careful selection of items for a coordinated campaign and a long range sustained merchandising
effect.” 281 If one could not be with the Brass in the flesh, one could live a lifestyle licensed by
him nonetheless. A&M, however, would prove to have more success selling records than any
accessory.
Promotional activities, like record production, shifted in the 1960s toward youth and what
the industry believed were its notions of community and authenticity. In selling the Doors’
Southern California-themed sonic dread and decadence, Elektra leased a billboard on Sunset
Boulevard as part of the promotion campaign for their debut LP. It was the first time what
would later become a common practice had been done. A&M had earlier considered leasing a
Sunset and La Brea billboard in late 1966 for the very different image of the Tijuana Brass.
A&M and Elektra were also among of the first companies to advertise in Rolling Stone but it was
Warner’s that exploited the new magazine with the greatest success. 282
Seeing that Top 40 radio was ignoring its “odder artists” Warner’s began taking out
unconventional full-page ads in the underground press. Unlike the ham-fisted efforts of rival
Columbia, Warner’s adopted an irreverent, knowing, and informal style. One ad assured
potential buyers, “You don’t like our records, send in for a free Baggie of Laurel Canyon dirt,”
referring to the famous Los Angeles street where musicians and counterculture types lived and
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worked. “Joni Mitchell: 90 percent Virgin,” declared another. Although Mitchell considered the
ad offensive, most artists appreciated Cornyn’s humor and candor. So did rock writers. Rolling
Stone’s Greil Marcus found in Cornyn a partner to pull off an elaborate gag that fooled the trades
and many fans into believing that Warner’s had recorded “Cow Pie,” an album by the fictitious
Masked Marauders, consisting of rock superheroes Bob Dylan, Mick Jagger, John Lennon, Paul
McCartney, and George Harrison. 283
The intent and effect of the Warner’s ads was in many ways similar to the promotions
pursued by Storz-owned radio stations a decade earlier. The audience was allowed in on a joke,
this time played on the recording industry and ignorant or unhip fans. The ads promoted a sense
of belonging as well as an implied cultural superiority. The irreverent style did not in any way
reduce the power of the record being sold, rather its informality enhanced the connective
possibilities the record offered. Paralleling the promise of the music, the ads offered one
belonging by “getting” the joke (which was actually quite serious) and even more so by
purchasing the album.

Radio follows the Record: FM

As young people turned away from the 45-rpm single and its radio advocate, they
discovered a new on-air voice. Frequency Modulation (FM) was instrumental in introducing
audiences to recently released rock long players, and the new format would take the place of Top
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40 as youth’s voice on the radio dial. 284 The stereo LP’s hi-fidelity capabilities that altered the
listening experience could be better appreciated on high fidelity FM stations. In 1967 the FCC
prohibited AM simulcasts on FM sister stations in major markets, and left blank hours of
programming. Even before this move, the FM dial had emerged as a significant player. In
Fresno, California, FM had penetrated nearly forty percent of all homes, and nearly one fifth of
all automobiles sported an FM receiver. Despite being associated with the male high fidelity
subculture, more women tuned into FM than did men. 285 Following the FCC decision, culturally
astute FM station managers filled the programming void with rock and what later came to be
known as the freeform or album-oriented rock format, giving the records of the young the high
fidelity treatment previously reserved for classical or jazz broadcasts. As with Top 40, many
industry leaders greeted the FM with suspicion and maintained what seemed to be working: the
Top 40 format. Young listeners, however, tuned in to FM to hear the latest sonic creations being
crafted in the nation’s most sophisticated studios by the wild and wooly men (along with the
occasional woman) of rock and commune with their morphing imagined community.
According to Rolling Stone, the self-proclaimed voice of youth rock and roll culture in
the late 1960s, Top 40 radio had betrayed its audience, having become: “A Rotting Corpse,
Stinking up the Airwaves.” Tom Donahue, a pioneering FM freeform disc jockey, attacked AM
Top 40 with more virulence in Rolling Stone than the magazine usually reserved for President
Lyndon Johnson. Top 40 was not merely FM radio’s competitor, Donahue maintained, but an
enemy of youth culture and of its social and artistic progress. The format once served a purpose,
but the mindless jingles, rapid-fire disk jockey patter (light years from Donahue’s low key on-air
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persona), and banal two-minute pop records no longer reflected its now more sophisticated
audience. “The music has matured, the audience has matured, but radio has apparently proven to
be a retarded child,” Donahue sneered. Out-of-touch Top 40 station executives did not
understand the importance of the LP, and even ignored their otherwise keen business acumen, as
Donahue related, “if a record is selling that is more than seven inches in diameter, they don’t
want to hear it, and most assuredly are not going to play it.” 286 Only on the FM dial did disc
jockeys respect listeners’ desires and intelligences and recognize the long player’s power and
meaning. At Donahue’s KMPX disc jockeys played extended and uninterrupted album cuts,
letting the LP speak for itself.
Ironically much of Donahue’s criticism of Top 40 sounds like an updated version of
Columbia A&R chief Mitch Miller’s famous 1958 denunciation of rock and roll as a social
disease and its listeners as bubble-gum chewing cretins. 287 Like Miller, Donahue urged disc
jockeys to exhibit taste and avoid programming for the lowest common denominator, which in
both following the singles charts. Unlike Miller, however, Donahue was a beneficiary of rock
and roll and looked the part. “Big Daddy” Donahue wore the clothes, had the beard, and the long
hair (albeit a bit grayer – he was nearly 40) that identified him as countercultural. Though he
demanded taste, what he really believed in was the market populism Top 40 had abandoned.
“Where once Top-40 radio reflected the taste of its audience,” Donahue proclaimed, “today it
attempts to dictate it, and in the process has alienated its once loyal army of listeners.” The
problem was not that Top 40 was too commercial, but that it had an out-of-date business model.
FM stations playing albums were more responsive to a changing market, and thus accurately
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reflected the current youth culture. The FM rock stations delivered the long-playing musical
commodity listeners desired. 288
When KMPX made Donahue’s its program manager in 1967, the album or “progressive”
rock genre accounted for 1 in 4 of the albums on the Billboard charts, but the sometimes long,
loud, and weird songs were hard to find on AM radio because the Top 40 format restricted song
length and catered to a broad audience. 289 In seeking an overlooked audience of LP-buying
young people, Donahue behaved as Storz’s had nearly two decades earlier, overcoming inferior
equipment and improvising as he went along. Donahue possessed an iconoclast’s reputation,
bolstered by his a propensity for following an Elvis Presley record with one of Mozart’s. He
maintained a vocal, if hazy, anti-establishment position. With Donahue at the helm, KMPX
rejected advertising spots for tampons, the armed forces, fast food, gasoline, alcohol, and
cigarettes. He enjoyed mutually beneficial friendships with many of the San Francisco scene
luminaries such as Janis Joplin and the Grateful Dead who often dropped by the station to chat
on air. As the radio industry woke up to the potential of a new audience that was intensely loyal
to its favorite station, it learned that an album-oriented rock format could deliver even larger
audiences (and sell ads to whoever wanted to buy) by dropping Donahue’s political rhetoric and
the Magic Flute. 290 This realization and the resulting competition among stations turned
freeform into a more traditional format, based on playing extended cuts from rock and roll LPs.
Unlike the old Top 40 format, however, freeform never promised nor delivered a dominant
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market share, but offered a loyal segment of the radio listening audience, a community that was
in reality a niche market.
Another old Top 40 hand and freeform convert, B. Mitchell Reed lauded the changes that
professionalized rock radio by the early 1970s. After the initial experimental period at KMPX
with Donahue, Reed was hired by KMET in Los Angeles. At KMET music and program
directors, acting in the same capacity as their counterparts at Top 40 stations, watched the charts
and identified which albums the disc jockeys were to play over the air. The disc jockey then
chose the songs from the selected albums, and added an “oldie” into the mix. 291 Though KMET
remained “left of center” as Reed put it, most rock stations ditched anti-commercial language
and practices. After Donahue left KMPX in 1968 following a bitter dispute over salaries and
equipment upgrades, he landed at San Francisco’s other FM rock station, KSAN, where he
abandoned his earlier programming idiosyncrasies and counterculture-inspired advertising
prohibitions. 292 The resulting format proved much more restrictive – and much whiter – than
Top 40, which might follow a the Doors’ “Light my Fire,” with Sinatra’s “Strangers in the
Night,” and cap off the hour with the latest offering from Motown. That sort of eclectic
combination would have produced howls of listener protest at rock-only FM outlets, who
demanded strict genre purity.
Rolling Stone saw the emerging hip business culture as a welcome sign of a youth-driven
cultural shift toward authentic community. Former Down Beat columnist, part-time
revolutionist, and Franz Fanon reader, Ralph Gleason noted with approval the $50,000 advances
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and gold watches the Steve Miller Blues Band and the Quicksilver Messengers received after
signing with Capitol. “This is absolutely a break with tradition,” Gleason exulted. Not only
were unprecedented advances offered, but the labels also gave rock musicians more power in the
studio and greater decision-making concerning the cover art. “This society works on money.
Change the way the moneychangers change money and you change society. Rock is doing
that.” 293 Though he may have expected different results, Gleason was right.
The triumph of youth at the recording studio and in the recording industry’s corporate
offices facilitated the triumph of the major labels. As Rolling Stone put a serious face on rock
journalism, making the old fan magazines seem infantile, the long-playing record with its stereo
sound reduced the 45-rpm record to a plaything. Top 40 radio had no place for the ten minute
long rock epics that filled ballrooms in San Francisco. The demand for studio-crafted LPs hit the
rhythm and blues labels especially hard and Chess, Imperial, and Modern disappeared as the
sixties gave way to the seventies. 294 From the perspective of Cornyn at Warner’s, the 1960s
preference for long playing records represented a maturation of the rock and roll audience.
“Singles started being for teens only… For above-teens, the stereo LP became the top sales
configuration… LPs made singles seem like foreplay.” Singles as foreplay represented one type
of relationship, long players offered the most intimate clinch. Rhetorically opposed to big
business and the establishment, rock musicians’ successful big label records centralized the
music industry. The record industry centralized while the youth culture fragmented.
The alleged growing up of the audience grew the bottom line of the major labels and
fundamentally reshaped music making and appreciation. The ethos of Top 40 – follow the youth
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audience – now dominated the recording industry but Top 40 itself had been reduced in
significance. Though recording engineers sought presence and a musically intense
experience, 295 the layers separating musician from audience increased, both in personnel and in
technology. Nonetheless, listeners formed deep, personal, and imagined connections to the new
sonic products, giving credence to the belief that the records were building an authentic
community one that was national or perhaps as Marek wondered in 1961, international.

One World in Sound

In August of 1966 United States Senator Thomas Kuchel (R-Calif.) welcomed the
Tijuana Brass to the Senate floor, commending the group’s international appeal, its unique style,
and its contrast to rock roll or what he termed the “discordant sounds and irregular beats.” Two
weeks previous, A&M Records sent the Senator a suggested speech for the Brass’s DC visit,
jumping at the chance to have a member of the United States Congress repeat the company line
that A&M records brought people together. In the suggested remarks, A&M wanted Kuchel to
emphasize the connective potential of the Tijuana Brass on an international level, perhaps hoping
that the Brass could take the place of American abstract painters of the early postwar era,
becoming Cold War cultural ambassadors “responsible for making friends for their country.”
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Kuchel delivered a more economical speech that also succeeded in taking the focus off of the
record and placing it on the performance. 296
Kuchel identified the Brass as a performing band – he mentioned “reproductions” only
once – while the suggested remarks stressed the Brass’s talents as a recording outfit on par with
the Beatles. The Senator credited the band’s unique “style,” for contributing to the group’s
international appeal, while A&M explicitly pointed to the “new and distinctive ‘sound,’”
correctly implying that a studio generated signature was responsible for the band’s cross cultural
and international appeal. “Think of it,” A&M hoped the Senator would say. “Mr. Alpert and his
men have more than 11 million albums in the hands of music lovers, 3 ½ million of which are
owned by people outside the 50 States of the Union.” With a host of rock acts signed onto the
A&M label, the suggested remarks, unlike the Senator’s ultimate speech, did not attack rock
music, but instead drew attention to a more general sense of sadness and despair in the world. It
was this global ennui that Tijuana Brass records countered by uniting people of many different
backgrounds. 297
For Alpert and A&M, the Senator’s welcoming address represented another, albeit small,
opportunity for publicity, and it made business sense for the label to draw attention to the
records, the sound, and the power of connection in its “joyous” music. Kuchel’s ultimate speech
offered a more traditional commendation of a group of successful musicians who happened to
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hail from his Southern California home. The vision presented by A&M also corresponded to the
underground Rolling Stone’s, and showed that the image of a community built in recorded sound
was neither an exclusively underground or countercultural phenomenon, but one that was
gaining wide popular acceptance in industry circles beyond. Moss and Alpert had listened to
their audience and understood that an effective way to market their products was to present them
as combating isolation. In this case, the nations of the world stood in for the individuals in the
United States, though, of course for the Brass this meant those in the MOR market segment. 298
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Chapter Five
Youth Culture of the 1960s, Pre-recorded Dreams of Authentic Connection

Reporting from the San Francisco’s 1967 “Summer of Love,” Joan Didion revealed to
readers of The Saturday Evening Post a youth dystopia populated by teenage runaways, rape
victims, paranoid radicals, drug dealers, and addicts. A yawning emptiness was at the mediacertified flowering (or deflowering) of the 1960s youth movement. “We are seeing the desperate
attempt of a handful of pathetically unequipped children to create a community in a social
vacuum. Once we had seen these children, we could no longer overlook the vacuum, no longer
pretend that the society’s atomization could be reversed. This was not a traditional generational
rebellion.” To Didion, the broken kids who congregated at the nightmare world around Golden
Gate Park and the Haight sought meaning, identity, and community, but lacked the necessary
rules and language with which to build or even talk about their inchoate desires. The postwar
youth culture founded in high school and built around consumption was in fact without a real
culture. “These were the children who grew up cut loose from the web of cousins and greataunts and family doctors and lifelong neighbors… They are less in rebellion against the society
than ignorant of it, able only to feed back certain of its most publicized self-doubts, Vietnam,
Saran-Wrap, diet pills, the Bomb,” Didion concluded.” 299
When Rolling Stone published its first issue later that fall of 1967, it echoed Didion’s
sympathy and concern for lonely and isolated young people, but heralded the rock music blaring
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out of stereos and inside Bay Area ballrooms as “the magic that will set you free.” 300 Like
Didion, the San Francisco-based magazine expressed unease about the runaways and the
growing despair in the streets outside its offices. “The mountains and hills have since become
repopulated and the Haight-Ashbury is a burned-out vision that leaves a bad taste with many
people because of the plain connection between whatever it was that was called ‘the hippy
scene,’” founder Jan Wenner lamented. The disillusioned, older, out-of-town journalists (Didion
was 32) and record company executives, Wenner claimed, had nonetheless missed the real story.
Time magazine and television had created the Summer of Love and the social dysfunction that
surrounded it. The real youth community was elsewhere. 301
In her analysis of the young people she met and who guided her through the obscure
rituals of the youth counterculture, Didion conflated the mass media. For her television, records,
mimeographed broadsheets, and radio were all equally destructive technologies of selfdeception. Rock records, Rolling Stone, countered, were unique, an unmediated expression of
the young and its authentic voice. According to the magazine, young Americans had been
communicating to each other for over a decade via rock music and subverting the atomizing
tendencies in the dominant culture. “The function of the music was for people to come together
(‘and smile upon you brother’) through the medium of dancing and listening.” In this spirit of
sociability young musicians created what Wenner dubbed the “San Francisco Sound.” The Great
Society, Jefferson Airplane and other seminal Bay Area bands, “realized the existential nature of
rock and roll and have learned to use pure sound itself in a meaningful way.” Having liberated
pure sound, rock and roll generated a self-sustaining community that stood in opposition to the

300

Phrase from a Lovin’ Spoonful’s 1965 hit, “Do You Believe in Magic,” repeated by 19-yearold Rolling Stone founder Jan Wenner.
301
Jan Wenner, “Rock and Roll Music,” Rolling Stone, Feb. 10, 1968, 16.

154
American Way of Life. The youth culture was “one borne of rejection of society,” but founded
in “honesty, and closeness to other people and the basic necessities of life…” Drawing upon a
rock mythology the magazine itself helped to create and perpetuate, the sound, which was now
only extant in live performances in a Western corner of the country, was destined, as Elvis and
the Beatles had once been so marked, to make its way into the recording studios and thence to
radio stations and record stores around the nation and finally to end up in the private rooms of
young people. “From this city,” wrote Wenner, “emerged a life style whose implications are to
be felt in every part of America.” 302 It was an article of faith at the early Rolling Stone that,
through the enlightened production of and consumption of rock records, the listener could take
the first and most important step in banishing loneliness.
Furthermore, Wenner continued, the children across the country were not, as Didion
claimed, hopelessly unequipped to face the world, but were in fact becoming better equipped all
the time with that socially integrating and transformative tool: the long playing stereophonic rock
record. Record companies, influenced by the demands of young consumers, were selling more
and more quality rock records to an increasingly receptive and understanding audience. The
intense feelings these records generated, Rolling Stone argued, not the resulting fashions blown
up in the pages of the national magazines and seen on television, bound the young together.
Unlike Didion, who pitied her “groovy” talking young guides, Wenner said that the seemingly
inarticulate young rock fans were responding appropriately to rock’s emotional power, it was
simply impossible to describe these records’ transcendent effects. 303
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1960s Youth Culture and Counterculture

By the late 1960s record consumption provided the young, along with the promise of fun
and peer identification, authentic community and self-sufficiency. Drugs, rock concerts,
discotheqes, and political activism, to say nothing of the petty thuggery in the Haight, was a
sideshow to the national community that had first sprouted when Top 40 radio began
broadcasting records to the youth market. The kids in the youth market had made their own
music, created a culture and a community, and were now selling the music to each other (along
with the critical help of a few hip adults) on their own terms. Rolling Stone grounded itself in
that progressive, regenerative rock history, implicitly identifying the authentic youth community
with the youth market that it claimed had been (or was in the process of being) transformed by
the connective and liberating power of rock music. The fact that young men were in mortal
danger – the war in Vietnam was killing thousands – contributed to the sense of urgency and
seriousness of purpose in the late-60s youth culture. As the youth market became more selfaware and self-confident in the 1960s, its musical preferences began to diverge, but its longing
for community grew stronger and expressed itself in the demand for and the changing use of
records.
Many of the negative attitudes toward youth that developed in the 1950s radically altered
in the last years of the 1960s, a change reflected in the aggressive marketing campaigns that
celebrated aspects of youth culture that had previously been vilified. As hostility toward the
young and the fear of juvenile delinquency dissipated, the national media celebrated sincere, funloving and exciting youth. In 1966 Look Magazine praised the “Open Generation,” for its
idealism and energy. Following the lead of the young and successful ad campaigns, stodgy
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Dodge urged consumers to join the “Dodge Rebellion Operation ’67.” 304 As a result of such
attention, the young became ever more conscious of themselves as a distinct group and of the
transparency of such strained attempts to appeal to them. And though Dodge or Pepsi might be
regarded by some as inauthentic elements in the youth culture, the records in the stores and the
songs on the radio were not. To an even greater degree than in the 1950s, the youth market and
culture centered on music consumption.
Didion underscored this connection in her description of an encounter with a young hippy
at the San Francisco’s famous Avalon: “The Avalon ballroom projects 126 decibels at 100 feet,
but to Chet Helms the sound is just here, like the air, and he talks through it.” Amidst the tumult
created by some expert practitioners of the San Francisco sound, Chet explained his cohort’s
power, “‘…fifty percent of the population will be under twenty-five…they got twenty billion
irresponsible dollars to spend.’” 305 As the 1960s ended, the youth market and its cultural
artifacts were upheld not only as markers of an authentic community, but also as potent talismans
of profitability and cohort economic power.
The traditional teen publications, the underground press, record labels, and FM disc
jockeys competed for influence in a youth market that continued to grow and simultaneously
fragment. The 1950s and early 1960s youth culture had emphasized belonging and spurred
establishment fears of other-directed conformism. The Beach Boys’ 1963 invitation “Let’s go
surfing now/everybody’s learning how” welcomed young people to a fun-filled group adventure,

304

Jack Shepard, “’Are You a Teenager?’ ‘Yeah, I’m Afraid So,” Look, Sept. 20, 1966, 48;
Advertisement, Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 18, 1967, 23; Advertisement, Daily Nebraskan,
Nov. 18, 1966; For more examples of the shift in advertising in the 1960s and an insightful
analysis of the mutually reinforcing relationship between the youth culture and advertising, see
Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip
Consumerism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, especially, 105-130.
305
Didion, Slouching Towards Bethlehem, 89 (I don’t think page # is right).

157
while “Be True to Your School” encouraged allegiance to the most prominent and conventional
youth institution. Three years later, the same band released, Pet Sounds, an LP dominated by
themes of introspection and sonic weirdness. 306 By the late 1960s, an element of the youth
culture was receptive to records like Pet Sounds, and took a more suspicious approach to funfilled consumerism. The high school, along with the university, became scenes of struggle
between youth and adults and among the young themselves. Seeking authenticity, some began to
identify the youth community on the basis of which individuals and groups were excluded. Such
efforts ironically repackaged the fear of conformism and other direction from fifties social
critics. 307
Older rock fans, including the college educated, sought new ways to experience music
and define themselves in opposition to mainstream or elements of youth culture. 308 A larger
proportion of high school students were enrolling in universities and colleges. “Higher”
education became “postsecondary,” in the 1960s, signaling its connection to high school. The
universities contained segmented youth cultures both similar and different from their high school
counterparts. Total enrolment enrollment for American colleges and universities more than
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doubled from 3.6 million to 7.9 million between 1960 and 1970. 309 For the older young, the
pillars of 1950s youth culture, including Top 40 radio, were increasingly identified as
inauthentic, childish, or manipulative. The underground press of the late 1960s sought to
identify and separate authentic expressions of youth culture, particularly in regard to music, from
the media-produced counterfeit. These publications threw up a divide between pop and rock
music relegating the former to bubblegum and the latter to serious art. In the ongoing quest to
define an authentic music and by association, authentic community the “movement” itself
appeared suspect, as did any sort of political activism.
The lone hold out at the center of the youth culture was the record. Rock critics and fans
might disagree on which records were essential, but they all agreed on the necessity of buying
and listening to records. Long playing rock records offered the opportunity for connection but
even here great caution had to be exercised, as the wrong records, “More of the Monkees,” say,
could make one a laughingstock or worse: a poser incapable of making real connections. A
problem long associated with adolescence, belonging, was by the late 1960s hopelessly
intertwined with music consumption. And underneath the promises of a new community lay an
equally compelling narrative of frustration, cooption, and alienation.
Through music consumption, the young could seek connection in the authentic youth
community or stand alone as hardened but self-sufficient individuals. 310 Fans may have not felt
they had to make a choice between community and self, seeking both of these contradictory
goals in rock records. As Wenner explained in 1968, “Rock and roll is the only way in which the
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vast but formless power of youth is structured, the only way in which it can be defined or
inspected. The style and meaning of it has caught the imagination, the financial power and the
spiritual interest of millions of young people.” 311 To transcend the phoniness and isolation of
postwar society and make the center hold, Rolling Stone exhorted its readers to go turn inward
and discover meaning and community between the grooves of rock records.

Evangelists of the Long-Player: Rolling Stone and FM rock radio

The name of [the magazine] is Rolling Stone, which comes from an old saying: ‘A rolling
stone gathers no moss.’ Muddy Waters used the name for a song he wrote; The Rolling
Stones took their name from Muddy’s song, and ‘Like a Rolling Stone’ was the title of
Bob Dylan’s first rock and roll record.” 312

In 1967 Rolling Stone located its origin as the mouthpiece of an authentic self-aware
youth culture within rock records and attempted to define the nature and goals of the movement
it led that would revolutionize the country. The magazine’s manifesto and subsequent grandiose
rock histories and interviews were, when at their most effective, presented along with an ironic
informality and self-deprecating sense of humor. Rolling Stone maintained and expanded upon
the sensibility of Top 40 radio, adding a high sense of purpose, an ironic edge, and an obsession
with authenticity. In the changing youth culture, Rolling Stone defined the its proper attitude and
rituals. Though based in San Francisco, the magazine’s writers kept their eyes on the larger,
national youth culture and focused on radio, politics, and, more than anything else, rock records.
Rolling Stone’s treatment of rock and youth culture touched a chord with readers, many
of who responded with enthusiasm. Buyers of popular music fan magazines found Rolling
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Stone’s serious approach to rock to be revelation. “But Rolling Stone tells it straight out without
all the garbage like what groups love spaghetti,” Andrea Bronstein wrote in to tell the magazine,
adding that she planned to write a report about the magazine for school. 313 Here was a
publication for the young that did not condescend, such as Seventeen, or publish trivialities, such
as Song Hits. Youth, in Rolling Stone, was neither empty fun nor an awkward stage to be exited,
but a right-minded attitude to be cultivated and celebrated. Not only the readers of teen
magazines, but also older ones who read the critical jazz reviews in Down Beat magazine were
drawn to Rolling Stone. 314 A new audience existed, and like Top 40 fifteen years before, found a
thrill in being addressed for the first time.
From inside the record and radio industries, came additional praise for the new
magazine’s ambition, artistic insight, and, above all, its “honesty.” Stax/Volt, offered its general
approval, while Atlantic’s Wexler kept up a running correspondence with the magazine. Radio
disc jockey Bruce Hathaway of KTSA in San Antonia wrote Rolling Stone, “I have mentioned on
my afternoon radio show, about this groovy thing, and I have received several requests as to how
they can receive the paper.” 315 From the beginning, Rolling Stone captured the eyes of an
industry unsure about the direction of the market, but that had a gut feeling that the “flower
children” might know the way to bigger hits. Originally filled with ads bought by independent
record labels, the majors quickly caught on and began buying up space.
Along with its advocacy of the powers of the rock record, Rolling Stone brought
segmentation to the youth market. The same year that it appeared more traditional teen
publications, Tiger Beat and Teen Beat, also hit the market, showing that the 1950s youth
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magazine formula had not vanished after the Beatles became hippies and released Sgt. Peppers’
Lonely Hearts Club Band. Rolling Stone, though it at times spoke as if the youth were one
entity, claimed the artistic and moral high ground and consistently attacked what it saw as the
manipulative mass media. Rolling Stone’s very existence, however, was evidence of a
fragmenting of the youth market and culture. Indeed, a recurring element of its record reviews
and general editorializing finds its highest sense of purpose in identifying those who are not
really part of the ever-dwindling authentic youth culture.
In its early issues, Rolling Stone identified FM rock radio as the new broadcast voice of
the young. Rolling Stone watched with a degree of optimism the rise of the freeform format,
giving its readers a city-by-city run-down of its spread, while expressing disgust at the state of
affairs on the AM dial. When the spoken-word “Letter to my Teenage Son,” an anti-anti-war
manifesto read by a middle-aged Wisconsin businessman became the pick hit at many Top 40
stations, Rolling Stone saw it as the most audible example of Top 40s decay. Backed by the
“Battle Hymn of the Republic,” the dour father explained that if his son burned his draft card, he
stood to disinherit himself (though his mother, being a woman, would probably continue to
acknowledge him as her own). More than angry or afraid, Rolling Stone was amused by the
single’s success on Top 40, and implied that “Letter to a Teenage Son” might yet appear on an
FM station, but only as a good joke. 316 FM was a legitimate medium because, unlike Top 40, it
broadcast LPs, and “The distinction between Top 40 and underground or ‘schlock rock’ vs.
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‘good rock,’” Michael Ferrandino wrote in a celebratory essay, “is understood by most members
of the youth culture…” 317
Though it was no “rotting corpse,” FM did not always meet Rolling Stone’s high
expectations. From its first issue, when freeform was still a San Francisco and New York
underground phenomenon, Rolling Stone gloomily predicted the favored format’s imminent
demise. 318 They had some evidence of an approaching fall before the format even broke the big
time. Disk jockeys battled with station programmers at flagship freeform stations in New York,
and even at KMPX, Tom Donahue’s pioneering San Francisco station, a five-week long strike
crippled the rock beacon and ultimately led to Donahue’s ouster and subsequent resurfacing at
KSAN. 319 Some listeners quickly tired of the freeform’s eclecticism and disc jockey control.
One Rolling Stone reader complained that too often the format was, “a half-assed, pseudointellectual amalgamation of classical and rock music.” 320 Disagreements, more intense than
earlier disputes over who was the “King of the Baritones,” divided the late 1960s youth culture.
Rolling Stone and its readers faced radio, separated between pop on Top 40 and rock-only
on FM, with ambivalence. Radio no longer presented itself as the medium through which
reconnection to the authentic youth community were possible. Perhaps radio never could
provide this. Even though FM rock radio stations attempted to speak directly to their audience
through the LP, they still had to cast a wide net, which inevitably diluted the broadcasts power.
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Further, in order to fully take advantage of the modern listening experience, one should be in
control of the music machines. Through its record reviews and editorials, Rolling Stone urged its
readers to bypass mediation and go directly to the record. If the fractious writers at Rolling Stone
agreed on one thing, it was that the 1960s individual needed records.
For the new batch of serious rock critics, such as John Landau, rock records represented a
technological means to intimate reconnection without any mediation, “[rock] is at its best when it
is used to explore the experience of the musician and the listener, when it seeks to entertain as
well as provoke, when it realizes that rock is not primarily poetry or art, but something much
more direct and immediate than either.” Rock was “simple body music” on record that bound its
practitioners to its fans through visceral and authentic emotions and not through performance
rituals. The great rock guitarist and performer Jimi Hendrix found greater acceptance in rock
press reviews, which often attacked his stage show as too contrived, only after journalists
discovered that Hendrix spent hours in the studio perfecting novel sounds a-la the Beatles and
Brian Wilson. 321 Rock records represented an authentic folk culture of the affect – one that
united the young or otherwise marginalized. 322 Listeners had to beware of attitudinizing rockers
and their histrionic performances, Landau cited the Doors’ theatrical Jim Morrison as a prime
example. These performers, unwittingly or not, created greater distance between listener and
musician and thus betrayed the rock record’s connective power. Landau did not say it, but one
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can assume he would find a Doors record preferable to a face-to-face encounter with the Lizard
King. 323

The Ideology of Rock: Alienation, Reconnection, and Phonies

Having dealt with lonely listener fan mail during their phenomenal growth in the 1960s,
A&M Records developed a Rolling Stone marketing strategy that identified its products as
unmediated connectors. A&M promoted the 1968 Phil Ochs album, “Tape from California,”
with a campaign featuring the folk musician’s personal postcard to his audience. Appearing as a
hand-written a poem, accompanied by a photograph of a smiling Ochs relaxing on a deck chair,
the text reads “Hi, thought I’d drop you a line/from the beautifulpeople coast,” meaning points
west between San Francisco to Los Angeles. Ochs references the National Liberation Front and
Che Guevara before hitting his audience with a pointed attack. “They’re not afraid they’re not
alone/(you are afraid, you are alone)/Can it be the Way of Liberation/has finally come home?”
324

Liberation or not, A&M offered the concerned but informal Ochs and his “Tape from
California” as a suitable remedy for isolation by putting the listener in touch with an artist who
understood and could sympathize, and hopefully, could help the listener transcend their current
situation. The title of the album and places Ochs mentions similarly transports the listener to the
“beautifulpeople” coast without having to go to the trouble of actually roughing it on the Haight.
Though perhaps such a bold move as joining the NLF may have also ended this debilitating fear
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and isolation, one suspects, this was not an option available to most Rolling Stone readers.
Purchasing the Ochs album would have been an acceptable alternative. 325
Peter Wicke has argued that the notion of a direct connection between fan and rock
musician stands as an important, but ultimately deceptive, element of what he terms the
“ideology of rock.” Rock critics, desiring serious artists worthy of their attention, and record
companies looking to create stars, share much of the responsibility for aiding and abetting the
spread of this ideology, but fans drove the phenomenon as well. Records, Wicke emphasizes,
were produced through industrial processes with no audience participation, in which musicians,
producers, and engineers at best guessed at audience response, perhaps aided by crude statistical
data. Rock musicians, especially after signing monies and recording contracts ballooned in the
1960s, lived very different lives than most of their fans. The connection between them was
incomplete and mutual understanding limited, but Wicke suggests that these shortcomings
sometimes made the records more meaningful to the alienated audiences. 326
Despite its position as the ideologue of rock, Rolling Stone exhibited a surprising level of
pessimism concerning the fate of the “movement,” or the ultimate fate of the youth culture and
the political goals of the New Left. Underneath utopian visions lurked a suspicion that the youth
culture’s center was weak, and that reconnection – even through rock records – was more fantasy
and reality. The pessimism and paranoia concerning inauthentic expression of youth culture,
whether by posers or charlatans, filled the record reviews and endless recapitulations of rock
history of the early Rolling Stone. Dread was a new and disturbing element Rolling Stone
inserted into the world of youth publications and was wholly absent from the teen periodicals of
the 1950s and early 1960s. At its darkest Rolling Stone saw an international youth movement in
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Didion-esque terms, a giant social centrifuge in which, “the rest of the world, pre-Chicago, prePrague, pre-lots, of things once almost reinable, will go spinning off God knows where,” because
“youth, with only its age and its music in common, will probably continue to lack unity…” 327
Perhaps contributing to the creeping malaise, Rolling Stone’s coverage of the record sales
differed only slightly from similar treatment in Cash Box or Billboard. The reports of million
selling LPs and letters wishing for a favored band to “make it in a big way,” exemplified the
underground magazine’s uncomplicated view of the industry and mass consumption. 328 Both
rock musicians and their late 1960s chroniclers felt that as long as rock records made it out to the
public, it mattered little where they came from, how they were produced, or what entities
profited from their sale. 329 Thus the Rolling Stone columnist Ralph Gleason could look at Steve
Miller Bands’ gold watches, gifts from Capitol Records, with approval. Mary Harron attributes
this pro-commercial attitude to youthful naiveté, but Rolling Stone exhibited a keen critical eye
in debunking the political opportunism of media-anointed movement leaders and also in
identifying the commercial origins of youth culture in Top 40 radio. More often than not,
Rolling Stone depicted hippies as an amusing mass media creation, a product of hyperventilating
national media that enterprising hacks from Timothy Leary to Jerry Rubin sought to exploit,
while labeling Top 40 a huckster job that had unintended positive consequences for the
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young. 330 Rolling Stone gave some credence to the notion that the youth culture rebels did not
exist as anything more than the sum fears or alternately hopes of the nation.
Rolling Stone mocked those – in radio, media, and the entertainment industry – who
approached the youth culture as if it were solely a market, defined by hair length, open toed
shoes, or Nehru jackets. A review of 1968 rock musical Hair, declared, “They look like the
hippies we read about in Time magazine and they do, or claim to do all the dirty things that Time
magazine hints such people do.” 331 The hippie “lifestyle” as understood by most of the country,
according to Rolling Stone, contained no deeper meaning than wearing pink and black had in the
1950s. It was a consumer choice, a lifestyle not a legitimate identity, collective or individual.
From its perch in San Francisco, Rolling Stone cast doubt on the entire movement, and expressed
gratitude that the “Summer of Love” had come to a conclusion. “The hippies are still with us,”
Gleason complained in 1968. “They are not dead, they’ve only moved a bit. What is now
clogging the streets in New York and Boston and Berkeley and Los Angeles is the second and
third generation mass media, mass made, cadre.” 332 The millions of the children in the media’s
thrall were not accessing the rock record directly and thus for them authentic community had
been tragically reduced to a lifestyle that could be mass-produced and mass consumed.
The quality of recordings and playback equipment thus became more than a mere
technical or even aesthetic matter, but one fraught with social, cultural, and even spiritual import.
In 1967 many labels followed Mercury’s lead in remastering monophonic recordings as “stereocompatible.” After listening to the product, Rolling Stone warned its readers that the rush to
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eliminate monophonic records resulted not in the “infinite advantages” of stereo sound, but in
poor quality hybrids possessing neither the fidelity of stereo or the charm of the old mono. The
industry had the capabilities to remaster their catalogs in stereo, but they were cutting technical
corners. 333 Expressing hope that that the Federal Trade Commission and the Record Industry
Association of America would prohibit “phony stereo,” Rolling Stone exhibited a rare example
faith in government and industry to fix a major problem, one that could potentially result in a sort
of musical false consciousness. 334
A letter interpreting the Beatles’ inscrutable lyrics for “I am the Walrus,” is a typical
example of the sort of experience on found in rock records. The words presented the effects of
“the bombardment of the world on the individual,” who nonetheless continued to seek
transcendence. The Lennon lyric, “’I am he as you are he as you are me and we are all
together,’” represented the global urging for “oneness,” the reader concluded. “We can change
the station,” he enthused, but “we soon learn that music is really part of the one.” 335 Consumer
choice in radio listening and in the record store were essential in this quest for reintegration. In
later years this sort of letter would have been a New Age howler, but the fan’s yearning for
reconnection and belief that it was possible through rock records was well withing the ethos of
the early Rolling Stone.
Rolling Stone’s attitude toward new left politics and its rather different promises for
oneness was suspicious and hostile. The magazine devoted considerable coverage to the 1968
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Democratic Convention in Chicago, where Youth International Party leader Jerry Rubin had
invited a number of popular rock and roll bands to play in protest to the Democrats’ failure to
nominate anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy and to hopefully win media free coverage of
New Left politics. The attempt to draft rock and roll into Rubin’s political agenda outraged
Wenner and Rolling Stone. The convention, Rolling Stone maintained, was not the place to enact
substantive change and Rubin was not the man to lead the young. Politics, whether new left or
not, was not up to the task of bringing about “oneness.” Rolling Stone displayed the same sort of
cynicism toward the growing popularity of long hair and Broadway hippy musicals. Politics was
equally phony, yet another confidence trick played on the young.
Chicago, for Rolling Stone, represented a microcosm of the United States, full of
damaged and lonely individuals, “… home of a million pieces that don’t fit, can’t fit, and never
will fit.” 336 The lonely yet energetic youth, however, could be assembled into a “rock and roll
army” that would easily overwhelm the tired and lifeless forces of reaction, the “paunching 40year-old men of responsibility” in a generational rout. 337 The real danger against whom this
potential host should unite against, however, was lurking close at hand and was to be found
neither in the overweight and bitter middle aged, or in the cops.
“There is an enemy,” an anonymous correspondent in Chicago warned, “but it’s not
Hubert Humphrey. And this, in a nutshell, is the ‘new’ left.” 338 The movement was a “selfindulgent farce,” a “pointless exercise of campus politics in a grownup world” that had divided
the young, appealed to the crudest mass media stereotypes, and thereby made its youthful
adherents guilty of all the faults of the regime they opposed. Humphrey, Nixon, and the other
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would-be leaders had no power over the youth because they had never really listened, at least not
by choice, to a rock record. More disgusting therefore was the betrayal of the New Left. By
virtue of its youth, these “new political exploiters: could successfully co-opt the movement and
turn it into something sterile and ultimately oppressive.
The Yippie! Party’s “grasping itself the potent charm of the music of the young” was a
dangerous gambit but one ultimately doomed to failure. Making himself a media figure, Rubin
had successfully contributed to the perverting youth culture, turning it into a superficial political
exercise whose members were connected only by their long hair and anti-war views. Rubin,
however, was deaf to the profound spiritual mission and affective connections latent in rock
music. His attempt to co-opt its form, by bringing the Fugs, Judy Collins, the MC5, Country Joe
and the Fish, Phil Ochs, and Timothy Leary to Chicago was pure fakery. The choice of marginal
rock musicians and an attention-hungry LSD guru showed Rubin did not truly understand rock
and roll. “Rubin has also invited the Monkees,” Wenner wrote, only needing to mention the
name of that television-created rock band to convict Rubin. “That is where he is at.” Such a sin
was impermissible. 339
The Monkees notwithstanding, Rolling Stone maintained that rock had liberated its
listeners bringing the music of African Americans into the homes of middle class whites,
breaking down a whole host of artificial barriers and connecting formerly alienated individuals
and groups of the postwar era. “It is indeed so powerful and full of potential as all that, and
more,” Wenner rhapsodized. “It has its own unique meaning, it’s own unique style, and it’s own
unique morality… it is slowly taking an actionable form.” This form, however, could not be
organized like any other political movement, because “…politics, even ‘new left’ politics… is,
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after all, still politics.” 340 Nowhere does he give any indication that such rock and roll reform
could exist in any way other than the most obvious: a trip to the local record store followed by
some time alone in one’s room.
Rolling Stone’s vision of social renewal hinged on individual choices made in the music
marketplace. Any kind of organizing activity came under suspicion not only for being led by
potential tyrants, but also because organizations by their nature produced other-directed
conformism. Rock record consumption and listening, on the other hand, put the focus on the
individual. “The real revolution is achieved by the individual,” Gleason noted, agreeing with an
earlier assessment by rock musician Frank Zappa. 341 Rolling Stone reconciled the contradiction
between its individualism and its desire for authentic community by appealing to the deeply felt
– yet impossible to articulate – emotions inscribed in records of Bob Dylan, the Grateful Dead,
and the Beatles. This transcendence bridged the divide between individual and community and
could only be accessed through the records, by the isolated listener who reconnected through an
affective alliance with other listeners. 342 The rock community as defined by the underground
press in the 1960s, referred “not to an institution, to a set of people, but to a sensation.” 343 As
with the Summer of Love, Rolling Stone found the events in Chicago had little to do with the
national community they sought because they focused on out-of-date face-to-face communities.
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According to its sympathetic documenter Theodore Roszak, a small but highly visible
segment of the young were at the end of the 1960s articulating the most thorough critique of the
American Way of Life, and as such it offered the only avenue through which a destructive
individualism and a genocidal international policy could be transcended. The young men and
women called hippies, Roszak maintained, were in reality a counterculture whose everyday life
and holistic worldview were revolutionary appeals. He found hope for modern society in the
counterculture’s embrace of communal values, its exuberant informality, and its liberated
sexuality. Nonetheless, Roszak was ill at ease with the central values, rituals, and artifacts of the
youth counterculture, from anti-intellectualism, drug use, and even rock records.
While one cannot avoid being impressed with the innovation and dazzling sophistication
of the best pop music, I fear I tend to find much of it too brutally loud and/or too
electronically gimmicked up. I am not particularly in favor of turning musicianship and
the human voice into the raw material of acoustical engineering. I also feel that the pop
music scene lends itself to a great deal of commercial sensationalizing: the heated search
for startling new tricks and shocks. 344
The LP’s overwhelming loudness and studio crafted “dazzling sophistication” along with
rock’s commercial viability were the very elements that made rock records the central artifact of
the counterculture. “…[L]istened to at home at top volume,” critic Robert Rosenstone noted,
“the music drowns down the individual in waves of sound… Throughout the music – as in youth
culture – there is the search for a kind of mystical unity, an ability to feel a oneness with the
universe.” Rosentone argued that far from diluting the rock record’s power, commercial success
had made the transmission of intense feelings from individual to individual possible and had
also, by creating an imagined community and nationwide peer support, bestowed upon the young
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the confidence and security that only strength in overwhelming numbers can bring. So that when
they went seeking “oneness” they need not feel alone and vulnerable. 345
Whereas Roszak identified LSD use and rock shows as illusory communitarian solutions
(he equated rock concerts with beer halls in Weimar Germany), 346 these two practices became
identified as key communal rituals within and outside the emerging counterculture. The rituals,
as Rosenstein argues, represented ways for the young to transcend the mass loneliness of postwar
society through a combination of powerful intense emotionalism and by inducing altered frames
of reference that allowed the individual to see their position more clearly.
Despite surface differences, both Rosenstein and Roszak agreed that late 1960s youth
represented a single and national, rather than diverse and local, association. Who constituted the
counterculture within the youth culture, along with where it was located and how individuals
gained admittance, however, remains hard to determine. Most college students, it seems, did not
use LSD and many of the young did not believe rock records offered either a blueprint for
revolution or that rock shows were an expression of a new communal ritual. Yet the
counterculture rituals and even more so the attitudes these rituals displayed permeated the youth
culture, circulating throughout college campuses and high schools, and on into the national
consciousness.
The counterculture was a subset – in many ways the trendsetting element – of the larger
youth culture. Peter Braunstein has noted that youth in the 1960s had become less an age
exclusive category and more an attitude, making youth more inclusive and open to construction.
With the counterculture at the forefront of youth, it was, in effect, probing the boundaries of
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mainstream culture, which would sometimes adopt and adapt its new behaviors and values other
times reject them. Some rituals and gestures of youth and counterculture were becoming not
only more widely known, but appropriated and celebrated in the mainstream. By the mid-1960s
solitary dances of youth culture, such as the Watusi, proliferated in discotheques across the
country, among men and women who had left school far behind. Life, a publication impossible
to confuse with The Berkeley Barb celebrated this development as early as 1964. 347 The young
and the youngish constructed and tore down identities in fashion, dance, in a type of play-acting
specific to the 1960s, when identity seemed to be particularly in flux. This was the decade in
which wig became common fashion accessories. Experimentation with different identities
became easier and took on added significance in the expanding leisure economy, and the young
especially “played hard,” taking their marketplace acquired identities seriously and believing
most sincerely in instant, transcendent change. Those who played the hardest with identities
were labeled countercultural. 348
By embodying the role with sufficient feeling and acquiring the necessary accoutrements,
the young could transform from a Haight-Ashbury denizen one month, to a Bonnie and Clyde
inspired militant the next. Identity was molten, and the past easily forgotten. In this
interpretation of the counterculture, the communal rituals, from drug use to rock show patronage,
were not so much stable practices but gestures in an elaborate game. The young could and did
rearrange and play with identity from the set of gestures. Any one of these gestures could be
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adopted to suit a certain moment, just as any record could be placed on the turntable to set a
desired mood. 349 The rituals that became associated with the counterculture, then, should be
seen not as initiation rites 350 or as epoch making events (Woodstock, for only the most overused
example) but as a collection of attitudes, poses, and symbols.
In this imagined community built on shared symbols, the gestures associated with the
legendary counterculture of California became key components of the stock set of universal
gestures the youth culture had been acquiring since the 1950s. For example, the Daily
Nebraskan gave students at the University of Nebraska a steady stream of updates from the
Golden State, and assured their readers that within ten years, their own modest school on the
plains might approach, on a lesser scale, the youth community in full bloom at CaliforniaBerkeley. 351 The Bay Area existed more than as a real place than as a dream workshop where
ideas and gestures about fashion, concert hall performances, and crash pads were being
manufactured and made ready for the national youth culture.
The perception of the San Francisco scene, whether coming from Rolling Stone or Life,
provided the templates for the proper forms of rock concert patronage, and the attitudes toward
drug experimentation. The San Francisco bands played loud and used light shows to create a full
sensual experience mediated by electronics. The so-called “acid rock” was an experience that
also included the ingestion of LSD or other hallucinogens. As in the listening experience, drugs
and concerts held the potential for instant, ecstatic release, a kind of satori that escaped the
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intellect. Unlike record listening, however, they provided an opportunity for intimate and faceto-face connections and a sense of the carnivalesque. In practice and in the ideal, however, the
counterculture rituals, whether communal or alone, tended to reproduce the experience of the
recorded listening experience.
For a youth culture that was increasingly alienated from the mainstream, the desire for
rituals and traditions to make meaning of their culture grew apace, and some have suggested that
rock shows came to fill void. Folklorist Bruce Harrah-Conforth has argued that the rituals of the
youth culture emerged in San Francisco’s famous ballrooms, which transformed into rock and
roll churches unifying all the disparate elements of youth culture. Before the bands began to
play at the Avalon, a pre-concert period Harrah-Conforth calls the “first stage,” projectors
showed cartoons or movies on the screens, the smell of marijuana filled the air, and hip
attendants handed out gifts – token, fruit, or some other symbol that told the audience member
that they were in a separate space with its own rules. The second stage, the performance, began
with
[T]he bombardment of the senses coupled with the freedom of the sanctuary… [T]he
overwhelming sounds of the bands assaulted the ears; the light show struck unfamiliar
and remarkable images over the whole of the assemblage; the unbounded dance patterns
permitted people to reach their peaks in groups or alone, and the assorted smells and
sensations found with the sanctuary bombarded the rest of the senses. 352

To Harrah-Conforth, the mass produced record album had distracted most observers from
recognizing that the performance was the key event in shaping youth culture values. The
“product” functioned as an “icon” to remind young listeners of the real thing. Yet, the HarrahConforth’s own description of the concert hall as a “sanctuary” and the event itself as leading to
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isolated ecstatic dancing, shows that the rock concert has very different roots than the traditional
American musical performance. The experience Harrah-Conforth describes is focused on the
individual to an extraordinary degree. The individual finds herself surrounded and bombarded
(Harrah-Conforth is especially fond of the bomb analogy) by electric sound and images. She
does not need those around her and can listen alone. It would seem that the concert was a
collective attempt to imitate the recorded experience, with the aid of powerful amplifiers, film,
and, for some, hallucinegenics. As Evan Eisenberg noted in his philosophical and personal
inquiry into the nature and meaning of recorded music, “If rock concerts and festivals were
revival meetings, record listening was the regular sacred service.” 353
The amplified electric instruments and the attendant light shows, as Rosenstein
suggested, were designed to overwhelm the listener, but this made dancing, talking, or
conventional appreciation of the performers difficult. By the close of the 1960s, the great bluesrock singer Janis Joplin found herself pleading with a young New York audience, presumably
fans who had heard and had appreciated her records, to approach the stage and dance. 354
Eisenberg has noted that those reared to accept the recorded artifact as the legitimate musical
experience, are not inclined to dance to performances. Less awkward for them are the solitary
dances associated with the discotheque. “People seem more comfortable dancing and courting to
mechanical music. The charitable interpretation of this is that it lets them be alone with each
other. The other interpretation is that it lets them be alone.” 355 Though the rock festivals – those
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grand gestures of collective identity – grew ever larger in the 1960s, culminating in the hundreds
of thousands who attended Woodstock and Altamont, the experience grew ever more
individualistic.

Public Rituals as Performed by Lonely Listeners: Altamont

Often cited as a death knell for the sixties counterculture, the Altamont free festival –
“Woodstock of the West” – can also be read as an event that revealed the powerful connective
reach of the freeform FM radio format, the nature and meaning of the concert experience, as well
the limits of these imagined communities built in recorded sound. Sol Stern’s essay is the most
thoughtful analysis of an event that received scant attention from contemporaries, but has since
become a common feature of rock history. Altamont had its origins in the Rolling Stones’ desire
to hold a free festival on the West Coast that would recreate the success of Woodstock the
previous summer. Capping off their 1969 North American tour, the Rolling Stones, decided on
somewhere in the Bay Area for a December festival that would include most of the great San
Francisco bands.
The planning was disorganized and the entire event did not come together until the last
moment, and yet it nonetheless produced, spontaneously it would have seemed, an enthusiastic
community. The Stones repeatedly changed sites for the festival, moving ever further east as
various local authorities sought to keep the areas under their jurisdiction from being overrun by
the notorious youth counterculture. Despite the chaos, the Stones secured the support of the
Grateful Dead and fellow Bay Area heroes, the Jefferson Airplane, Santana, among others. Two
days before the show was scheduled to happen, workers ripped down a hastily constructed stage
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and moved the sophisticated audio setup to the abandoned Altamont speedway, the location that
finally proved permanent. The newspapers, even the underground ones, were unable to keep up
with or provide any legitimate publicity for the event – indeed, it was never clear until the music
began that the show would actually happen. FM radio, however, remained on top of the situation
and reported every twist and turn to its listeners. Even then there were problems, as Stern said,
“Different radio stations were carrying conflicting reports (the radio was the only effective
source of communication about the concert, since the newspapers were too slow to keep up with
the changes).” 356 Even so, 300,000 rock fans descended upon the racetrack for one night and an
early morning of violence, mass anomie, and rock and roll.
Similar to its AM counterpart a decade ago, FM freeform in the late 1960s was capable of
massing great armies of the young who neither knew each other nor the men issuing the
summons, but shared an intimate bond through recorded music and an appreciation of the rituals
of rock concerts. Todd Storz’s promotions had led to fist fights and traffic jams, but the Altamont
festival upped the antisocial ante, and adding murder, assault, and psychosis. Hundreds
experienced nightmarish acid trips and others were savagely beaten. Notoriously, the Stones
hired Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang as provide security, paying them in beer. In fulfilling their
duties, pool-cue wielding Angels beat anyone who approached too near to the stage. As the
Stones played, the Angels stabbed to death a young black man. Along with the 300,000 fans, the
Angels oversaw the deaths of three others, two in car crashes during the mad scramble to exit the
speedway and one who drowned, face down in a puddle. The crowd, sickened and confused by
the escalating violence swirling around the stage, nonetheless, stuck it out until the Stones ended
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their set. 357 Stern explained, “We had pushed and shoved each other, been humiliated by the
Angels, destroyed the landscape, fouled the air, all just to see this moment, and even now no one
could get up, say it wasn’t worth it and go home. Most of the crowd had never seen the Stones
in a live performance (emphasis mine).” 358
The imagined community of rock records compared unfavorably to the ancient gangster
ethos of the Angels – they knew who they were and shared a “mission.” The Angels’ unity gave
handful of men armed with primitive weapons the power to terrorize a crowd of hundreds of
thousands. The community of rock records even failed to such a degree that many committed
radicals looked in vain for a hated police officer to restore order. In any case, once the concert
ended and everyone went home, it was the mainstream culture’s authority figures who were left
with the responsibility of tending o those brutalized at Altamont. A disillusioned Stern
concluded,
We had set out on our trip dreaming a fantasy of marching on Santa Rita with our
community of 300,000, ripping off the Alameda County Sheriffs and freeing the
prisoners. The reality was that when we beat a hasty retreat from Altamont [that killed
two], we left behind the body of Meredith Hunter, one of our people, a kid many of us
had probably nodded to on Telegraph Avenue. And the only ones who cared for that
battered body, made sure it got from the coroner’s office to a funeral parlor, informed the
parents, and now the only ones trying to bring the killers to justice are the Alameda
County Sheriffs. 359
The national community built over the air and in cars and in rooms revealed itself at
Altamont to be just another form of the collectivized loneliness that Roszak and the Wenner
believed the counterculture was rebelling against. In perhaps a less dramatic way, this was
already evident. Rock musicians became stars with little connection to their audiences other than
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the recorded artifact and sales figures, and the distance between them and between the
individuals in the audience expanded and grew into a dark space. …[S]oon all the music came
from the stage and very little energy came to the stage from the crowds… Eventually, people
stopped dancing in front of the bands, not just at big events like Woodstock and Altamont but at
the Fillmore, where it all started. Dances became concerts...” 360
The great rock festivals, which flourished at the tail end of the 1960s, vanished in the
subsequent decade. Local communities fearing the potential arrival of hundreds of thousands of
young people balked at giving permits and some rescinded licenses, investors were hard to find
who were willing to pay the skyrocketing advances for rock talent and the ever more
sophisticated light and sound equipment that had suddenly became necessary. After often
dumping $400,000 before selling a single ticket, promoters could no longer turn a blind eye
gatecrashers and (Altamont may have played a hand in this too) had to hire additional security.
As with many elements of youth culture, the festivals were grand gestures, not permanent
institutions. 361
If the social ritual of the concert was based in the isolated experience of listening to
recorded music, than what of that other alleged pillar of the counterculture: drug use? In the
popular imagination, LSD and marijuana figured as integral rituals of the counterculture,
accompanying the concert going experience and the group appreciation of recorded music, but
the connection between drug abuse and youth has been overstated. Despite the fact that their
actual use was somewhat limited, the Daily Nebraskan possessed a strong interest in and
fascination with LSD and marijuana in its reporting and in its graphic style. The paper
simultaneously lamented students’ drinking habits, a drug associated with their parent’s
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generation. 362 LSD and marijuana represented “youth” drugs as opposed to cigarettes and
alcohol, and had a special cultural significance to the young.
Drug use, however, was far from a counterculture invention, and is better seen as a
modification of an accepted practice. The mainstream culture consumed mass quantities of mindaltering substances, with physicians writing 123 million prescriptions for tranquilizers in 1965
and an additional 24 million for amphetamines. Alcohol was an acceptable social lubricant, and
nicotine and caffeine pepped up workers. “Americans in the 1960s,” historian David Farber has
said, “had accepted the intoxicated state as part and parcel of the American way of life.”
Americans used drugs to integrate into existing work ways, assist in alleviating the anxiety of
raising a family, to dispel awkwardness at social events, or, on the more socially unacceptable
level, to escape everyday problems. Drug use was utilitarian and pragmatic. The counterculture,
however, experimented with illegal drugs so as to imagine new work, leisure, and community
possibilities. The different and adversarial meaning ascribed to youthful experimentation made
the drugs and their use controversial, rather than their actual effects or rate of usage. 363
The illegal drug use 364 of the young (and primarily white) counterculture claimed descent
from earlier black hipster and Chinese immigrant cultures. Tom Wolfe mythologized the mid1960s freewheeling fun and LSD use of Ken Kesey’s Merry Pranksters in Electric Kool-Aid Acid
Test in 1968. Kesey, along with former Harvard academic Timothy Leary, established the
parameters of the counterculture drug experience. The prankster’s candy-colored school bus,

362

Eileen Wirth, “LSD can be a Rewarding Experience, says Cannon,” Dec. 12, 1, Daily
Nebraskan; for psychedelic graphic design see the flower lettering for weekly column, “The
Pot,” Nov. 1, 1967, 2, Daily Nebraskan; Column appears in academic year 1967/68.
363
David Farber, “Intoxicated State/Illegal Nation: Drugs in the Sixties Counterculture,” in
Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960s and ‘70s, Peter Braunstein and
Michael William Doyle, eds. New York; Routledge, 2002, 19.
364
LSD was not illegal until 1967

183
which possessed a state-of-the-art sound system, possessed a collection of rotating and equally
colorful characters bent on enjoying the national life in a truly authentic and spontaneous
manner. LSD was, like making or listening to music, a means to physical enjoyment and an
expression of a joy of life. The more pedantic (at least in his earlier incarnations) Leary
advocated LSD as a form of spiritual enlightenment, while rock bands combined fun and
spirituality without qualms. Like the black hipster culture, the young drug users (though Kesey
and Leary were not young) did not desire pharmacological bludgeons to reshape their psyches to
better fit into socially prescribed roles, but as tools of personal growth. 365 Drug use, like music,
was a way the counterculture could bring into existence a more humane community, as Farber
explained about Kesey and the pranksters,
Instead of competing for resources in a socially prescribed marketplace and then
retreating into private households to consume goods with a tiny set of loved ones, the
Pranksters took their acid visions as a sign of the immensely entertaining, challenging,
and occasionally enlightening free spaces people could create if they cared to. 366
The drugs were often used to complete the musical experience, and in the case of acid,
allow one to, as Leary claimed, “find what is within.” Braunstein has shown how acid was an
integral part to appreciating rock light shows. The East Village in Manhattan was the Atlantic
Coast mirror of the San Francisco’s Haight-Ashbury and had developed a counterculture that
frequented discotheques more than it did live shows. The most famous club, the Electric Circus
featured, surreal atmosphere where the sound and visual stimuli arrived simultaneously and were
“products of a psychedelic drug culture.” The irreverent humor associated with the ads of Stan
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Cornyn found its way into promotion of the Electric Circus as, “air conditioned (in more way
than one”). 367
Finding what is within, even if entirely beneficial, was a yet another solipsistic enterprise
with little apparent social value. Following the success of the Electric Circus, Cerebrum opened
its Soho doors in late 1968 as “an electronic studio of participation.” After exchanging their
clothes for transparent togas, dancers would sit on the floor and put on headphones. Talking was
not possible or desirable as it would spoil the experience. 368 Why one would pay admission for
this sort of experience when headphones and drugs were available privately might help explain
why Cerebrum proved a dismal failure.
Since the visions of acid trips faded when the few hours were over, their promise was
ever ephemeral, as former Leary associate Richard Alpert concluded, “You came into the
kingdom of heaven and you saw how it all was and you felt these new states of awareness, and
then you got cast out again, and after 200 or 300 times of this… an extraordinary depression set
it.” 369 Drug use, therefore, was a gesture – heroic or just life affirming – more than it was an
organizing ritual in a coherent way of life. The drugged out and scary Haight-Ashbury of the
late sixties attests to the limitations of such a lifestyle, though this dark reality was probably not
necessary for most to realize the transient nature of the pleasures (and on occasion terrors)
hallucinegenics offered. For the purposes of music and youth, however, drug use and its
celebration demonstrate again the powerful yearning for a more fulfilling social life and
paradoxical response of choosing agents and practices that tended to isolate and strengthen the
focus on the self. As Roszak had suspected, the young dreamers in counterculture had not
367

Peter Braunstein, “Disco,” American Heritage, Nov. 1999,
“http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=2434288&site=ehost-live
368
Ibid.
369
Quoted in, Jill Jonnes, Hep-cats, Narcs, and Pipe Dreams, 235.

185
distanced themselves from the American propensity for quick solutions through technology and
had been betrayed by an inability to imagine a more revolutionary form of resistance and mutual
association.
The gestures of the counter culture were significant for community creation in three
ways. First, they were connected to the recorded listening experience. Rock concerts were an
extension of this, drugs were an enhancement and for some necessary context. Second, they
were national and perhaps international in appeal. The counterculture existed more as a national
set of gestures (drug use, dance styles, fashion) that was forever in flux and capable of producing
tremendous anxiety about “authenticity” than it did as any sort of identifiable community. Third,
the gestures sought community in ways that were patently impossible in which to bring it about.
They came with a built in paradox, one that was recognized by the more perceptive in the youth
culture. This paradox contributed the sense of dread that permeates much of Rolling Stone’s
exultations of youth and its music and in the music itself, which took on darker hues more
distortion as the decade careened toward its end and the coherent youth culture toward its final
fragmentation. Technological progress and choice in the market, which were hardly
oppositional, had come to define the counterculture and popular recorded musical experience.
Disillusionment was bound to follow.

The Weakness of a Pre-recorded Community

The desire to build an authentic community based on affective alliances accessed through
rock records did not collapse so much because of any alleged radical individualism of the
counterculture, the cooption of the movement by capitalism, or political betrayal, as it did in the
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learned behavior of the postwar youth. Records were among first commodities the young
purchased. Thus from early childhood, aesthetic and social distinctions were based around
consumer choices. Segmented from the adult world, the young in the postwar era first
discovered their power in the mass consumption society through the radio stations they dialed in
and records they purchased. More than comic books or clothing, music suggests connections in
an individual’s life over time and to peer groups. Recorded music became the pivot around
which fashion and other commodities revolved because it carried more social significance. 370
Furthermore, the long understanding of music as a uniquely social human behavior contributed
to both the young’s investment of great meaning in records and its belief in the socially
transformative power of record consumption. In a performance the connection between audience
members and musicians is physical and visible, but with the record it is implied and imagined.
The elusive and national (at times international) community that Rolling Stone appealed to was
one that had been brought together not through institutions or face-to-face interaction but
through record purchases. It marked a continuation of the youth market and an expansion of its
aims.
One Rolling Stone reader implicitly questioned whether a direct connection to the artist
was possible through the record. In part bewildered, in part tongue in cheek, and in part looking
for a freelance job, he asked, “What is a producer? What is an engineer? What do they do?
How are the master tapes made? Record companies and other villains? Promotion? Role of
radio stations? How are records made in the factories? And finally, how exactly does my record
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player work?” 371 Rolling Stone consistently refused to answer most of these questions, with
promotion and radio stations the notable exceptions. As to the more mundane and less heroic
aspects of record production and consumption, the magazine remained mute. The record was
given the preeminent place, but it remained a mystery, and its social power was an ephemeral
feeling, not a long-standing institutional reality. The record was, at best, a gesture.
The fears of loneliness and isolation that underlay much of the 1960s were countered by
an expansive vision of a new community. In the pages of Rolling Stone and the rituals of the
counterculture, this new community was national, consumerist, and egalitarian. The community
of affective alliances built through recorded sound would be authentic and in opposition to the
allegedly plastic American Way of Life. Coming out of the history and experiences of the
postwar youth, the vision began to falter in the seventies. The Beatles broke up, Rolling Stone
left San Francisco and turned into a glossy “rock Esquire,” 372 the different popular music genres
split into subgenres and hostile subcultures, and notions of a unified movement or even a
coherent youth culture disappeared. Records became less a staging ground for the construction
of a new community, but a refuge for a self under siege, supplemented by new and increasingly
mobile technologies that further commodified music, isolated the listening experience, and
privatized public space.
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Chapter Six
Lonely Sounds: Sonic Self Sufficiency, Personal Control, and Social Shields

Moe Berger, a rig-building fanatic, “set the cart before the horse” and attended his first
live concert in 1957. Years earlier, Berger had become a high fidelity enthusiast, an identity he
assumed following a successful sonic simulation of an earthquake on a “rig” composed of high
priced audio equipment. Since then his desire to simulate sounds had expanded to include
music, and in a humorous contribution to Popular Science he related his disappointment when he
showed up live and in person to experience the real thing with musicians and an audience. He
realized that for the first time in his adult music listening life, he could not “adjust the damping
control on the amplifier or set the equalization curve on the pre-amp.” Even worse, for someone
who had spent years allegedly seeking to recreate the magic of the real thing, the live “strings
lacked presence,” and “the music lacked the depth of stereo.” Berger wondered, “where was the
explosive force from the percussion?” It dawned on him that he was a captive, powerless, and
ultimately unhappy audience member who felt separated from the audience even though he was
surrounded by his fellow concert-goers. “The concluding applause,” he noted glumly, “did not
stir my emotions.” It was easy to hear – high fidelity was simply “better sound.” Pondering the
fantastical works Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms would have created had they had access to
modern recording equipment, Berger concluded that he would not trade “my twin triaxial
speaker systems for the best seat in Carnegie.” 373
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Berger’s position remained heretical for most true believers in high fidelity, but for those
novices entering the world of quality sound in the sixties and seventies, his position was hardly
radical. This was especially true for young consumers, who through their experiences with Top
40 radio and rock records understood that music could be merely sound alone and that it was best
experienced alone. The applause and the audience were irrelevant, or at best kind of local color.
As the hopes for social renewal faded and national frustration rose in the 1970s, Berger’s desire
for personal control over recorded would become widespread.
The changes high fidelity introduced in the production and consumption of music that
seemed frightening or disturbing to older generations of cultured classical listeners seemed
natural to the Top 40 generation. For a small but growing group of men in the 1950s
constructing sophisticated audio systems from discrete components, or “rigs,” had become
something more than a hobby. It was a mission to create using mechanical means and with
perfect fidelity the experience of a performance. In the period from 1957 to 1979, the increase of
high fidelity stereo equipment in the homes, automobiles, and on the bodies of Americans saw
the rise of a very different desire. The listening style they developed would complete the
transformation of music into a thing, and listening into a personalized and solitary pursuit.
Culminating with the introduction of the Walkman in 1979, music would come to be seen as a
source personal empowerment and a social shield, helping to achieve not so much connection but
self-sufficiency. To listen to music in 1979 was, in most cases, to listen alone.

High Fidelity’s Early Years –High Wattage and High Culture
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For the first ten years of the postwar era high fidelity remained the exclusive preserve of
technically savvy and financially secure adult male hobbyists. These audiophiles built their own
high fidelity “rigs” from discrete parts or difficult-to-assemble kits that required a sophisticated
understanding of electronics. The best high fidelity sound, as guidebooks and magazine articles
religiously pointed out, never came from prepackaged whole, but from the applied knowledge of
the audiophile. The expensive components along with the impenetrable jargon of audiophiles
and retailers effectively sealed high fidelity from the mainstream consumer culture. For much of
the 1950, audiophiles comprised a recognizable subculture of serious men who pursued
equipment with silly names, such as “woofers” (low register speakers) and “tweeters” (high
register speakers) with “amazing decisiveness and purpose.” Their goals varied. Most sought (or
claimed to seek) an exact sonic replica of the concert hall. Others found their calling in imitating
the Doppler effect, or earthquakes, or in testing the sonic limits of their rigs. And there were
those whose rigs were primarily markers to impress (or bore and annoy) friends and family.
Whatever their goals, early postwar sound systems offered initiates into the high fidelity
subculture a refuge from the public sphere of work, neighbors, and even spouses. It was not all
isolation, however. A rig was a ticket into a community of the knowing, and its builder also
received great sounding music and a powerful aesthetic experience. Most likely, the average
1950s audiophile sincerely loved the music his machines produced. The subculture’s
mouthpiece, High Fidelity began publication in 1951, and in its early days assumed its readers
possessed considerable taste in and knowledge of classical music. Though it catered to the do-ityourself hobbyist, the magazine nonetheless printed a number of helpful and friendly “primers”
to familiarize high fidelity novices with the equipment and jargon. For the reader to not
understand the workings of the new Ampex tape recorder was forgivable. Less forgivable was a
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taste in classical music that only extended to snippets of popular favorites, such as
Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture.
The magazine also engaged in a practice of ritual reassurance, telling its readers at
regular intervals (often at the end of long pieces) that their private hobby enhanced the authentic
musical experience: the performance. The credo of the 1950s audiophile, as seen in the pages of
High Fidelity, proclaimed that performance was primary and the all the sophisticated equipment
was in place to democratize what had for most of history had been an elitist pleasure. This
position would become less and less tenable as the hobby actually democratized and grew into a
mainstream cultural practice.
Building rigs in the 1950s and early 1960s was often a novelty of sorts, a costly game to
construct an electronic apparatus that could mimic a phenomenon as sonically complex as an
orchestra. The large outlay of money was officially regretted, but always acknowledged by High
Fidelity. “An interesting observation on the subject,” John H. Newitt told the prospective 1957
novice buyer, “is that good equipment is usually expensive, but equipment isn’t necessarily good
because it is expensive…” in any case Newitt concluded, “It is to be strongly emphasized that
you should avoid very inexpensive equipment.” 374
A high fidelity rig meeting the basic requirements was out of the price range of most
young people. For those “average listeners” seeking a barely adequate rig, High Fidelity went so
far as to surmise that they might not even desire to reproduce the sounds of the performance.
“The average listener, however, might possibly find that he likes certain modifications of the
standard characteristics,” Newitt mused. “This amounts to creating a ‘new’ electronic instrument
since the result certainly isn’t one of the accepted standards. But the fact that this new
374

John Newitt, “A Hi-Fi Primer, Part 3,” High Fidelity, October 1957, 57; John Newitt, “A HiFi Primer, Part 4, High Fidelity, December 1957, 130.

192
instrument may sound out of balance to a musician does not necessarily mean that it is
unpleasant.” 375 Perhaps pleasant, Newitt implied, but certainly not art or “authentic.” Though
high fidelity brought near performance-quality music into the home using sophisticated
equipment, the official subculture’s understanding the listening experience remained wedded to a
traditional understanding of music as performance.
Rigs, if not hidden in cabinets or otherwise disguised, created an unseemly mess wires,
knobs, and ugly glass lights all of which jarred with the domestic of ideal upper middle class
home. Along with the music making machines, enclosure construction – to hide the equipment –
received a considerable amount of attention. Male audiophiles were decidedly unconcerned with
the appearance of their machines but women allegedly were. High fidelity was the indoor
version of auto repair and the bar-b-que pit. A running joke in the 1950s High Fidelity had it that
cluck-clucking wives, not distortion and faulty equipment, were the greatest enemy of good
sound. The magazine even felt it necessary to dispel a rumor that women possessed inferior ears
than did men. This would have provided a scientific rationale – always a plus among
audiophiles – that explained the wifely hostility to the expensive and ugly hobby. 376 The
magazine, outside of High Fidelity, that paid the most attention to stereo components and rig
construction was, not surprisingly, Playboy. Hugh Heffner published the first Playboy in 1953
and his magazine consistently promoted the high fidelity system as an essential commodity of
the Playboy lifestyle. 377 High fidelity was exclusive both by income and gender, and for a brief
time these barriers bounded the hobbyists together into a community with a coherent set of
values and goals.
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The Performance Standard of Early High Fidelity

The technical demands of the hobby and the aesthetic nature of the musical experience
produced a natural tension in the high fidelity subculture, one that reflected an anxiety over the
changing nature of performance and music appreciation. Was the goal to be as faithful as
possible to the original performance, or was it to create new and better ways of experiencing
music? Sound systems made it possible for music not only to be repeated, but measured and
manipulated, offering the opportunity to improve a flawed performance. Such sonic massaging,
however, represented a disturbing prospect to most committed 1950s audiophiles. An engineer
in High Fidelity worried that stereo rather than helping reach the goal of realism, might not
instead be mere gimmickry, while a musician warned that the popularity high fidelity recordings
and rigs were already transforming aspiring singers into biological tape recorders. 378 The effects
on the “average listener” might not be beneath High Fidelity’s and the audiophiles’ concern.
More alarming, however, were the ways the machinery jeopardized musical art and its producers.
Respect for the machines, the warning went out, must never be so great as to overshadow the
musicians.
According to sound system guidebooks and High Fidelity, the hours spent constructing,
maintaining, and upgrading rigs represented a noble quest to recreate, through the application of
and science and technology, the exact sound of a live performance. “[Audiophiles] are
thoroughly saturated with the tantalizing idea that sound, a complex arrangement of fantastic
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waveforms, can be stuffed into complex electro-mechanical apparatus and emerge amplified, but
so unchanged, that the listener is deluded into thinking it is the unmolested original,” one highly
technical early 1950s high fidelity guidebook explained before the it entered into page after page
of bewildering schematics. 379 The stated goal therefore differed little from the old Edison tests.
In the closing years of the nineteenth century, Thomas Edison demonstrated the effectiveness of
his product by exposing blindfolded listeners to two versions of the same piece of music
performed by a single instrument or voice. The test subject guessed which one was “real” and
which on was the recording. By choosing the machine or by displaying at least some hesitation
meant that his engineers had done their job and that the cylinder was worthy of the consumer’s
dollars. 380 The rig of a skilled 1950s audiophile should similarly fool a blindfolded visitor into
mistaking the sounds coming out of a basement rig to find a full Mahlerian orchestra. “High
fidelity” meant that the reproduction was “faithful” to the original performance, but one could
also understand the fidelity as a promise from audiophiles to maintain their faith in the
conventional understanding of music. The lack of an audience and the strange places music
could emerge continued to bedevil audiophiles into the 1960s, who wondered whether they were
breaking their faith with the performance. 381
The meaning of the high fidelity experience, however, from its very beginnings was quite
different from that associated with musical performance. Like the garage or the back yard, the
room containing the high fidelity rig was a male space, mechanical and outside postwar
resurgence of traditional femininity. Even when in the living room, the rig was hidden in
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cabinets and enclosures and only emerged when activated. At that point, it transformed a
domestic space into an intimate masculine preserve. The volume a powerful rig produced –
especially if used with earphones – surrounded the listener in a sonic embrace that was not
possible in any performance. A Newsweek cartoon illustrated both the sublime stereo experience
and the gendered nature of early high fidelity subculture showing a man reclining to music in
ecstasy while his wife looking on with displeasure. 382 High fidelity’s transformation of music
into a personal refuge, along with its technical virtuosity, would be key selling points to both
men and women when it made its way into the mainstream in the 1970s.
Though enamored with their creations and committed to improving recorded music, male
audiophiles rarely questioned the assumed hierarchy of the musical experience that privileged the
performance. A somewhat cranky high fidelity guidebook underscored the faithfulness to
performance assumption, which when the guide appeared in 1976 had all but vanished. “All hi-fi
enthusiasts,” it advised, “should certainly refresh their ears by attending live performances, for it
is all too easy to be deluded by ‘chromium-plated’ equipment into thinking that what is in fact
false and indifferent reproduction is better than intrinsically more faithful sound.” 383 The
guidebook’s author expressed a common fear of the 1950s that mechanical virtuosity would
replace human creativity and in the process would destroy music’s communicative properties
along with its beauty. It mattered little whether the recorded version sounded better than the
performance, as the performance was inherently superior. The anxiety was that the hermetically
sealed world of sound the rig created could ultimately become a trap, keeping music lovers from
the “real” thing and from other people.
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The musical experience in the listening room was, despite official pronouncements on
fidelity, designed to disorient. Turn out the lights and then enter the room, High Fidelity advised
its readers in 1957. “You should experience an upset of your sense of orientation. The massive
forces of the pipe organ with its separate choirs of great, swell, solo, and echo show up
marvelously in stereo.” 384 The lack of an appropriate visual analog to the sonic stimulation had
long been one of the intriguing and disturbing elements of recorded sound. A British critic in the
1920s noted that many could not bear to listen to the human voice issuing from a box. 385 A
darkened room, unfamiliar, and full of sound was not feared in the postwar era – it had become a
sanctuary. This same sort of disorientation would be celebrated by the rock-listening youth
culture of the 1960s. The mind-altering refuge that high quality recorded sound offered would
become especially prominent after a number of outside factors made escape into the private
realm much more appealing.

The Rise of Living Room Culture: The Mainstreaming of High Fidelity

The technical origins of high fidelity lay with Columbia and the British record giant
Decca, and it was around the long-playing record that companies both small and large offered
amplifying equipment, speakers, and other components. For some audiophiles tape offered the
greatest sonic rewards, and tape’s cumbersome nature in the 1950s tended to also increase its
appeal among a certain type of hobbyist. The phonograph, however, reigned supreme in sales
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and tape found its way only into a small minority of rigs. 386 The minimum essential components
of all rigs consisted of a tuner and record player, an amplifier, and speakers. In 1957, when high
fidelity was an established industry on the verge of breaking mainstream, the major record
companies agreed on stereophonic record standard, opening up their extensive catalogs of
recorded stereo music and consumers to a previously hidden sonic experience. Throughout the
1950s, the major record companies had been producing masters in stereo sound, so that when
they finally agreed to an industry-wide standard, they would be ready. The stereophonic record
allowed the high fidelity to transcend hobby status and become a mass phenomenon 387
Stereophonic sound (and its less popular sibling “quad”) promised depth and space,
replicating the feeling of the concert hall and thereby increasing the rig’s “fidelity” to the
original performance. The two channels allowed for sounds to be separated in reproductions,
similar to the arrangement of instruments on an imagined stage. Stereo also made constructing a
rig a less-expensive endeavor. Stereo rigs, as opposed to their monaural counterparts, achieved
high quality sound with small speakers and relatively weak amplifiers. 388 By 1957, the hobby
began to make major commercial waves, when equipment sales topped $500 million. Of that
total, the industry estimated that $135 million came from the “cultists” who constructed their
own rigs and the rest – the lion’s share – came from first time buyers. The big record companies
assisted novices, selling more high fidelity packages. Unlike the kits popular with old-guard
audiophiles, the packages required little in the way of assembly or prior knowledge of the
technology. Consumer-friendly packages and stereo sound ended high fidelity’s image as “a
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strange screwdriver and soldering hobby.” 389 The rise of the rock long player in the subsequent
decade and the conquest of high fidelity subculture by youth culture would further change the
meaning of high fidelity and the listening experience overall.
It was not only cost that drove the growth of the high fidelity market, as industry leaders
recognized the appeal a sonic refuge held in “The Age of Anxiety.” In the breakthrough year of
1957 the president of Columbia Records, Goddard Lieberson, contributed a breathless account of
the rise of new listening patterns to High Fidelity, which he claimed were not only increasing his
companies’ bottom line but were changing Americans’ understanding of music. Presaging later
declarations from Rolling Stone and the youth counterculture, Lieberson maintained that records
and the act of listening to them at home was revolutionary. The bureaucratic modern world
alienated individuals, obscured real pleasure, increased to unnatural levels the speed of life, but
good stereo counteracted these trends. “Since we are as much defeated and halted by stress and
tension as by any dread disease,” Lieberson wrote, “the long-playing record has come along
demanding (and getting) the one thing we apparently could not give: more time.” The high
fidelity and recording industries offered a palliative to nervous moderns that not only eased their
anxieties but also, and more importantly, initiated a “sensory revolution,” similar to what
Marshal McLuhan would make a career expounding. Audio systems restored the organic, tribal
drum, unifying fragmented psyches and societies. 390
The mass consumption of high fidelity “signalized a new consciousness of sound, a new
respect for the ears and hearing, it was as if a new set of taste buds had developed or a new color
spectrum had been discovered.” The revolutionary listening behavior of a present and growing,
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if still largely immature and inchoate, appreciation for sound had “brought the attention of an
otherwise unaware and indifferent public the excitement of restoring the phonograph and the
phonograph record to their rightful place as a means of entertainment.” For a recording industry
that had been battered by radio since the 1920s, the phonograph record’s restoration was indeed a
welcome development. Lieberson admitted that at present the masses did not fully comprehend
high fidelity’s revolutionary potential. Enthusiastic or misled amateurs confused woofers with
tweeters, listened to the wrong records, and purchased inferior equipment. Despite these
predictable growing pains, the practice of listening to records “had entered the bloodstream” and
would slowly work its magic over the nation’s collective consciousness. Adapting old mantras
about the educational value of television and radio to high fidelity, he concluded “the American
living room had become a scene of cultural activity in which the phonograph record brought the
university lecture hall, the theater, and the concert hall into the intimate possession of those who
had never known them. Furthermore, this cultural interest can be measured: for we know from
the millions of records… that are purchase, that the American interest in living-room culture is
quite probably at the highest point in history.” 391
Exquisite living room culture aside, high fidelity was not without its pratfalls. Lieberson
took care to exclude the “hit” song from being part of this consciousness changing mass
consumption pattern and engaged in the ritualistic condemnations of those hobbyists who in their
obsession to solder out of existence all traces distortion lost sight of high fidelity’s true meaning.
These were the men looking at meters instead of listening to Beethoven, those more interested in
“naked sound” than real music. This straw man, if he existed at all, was one of a dwindling
group and an easy target. The young consumers purchasing rock records (especially Elvis discs
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sold by Lieberson’s competitor RCA Victor) were probably more disconcerting to the industry
executive. Though one would expect the head of the largest record company to extol the
benefits of products that he produced, the importance Lieberson ascribed to (if not all of his
conclusions about) high fidelity were not overstated. The rig was a refuge and listening to music
there – so different than attending a performance – represented a revolutionary shift. The
practice encouraged the development of a new culture based around the home and the privacy it
provided. These notions would become commonplace and be expanded in subsequent popular
treatments of high fidelity. 392
Toward the end of 1957 the national media blitzed the public with coverage of the social
and familial benefits high fidelity offered. Look magazine celebrated the connective possibilities
high fidelity offered to the suburban family. A photo essay from that year featured two white
children resting on stereo equipment, feeding tape into a player, and enjoying the machine in the
company of their parents. Look, in a move that would have unnerved the editors of High
Fidelity, attributed the rise in home audio systems to the popularity of Muzak that had piped
sounds into factories and shopping centers since World War II. Muzak, significantly, was a
genre that had been engineered to function as background music – it made no attempt to imitate a
performance. This same quality had made Muzak the bête noir of 1950s audiophiles who saw in
it the complete break with fidelity to the performance and the triumph of the banal. 393 The
majority of Americans, Look concluded, had grown accustomed to navigating public spaces such
as shopping center with musical accompaniment and now wanted their everyday lives to be
musically enhanced. Stereo offered the opportunity to experience “the extraordinary effect of
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being entirely surrounded by recorded sound” in the privacy of their own home. 394 Recorded
sound was a security blanket for the entire family.
In this vision of high fidelity, recorded sound sheltered the family – rather than just its
male breadwinner – from the outside world, amplifying the effect of the postwar domesticity.
The adult and the masculine markers of audiophile identity faded somewhat, and the mass media
depictions of the high fidelity hobby presented a much more inclusive activity than before.
Children and wives were now pictured enjoying the relief, security, and innocent fun private
sound systems provided. High fidelity was taking its place alongside the television and
becoming part of the family-centered postwar American Way of Life.
Stereo connected nuclear in a way that was not entirely different musical performance
had for past communities. High fidelity could assist in defending the postwar family, assuaging
nervousness about suburban living and the centrifugal forces of postwar life. It is interesting to
note that 1957 was the second consecutive year that rock and roll dominated the charts and split
generations along musical lines. There is no hint in most media treatments of high fidelity that
rock and roll, which was found mainly on monaural AM radio and cheap 45 rpm singles, had
anything to do with long playing stereophonic high fidelity.
Veteran audiophiles of 1957 greeted the simultaneous equipment improvement and mass
popularity of their hobby with ambivalence. Some mused darkly on what they assumed had to
be a cheap musical experience that suburban music lovers sought. “It has not occurred to them
that one man may conduct a symphony better than another,” sniffed the Atlantic Monthly in its
overview of the first ten years of high fidelity, “They want the new recording, because it will be
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the most ‘hi-fi.’” 395 The consumer rush for stereo held the potential to excise spontaneity from
music. Further, a technologically dependent understanding of musical quality represented a
slippery slope that could undermine the centrality of performance in the musical experience and
keep the listener home alone.
That the democratization of high fidelity could alter the musical experience seemed
obvious, that it would likewise lead to a revolution in musical production was less obvious. As
advances in high fidelity convinced orchestra leaders that the record presented an accurate,
permanent, and therefore definitive version of their work, they listened to tapes all the more
closely, “perfecting” mistakes through repeated takes and employing more controversial
practices such as splicing tapes and, later, mixing separate tracks in the studio. High fidelity
allowed composers to analyze raw sound that previous equipment could not. Orchestra leaders’
concerns with perfection created a feedback loop with the players, who sensing the changed
expectations of their conductors altered the way they approached performance. “At worst it
takes the shape of emotional discontinuity,” The Atlantic warned. “At best it makes it seem
almost as if the players had rehearsed once too often, and had lost their spontaneity.” 396 The
musicians ended up imitating machines and in the process made their own existence, in World
War II musician union leader James Petrillo’s worst nightmare, unnecessary.
Instead of playing for an audience and responding to it, musicians and conductors
focused on the sounds on the record that they had produced, but eventually the feedback loop
between conductor, record, and musician would expand to the audience. This new element, the
Atlantic worried, would become accustomed to the modern sound devoid of mistakes and learn
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to enjoy mechanical sounds. This The Atlantic, feared would mean that the essence of music –
its communicative and connective powers – would be diluted if not destroyed. Because
recordings had become more common and because high fidelity stereo components increased
playback quality, the potential for audience/musician alienation increased. This did not
necessarily mean that reconnection was impossible. Despite of the negative possibilities, The
Atlantic ultimately believed that once the masses (or a sufficiently large chunk of them) became
acquainted with good music and educated themselves sufficiently to its pleasures, their demands
for good music would lead inevitably to its production and eventually to their entering a concert
hall. Once having experienced the presence of a true performance, listeners would begin to
demand from records the closest approximation to the real thing – not mistake free perfection. 397
The major record companies, however, had not yet recognized the youth market for high
fidelity recordings. The best selling long players of the early 1950s were big band jazz releases
such as the 1951 “Benny Goodman Carnegie Hall Concert,” spoken word albums (“John
Brown’s Body”), or recordings of Hollywood film soundtracks. Youth music was confined to
monaural singles and AM radio. The 1954 release of the Blackboard Jungle soundtrack on LP
should have set off alarms as to a changing regime in high fidelity music. The MGM film on
juvenile delinquency included Billy Haley and the Comets’ “Rock around the Clock,” and hit
number one. It would be some years, however, that the long-playing charts came to resemble the
singles in representing the young consumer. 398 Young listeners brought with them a new
definition of fidelity – one that did not find it necessary to reference the performance.
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Youth and High Fidelity

High fidelity guidebooks began to acknowledge the greater participation of the young in
the market in latter part of the sixties and early seventies. An example from 1971, Stereo in Your
Home, makes the standard attacks on novelties and gimmicks that too often seduce naïve
listeners when first exposed to high fidelity audio, and it engages in the usual ceremonial bowing
to the superiority of live performance. The guidebook also, however, includes a chapter with
advice on which manufacturers make the best color organs, then and now common sights at
discotheques, and why a potential music lover might want to buy one. It admits that the organs,
which covered walls with vivid colors and changing shapes that appeared to move to the beat of
the music, did nothing to the sound, but explains that they do provide a “semipsychedelic visual
stimulus” that had become increasingly popular. 399
One long-standing problem that a well-constructed color organ remedied was the issue of
what to do with one’s eyes when listening to recorded music. “Very often people find
themselves at odd ends trying to listen to music because they cannot seem to focus their attention
on it when there is no visual stimulus,” and, “[A]color organ not only gives this… but also
provides some interesting artistic values as well. Walt Disney did this on a grad scale in
Fantasia. 400 The color wheel worked more fully enclose the listener by occupying yet another
sense.
The color wheel may have also helped remedy another problem associated with listening
to recorded – what to do with other people. The guidebook noted that for most listeners using a
color wheel on their own, the effects eventually becomes tiresome, and that it often served best
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as a conversation piece for guests, or as an “attention getter.” This latter designation suggests
that the color wheel may have helped ease the difficult period of what do once the high fidelity
rig was fired up. Evan Eisenberg has noted that listening to recorded music in groups is a
notoriously awkward experience. He has observed that listeners nervously flip through
magazines, smoke marijuana, drink, or engage in small talk, anything to lessen an uncomfortable
feeling. 401 The color wheel solved some of these social issues. Its use as a conversation starter
also shows one reason why recorded music was best experienced alone. This was a reality that
young listeners were acutely aware.
Not until the mid 1970s did High Fidelity begin to acknowledge that the young were
becoming major consumers of audio equipment and potential subscribers. Some rock records
snuck into the “Lighter Side” review section starting in the 1960s, and in 1977 the magazine
finally jettisoned its classical music bent. It subsequently ditched the Lighter Side and added
“Backbeat,” which the magazine hoped would not serve a passive pop audience, but an active
group of music makers. “We figure there are a lot of equipment-crammed basements around the
country where our readers make live recordings,” editor Leonard Marcus explained, “and that we
can be of as much service to the active pop recordist as we have been to the classical music
listener…” 402
By the late seventies, the magazine changed once again, expanding it coverage of popular
music including selections from regular contributors to Rolling Stone and The Village Voice,
adding a section on sound technology significantly titled “Surroundings,” and updating the
graphical content to achieve an overall more modern feel. A new editor endeavored to reassure
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anxious readers that “visions of familiar landmarks toppling, bastions crumbling” were not so –
that despite all appearances, High Fidelity had not become Rolling Stone. 403 He was right; it had
not. “Musical America,” a supplement that would not have been out of place in high school
band rooms, remained an integral part of the publication, as did reviews of classical music –
though images of classical musicians never again graced the cover. The culture beneath High
Fidelity, however, had shifted decidedly in favor of the young’s understanding of the musical
experience.
Anywhere Out of This World: Listening Spaces of the 1970s

In the 1970s exceptional listeners brought music with them wherever they went.
President Carter lived a public life surrounded by private music after he had installed a system
that piped high quality stereo sound to every corner of the White House. Conducting affairs of
state in the Oval Office the president enjoyed “optimized” sound in which the system took into
account that room’s unique aural fingerprint, including a particularly troublesome desk. Son Jeff
claimed the in a short time the system had become necessity for the entire family. Unlike his
voyeuristic predecessors, Cater did not want to listen in to or revisit tape conversations but to
tune out distractions. In this desire, Carter was in tune with his era as millions of his fellow
citizens also went hi-fi. In a period normally associated with economic malaise, the sale of high
fidelity components grew from $800 million to two and one half billion dollars while at the same
time, despite inflation in other areas, the price of stereo equipment declined. 404 The ability
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personalize one’s own sonic space had never been so affordable nor so desirable. In the 1970s,
Americans escaped into a sonic environment over which they exercised perfect control.
Listening to popular recorded music became both more private and, paradoxically, more
public during the course of the 1970s. High fidelity took listeners into the seclusion of the their
own private space, but as the decade closed, the promise of high fidelity included audiocassette
systems and hand held portables allowed for this privacy to extend beyond the four walls of the
home. These machines and the culturally prominent ideal of self-sufficiency brought listeners
back to the public, though they did not bring listeners together. The isolated listening practices
encouraged by the increasing popularity of high fidelity audio systems required the privacy of a
specially designated space and this requirement did not vanish with portability. Listeners of the
late 1970s cut through public space shielded and empowered by their car stereos and portables.
For most of the nine and a half million American households who owned high fidelity
sound systems, however, personalized music was confined to one space: the “listening room.” 405
The rare room expressly built (in some cases the home) for the purpose of enjoying high fidelity
recorded sound was the gold standard of all committed audiophiles, and was therefore for most a
distant dream. Instead Americans made do with their existing private spaces, and the living
room, den, or bedroom temporarily became the listening room. For others the automobile, long
the domain of radio, offered the best location to enjoy recorded music of one’s own choosing.
And for a smaller but growing group, the portable with headphones turned any room into a
personalized sonic space. The Yeaple Corporation even went so far as to market the
“Stereopillow” to add high fidelity sound to sleep. 406
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In each example, recorded music offered a mixture of security, escape, and selfpossession. The listening room became a sanctuary where one could get lost in sound, or,
especially in the case of car audio systems, a space where machines allowed one greater control
over the environment. Rarely in the pitches to persuade Americans to construct or upgrade a
high fidelity system, however, did marketers present the listening room as offering any sort of
recognizable social event or that it would make good on the grandiose promises of social renewal
and revolution associated with 1960s rock and roll.

The Listening Room

The l970s listening room was visually more pleasing than those of earlier decades as the
constructing and maintaining high fidelity stereo systems had become gender inclusive. This
development caused some degree of ambivalence amongst the old guard audiophiles, who felt
that the inclusion of women threatened the integrity of the culture they had constructed.

“Never

feel embarrassed to base your final choice on how it will look in your room,” Ms advised its
readers, a declaration that would have been heretical in the pages of High Fidelity. 407
Women’s magazines in the final years of the 1970s ran articles, which often appeared as
if they were penned by industry reps, acquainting readers with the benefits high fidelity offered
and reassuring them that sound systems were not only for men. 408 Ms went so far as to resurrect
old stories about women’s allegedly different hearing capabilities, but this time to argue that
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women possessed superior ears than did men and needed to trust them when negotiating with
male clerks. 409 The articles, though in general quite similar to early “primers” in High Fidelity,
tended to emphasize the way that audio systems could be manipulated, made to adapt to the
domestic spaces allegedly already under female control. “Don’t be embarrassed about liking
something for its looks,” Working Woman echoed the earlier Ms assertion. “A sound system
should fit into your room just like anything else.” 410
The focus on personal control of the sound was not only evident women’s magazines, but
also present in the mass media’s general approach to audio systems at the end 1970s. “Lean and
spare is the look of the Eighties,” Rolling Stone predicted in the summer of 1979, noting that
men and women were “shoehorning themselves into designer jeans while designing their
sometimes tiny rooms with sonic brilliance and visually pleasing equipment. The new
appreciation of the audio system’s visual qualities and the demand for better looking audio were
manifestations of the growing desire for perfect control over the individual’s environment. The
ability to transform private space into one’s own sonic would be a major selling point for stereo
components in the 1970s and beyond. 411
The numbers convinced industry leaders that high quality audio components had a truly
mainstream market. Pioneer in 1977 identified young women as the top potential target, while
John Koss of Koss headphones joined an advertising group in urging his fellow high fidelity
manufacturers to reach out to women. Such a reach out effort may have been unnecessary by the
late 1970s. Publisher of Ms, Patricia Carbine, claimed that 47 percent of subscribers owned
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separate stereo components – the definition of a high fidelity system. Listening to recorded
music on expensive equipment had broken free of its moorings in the male hobbyist culture. 412
The editors of High Fidelity looked on uneasily at the changing profile of the high
fidelity consumer. This was perhaps not without justification. As the markers that made the
audiophile distinct from the mainstream consumer disappeared, the magazine itself seemed to
lose its reason for being. Like the young listener, the woman listener allegedly approached the
recorded sound lacking proper reverence, and in their hands the noble ideal of perfect
reproduction of a performance gave way to a more mundane goal of personal pleasure and
control. “Most of the women in this group knew little, in anything, about audio technology,”
High Fidelity claimed about female college who purchased stereo systems. “None read an audio
magazine regularly and few recalled ever seeing an ad for equipment in the magazines they did
read.” Not only were they ignorant of the true value of high quality reproduced sound, but also
were too conscious of visual aesthetics when deciding which audio components to purchase.
“Are cosmetics important to these women? To the majority, yes…. The bottom line was, ‘When
you knock yourself out to make look good, you don’t want a bunch of ugly boxes sitting around.’
One woman added, ‘my husband is just as concerned about that as I am – maybe more so. He’s
an interior decorator.’” 413 The listening room and its rig had become a place explicitly devoted
to reflecting or amplifying one’s personality, not a sacred space in which to pay homage to high
art or to struggle against nature to reproduce with machines the illusion of presence. High
Fidelity would cease publication in 1988.
The true audiophiles of the earlier era recognized that the listening room was “part of
your high fidelity system” shaping refracting sound waves in unpredictable ways. Though a
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clever and handy audiophile possessed considerable control over the audio equipment, the
physical space itself escaped his mastery. The listening room could be too small, or too boxy, or
too hard, or too soft to remain faithful to the original sound source. 414 It seemed to possess its
own qualities, a situation that produced anxiety in the pages of High Fidelity, not because the
audiophile should be able to alter the sound to fit the room, but because the room was frustrating
the faithful reproduction of the performance. By the seventies, however, the worries over sonic
perfection had faded as the sound system and the room that housed it came to be understood
more and more as an extension of the self. “What’s Your Stereotype?” Teen magazine asked its
young adult female readers as they began to think about stereo components. 415 Whatever music
one consumed by the late 1970s was to reflect either a personal idiom, or in the case of Teen, an
identifiable “stereotype.”
The 1970s listening room transformed a solitary space not into one filled with people, but
one that provided art, comfort, and a human touch via a mechanical apparatus. Advertisements
for and articles covering home stereo systems implied that scientifically engineered recorded
sound, acting as an audio tonic, would ease alienation and anxiety by adding what sounded like
life to what was otherwise monotony. Absent from 1970s high fidelity boosterism were any
references to the performance, rather it was understood that “it takes high-quality equipment,
carefully chosen, to retain the breath of life in reproduced music,” Hans Fantel wrote in New
York Times Magazine. The most alive music was “blatantly technological” and musicians,
producers, and engineers had finally discarded outdated dogma that called for fidelity to the
performance and were instead engineering sounds for the man on the living room armchair.
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Technology had liberated music form the tyranny of localism, and given listeners the ability to
program and color their lives with sound as they wished.
Not only did recorded music and high quality sound provide psychological benefits, but
they also revitalized democracy and expanded personal freedom. High fidelity represented a
victory for ordinary individual listeners, and Rolling Stone credited a number of 1970s consumer
electronic devices, from equalizers, to time delay to noise reduction technology, with “increasing
the power of the hi-fi buff over his or her equipment.” Claiming the old era of high fidelity,
circa 1970, was a time of sonic oppression, Rolling Stone noted that in the new golden age one
“can tailor the sound of Dark Side of the Moon to resemble Pink Floyd at the Cow Palace.” Pink
Floyd was an interesting choice, since the rock band was famous for trying as best it could to
make its performances conform to the recorded versions. No matter one’s whim, it was now
possible that when the listening ended, “you won’t have to get up from your chair because addons that automatically turn off your system are available.” 416 Exactly why one might want to
continue to remain seated in a silent room is left unexplained. The concert offered the listener
little control over the sound and because an event was too “formal” and did not integrate music
into everyday life. Cheap stereo technology did. 417
The poverty of a modern life lacking recorded sound was illustrated in an advertisement
featuring a stark picture of an empty room with four white walls, one narrow window, and hard
wood floors. The copy read “At Technical Sound Industries There’s Never a Day Without
Music.” 418 The empty room not only appeared lonely, but intimidating. Private space was a
prison in which modern Americans were trapped and alone. Good speakers, and by extension
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the electronic media in general, capable of delivering high fidelity sound counteracted the freefloating fears of isolation and loneliness and transformed the reality of an alienated existence into
something tolerable, even pleasure. And this miracle occurred not just occasionally but every
day. Instead of feeling a powerless prisoner, the owner of a high fidelity system was awash in
sound over which he exercised complete control – making the kings and lords of the baroque era
with their personal chamber orchestras look like pikers.
High fidelity offered virtual reality before the home computer industry had even began.
Not only music, but also “natural sound” and “white noise” had become available to listeners.
Popular Mechanics claimed that many listeners used such noises to improve the functioning of
their “left brain.” Besides helping out a tired cranial hemisphere, recorded sounds of frogs
croaking and tides crashing could improve one’s love life, quality of sleep, and concentration. 419
Here psychoacoustics are identified as a new pharmaceutical, a quick and perhaps pleasant
curative for neurosis.
Electronics companies often claimed listening to recorded sound on expensive equipment
also provided overwhelmed listeners with an escape from social obligations. Stanton
Corporation’s 1977 playful advertisement for its quadraphonic headphones featured a series of
photos in which individuals wearing the headphones avoided dealing with a variety of domestic
problems. In one a woman stood with her eyes closed, blissfully unaware of the crying baby in
her arms. The man in the next photo smiled while working a chain saw over what appeared to be
house beam, and in a series of three photos, a woman in curlers harangued who responded by
remaining seated, peacefully reading a newspaper. A pair of Stanton headphones had relieved
these three lucky individuals and allowed them to enjoy the music being piped into their ears
419
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and, most important of all, their own privacy. If, as Jean-Paul Sartre claimed, hell is other
people, Stanton offered a tool toward isolated salvation. 420
As control over the sonic environment increased and prices of audio equipment fell, the
listening room held the potential to transform itself into a music producing center. A do-ityourself model of music making emerged in the 1970s, a solo counterpart to the proliferation of
rock and roll bands a decade earlier, that was decidedly record centric. The dream of the
basement recordist was not giving a dynamic performance, but the cutting of record and its
distribution to an unseen national audience. Costs probably remained prohibitive for most of
those inclined to record at home – in 1979 Rolling Stone estimated that transforming a basement,
garage, or bedroom into a sound making unit required $2000 for the four track recorder and at
least as much for remodeling and soundproofing (to say nothing of the instruments
themselves). 421 Nonetheless studio systems designed specifically for home use had never before
been even this inexpensive, and some first adopters, like Peter Brown, took advantage of the
technology, made records, and even scored hits. 422
In telling his story of the journey from anonymity to gold records in the pages of High
Fidelity, Brown credited “my bedroom in my parents’ suburban ranch house. Or more
specifically, the studio I built in it, which – since garbage men don’t exactly earn megabucks –
was put together for less than the cost of a Buick.” A part time art school student living his
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parents (Brown remained with his parents even after he found success as a recording artist) he
purchased some instruments and recording devices. Brown’s goal was to make music that
sounded like a group, not an individual. He wanted to use his bedroom studio – a place where he
no doubt listened to music – to create the illusion of accompaniment. Through trial and error, he
found the full sound he was looking for, and after sending out some tapes he was signed by a TK
Records. Brown played, recorded, and mixed all the instruments in his bedroom, just as he
designed the album covers. If one ignores his decision to remain with his parents, Brown stands
a model of self-sufficiency. There was no need for a band, less of one for a label, and no need
for the audience until the music had been reduced to recorded form. Had he been inclined less
toward R&B and funk, he might have found a home in the burgeoning punk and new wave scene
where the do-it-yourself ethos reigned supreme. 423

In Cars: Cassette Systems and the Empowered Listener

As with the listening room proper, the car provided security and control, but with the
bonus of power, speed, and mobility – a literal escape. “You may not be able to go very fast on
America’s highways, what with speed laws intended to prevent everything from death to runnin’
out of gas,” Rolling Stone complained in 1979, “but you can go loud.” 424 If you conveniently
ignore the long history of car radio, going “loud” in one’s own car was not practical, according
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to the late 1970s Rolling Stone, until the development of tape technology and the advent of
cartridges and cassettes. In 1964 Phillips made possible the transformation of the automobile
into a high fidelity sanctuary when it introduced the cassette. By the late seventies, the sound
quality of “highway hi-fidelity” had reached the point where the standards had been set and that
refinement, rather than innovation, characterized the manufacturers of car stereo components.
Prices fell and equipment appeared in more and more cars across the nation. 425 The car’s
mobility and ability to retain privacy in public space made it an ideal listening space in the late
seventies and beyond.
Automobile audio, like the increasing revenue in the recording industry, was connected to
the popularity of rock and roll among the young. Top 40 stations in the late 1950s and early
1960s faced daunting production problems sequencing voice, rapid-fire spots, music, and sound
effects into a seamless whole with the then existing acetate disc technology. Looped tape
cartridges containing jingles and ads began to replace discs in the early 1960s. The cartridges
never wore out and could be roughly handled and thrust into the machine, ready to play on cue,
all without rewinding. This improved the production’s quality and deskilled the disc jockeys. It
also gave an enterprising car salesman, Earl “Madman Muntz” the notion to put a cartridge
system in one of the cars he sold. After three years of business, Muntz and his associates had
installed 100,000 systems. Telepro manufactured most of the radio cartridege systems before
transitioning to individual cars. 426 Motorola and Ford began offering their systems as additional
features with what became known as the 8-track. The 8-track would itself give way to the
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cassette, when metal or chrome tapes appeared in the early 1970s offering an unbeatable
combination high fidelity, convenience, durability, and recording capabilities. 427
Car systems suggested from their outset a new approach to high fidelity, one that was
connected to youth culture and the visceral power, social meaning, and radical individualism
accorded to recorded rock and roll. In advertising a homebound speaker system, E-V SEVEN
nonetheless used a photograph of a man standing up through the sunroof of a Volkswagen
Beetle, holding a speaker in his arms. The copy of the 1965 spot declared; “Of Beetles, Beatles,
and Beethoven!” The implication was that the “bug” and the Beatles were for a type of high
fidelity fan who was individualistic and mobile and not committed to the conventional wisdom.
This audiophile was young at heart and undeniably hip. “The new E-V SEVEN… is not for
everyone. You have to be someone special to appreciate its value. That’s because the E-V
SEVEN doesn’t go along with the crowd.” Fidelity to the source meant less compared to the
desire of the individual listener and the potential for providing a mobile sonic space. The buyers
of E-SEVEN were not beholden to any high fidelity dogma – they knew what they wanted.
“There are no claims that it’s the world’s finest loudspeaker regardless of size – none of that
malarkey. (You know better so do we.)” 428
The car stereo, as with the listening room, was in fantasy form a multimedia center that
both protected and connected that also possessed the capability of providing an intense and
personalized listening experience. The aging former Top 40 radio listener had by 1979 the
opportunity to tune out the fragmenting youth cultures and into their own head. Pioneer was the
industry leader in car audio systems, and it marketed its components toward young men,
addressing adolescent insecurity and offering its solution in the form of automotive and audio
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self-sufficiency. High fidelity in the intimate space of the automobile encouraged sexual
adventure – brief but intense contact with another human being that had no lasting obligations.
Sex became an experience not unlike “really” listening to a good record. The listener inserted
the cassette, and got what they wanted from the system, all while maintaining the option to press
the eject at any moment. “Have an ‘Eargasm’” a famous and widely reprinted Pioneer ad
enthused. 429 The accompanying image consisted of 30 separate human ears from men and
women of different races. All these ears were assumed to be in ecstasy and alone, though united
by their choice of high fidelity sound and their sexual desire. Where the early Rolling Stone and
the recording industry associated 1960s records with social revolution, Pioneer offered let 1970s
consumers’ individual satisfaction on their own terms.
Mobility and freedom of a car audio system made it the next frontier of high fidelity.
“…[T]he car is the best place to listen to music – outside of a concert hall,” Rolling Stone
declared, giving ceremonial deference to the event before quickly showing that even
performance paled in comparison. “I mean you can really crank it up. Runnin’ down the road at
fifty-five mph, you have no neighbors banging on ceilings and walls to get you to turn it down.
And in that little acoustical environment, it sounds more like you’re up on stage with the
performer than down in the audience somewhere.” 430 Being a member of the audience in a
modern rock and roll show was to be a degraded mass participant, but the car offered the illusion
of importance and if not friendship, than imagined adulation and temporary celebrity.
The car had long been constructed as a place of youthful sexual adventure, and the car
stereo competent manufacturers marketed the cassette deck as a tool to amplify this
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phenomenon. Another Pioneer ad featured two photos of a young man. In the first picture, he
rests on a red sports car, holding a woman in short shorts from behind. In the second, he has a
woman on each arm. Two of the three women wore pioneer T-shirts with the slogan (a la Patsy
Cline) “I’ve gone to pieces.” “Let us fit you to a T,” the company explained. 431
Purchasing a high-end car audio system gave one “power without corruption” so that one
could enjoy the pleasures of the ruling class while retaining a rebellious heart. Pioneer did not
model its system on the concert hall. “In search of the ultimate car stereo, we chose of course
the home stereo. And broke down the system into its separate components.” 432 Once again,
music is defined as sound alone and therefore the use of high technology to reduce it down it its
essential elements and reconstitute it in improved form becomes possible. To the new listener,
this was progress, but to the aging high fidelity aficionado, Quixotically committed to the
performance, this represented another misuse of the technology. “Unfortunately, many people
are not very perceptive,” Joel Cohen complained about his car stereo system customers.
I find people who own [a delay unit for a car stereo] driving around with the rear
channels much louder than the front and the delay shoved way up – a totally unnatural
effect. They bought the equipment, and they want to hear it working. All of our talk
about accuracy presupposes that the user will not abuse the equipment. 433

Portables and Control – The Sounds of Self-Sufficiency

Personalization and control of recorded sound went a step further as 1979 ended when
Sony introduced a hand-held cassette player called the Walkman. The second generation –
Walkman II – released three years later, would sell over 2.5 million units, and in the process
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become a cultural phenomenon. Sony recognized the appeal of the Walkman in its initial ad
campaigns that celebrated the diversity of Walkman listeners, who in one ad included a young
and liberated woman and a Buddhist monk. By the mid 1980s, Sony was designing different
Walkman’s for separate niche markets – it had “lifestyled” the Walkman. 434 Control and
privacy, along with the knowledge of being among the hip, shaped Sony’s marketing efforts and
the product became associated with the young, the physically fit, and the hip.
The transistor had led to a more portable radio, one that was even attachable to the body,
and so the desire to have sound follow the individual into public space was not new in 1979.
What had changed was the amount of control one had over the sound and the meaning of
listening alone in public. Retailers began noticing in the early 1960s that playing music to
customers on headphones, rather than a traditional speaker arrangement, resulted in doubling the
sale of records. 435 By the 1960s listeners found that there was something desirable about being
immersed in sound that no one else heard. High Fidelity kept a close eye on portables – as it did
not all aspects of sound recording technology. The magazine, however, tended to see portables
as an afterthought – something an audiophile might take on vacation, but only because hauling
the rig along was not practical. 436 Other portables of the 1970s marketed their wares as mind
benders. “It’s like listening with your whole body,” declared an advertisement for the “Boom
Box.” Bass notes came with a “blast of air” allowing one to not only hear but also “feel the
boom box.” 437
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Sony, on the contrary, never claimed that the Walkman would overwhelm the individual,
or that it was a pale imitation of a stationary audio system in one’s room. The Walkman instead
was better than all other music systems because its mobility allowed for unprecedented
individual control over the environment. Not only did the user acquire a soundtrack, but also a
barrier that kept unwanted sounds or unwanted others out. Sony marketed the Walkman as a
device that would enhance the powers of or protect the user – making the listener more of who
they already were. Music as shield and music as performance enhancer – this was the twin
appeal of the portable for joggers and postmodern urban flaneurs.
Sony’s chairman and public spokesmen/philosopher, Akio Morita saw the success of the
Walkman – before it was a fact – as an inevitable result of the cultural zeitgeist. Everyone, he
told Rolling Stone in a 1980 interview, would soon have their own personal stereo. Those in
rural areas, or those who spent the day out doors would no longer be without music. It is hardly
surprising that Morita would predict the overwhelming success of his company’s product. What
is striking, however, is his assumption, apparently one shared by Rolling Stone, that the best
music was enjoyed privately, in doors. It was understood that those outside and in the public had
been missing something and would welcome the chance to more completely manage their sonic
environment and in the process seal themselves off from the distractions, including other people,
that currently surrounded them. 438
The portable cassette player was the logical next step in the sonic fight to combat
loneliness. It did not trap one in a listening room, yet neither did it expose one in the
unpredictable public realm. Its private noise and public silence gave one the opportunity to be
both among people and yet remain apart – making the Walkman simultaneously subversive and
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safe. “We do not return to individualized or privatized emotions when we use the Walkman,”
Rey Chow said extolling the device’s liberating and revolutionary aspects, “rather the
Walkman’s artificiality makes us aware of the impending presence of the collective, which
summons us with the infallibility of sleepwalker.” The presence of the collective is not forced
upon the individual by “the loudspeakers of history” that radio or the public address systems of
the past had. 439 The Walkman did not oppress, rather it allowed one to resist the negative
aspects of the collective. One could be public without the fear of losing one’s individuality. The
control, the smallness, and the accessibility of the Walkman make this possible. It also
obliterated the traditional understanding of music’s social nature and sense of obligation.
Personal control was one of the defining features of the 1970s listening style – the
proponents of portable stereo sound argued that the new technologies were expanding democracy
and empowering the individual at the expense of the powerful corporate machinery. Rolling
Stone, in particular, displayed a late-seventies obsession with the control modern technology
offered the individual listener. Equalizers, micros, and something as sinister sounding as Advent
Corporation’s “Sound Space Control” excited the former revolutionaries at Rolling Stone more
than any Bruce Springsteen record could, “So, at your option,” Rolling Stone explained to its
readers, “you could make, say, Abbey Road sound as if the Beatles were performing it in your
bathroom (two-millisecond delay, wet) or in Albert Hall (sixty-millisecond delay, dry).” 440
Given Rolling Stone’s youth culture roots, this desire to manipulate that culture’s heroes is
significant. The Beatles no longer were the avatars whose messages required one’s complete
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attention, but sonic clay in the hands of the modern listener. Technology provided the listener
with the choice to accept the Beatles (or Beethoven) as intended, piecemeal, or not all.
As the above examples suggest, the 1970s obsession with control of one’s sonic and
social environment was not an indication of the individual’s strength, but rather its opposite.
Sociologist Richard Stivers has labeled devices such as Walkmans “stimulus shields.” By
creating a sonic bubble around the individual in the public sphere, a stimulus shield protected a
weak individual from loneliness as well as from the perception of being alone. These devices
became increasingly necessary to postwar Americans. In a competitive and individualistic
society, face-to-face were more ambiguous, threatening, and undesirable. Relationships
mediated by communications technologies protected the individual. The more one was
disconnected from face-to-face interaction and conflict, however, the more one needed
protection. Thus the existence of the stimulus shield fed the need for ever-stronger shields. 441
The Walkman, which was marketed from its inception as a tool for the self-confident
instead can be better seen as one of despair and a symbol of a culture beset by insecurity and
alienation. Embattled individuals lacking the resources or the public space in which to reconnect
turned instead to the very devices that are pushing them further apart. The desire for sonic selfsufficiency has resulted in an era of lonely sounds. Wrapped in their own sonic environment, the
Walkman user was a microcosm of his culture.
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Epilogue

In the post World War II era, loneliness and recorded popular music became linked. For
both the performer and audience, the musical experience had become more solitary and mediated
over time. This separation occurred in the context of a historically individualistic culture that
was placing an ever-greater emphasis on the self. By the 1970s the celebration of the autonomy
and sufficiency of the individual had been taken to new extremes with consequences for all
aspects of American life. The story of popular recorded music’s journey out of the public and
into the personal, therefore, represents only one part of a larger national story that includes
privatized leisure generally, the expansion of the suburbs, the emergence of niche marketing,
individualized spirituality from “born again” Christianity to New Age mysticism, and the
emphasis on control over the body. It is a story that also includes the collapse of a liberal
consensus, increasing cynicism, and the rise of the new right in politics. The lonely listening
style of the late twentieth century therefore should concern anyone interested in the American
experience. 442
Americans’ relationship to popular recorded music and its technologies provides a
window through which to understand how other electronic media and information technologies
have affected social behavior. Along with stereo rigs, televisions and personal computers have
long been identified, among a host of other things, as hedges against loneliness and tools to
banish unpleasant moods. As with recorded music, Americans used these devices at home and
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often alone and in the process altered their relationships with their families, friends, neighbors,
and other citizens. A wide cross-section of observers have agreed that in the postwar era a
growing social disconnection was related to the peculiar uses for which Americans created for
their media and the technologies, with impressive psychological, social, cultural, and political
consequences. 443
In psychology and communications studies, scholars have blamed media technologies –
from the radio, television, and the computer for degrading social connections. Communications
studies scholars Brian Spitzberg and Daniel Canary have noted that Americans had incorporated
the electronic media into their lives as a form of private practice in ways that potentially
exacerbate the growing problem of loneliness in American life. Most Americans, the pair
contend, spend their lives moving in and out of loneliness and are thus “situationally lonely.”
This is a normal, or at least transitional, state. A smaller group of Americans, however, are
trapped in loneliness – the chronically lonely. They are alone, or feel that they are, most of the
day and have become resigned to a reality in which reintegration is no longer possible for them.
The chronically lonely also tend to be heavy users of electronic media. This is despite the fact
that they do not believe, as the situationally lonely do, that television or radio has any socially
therapeutic qualities. 444
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Electronic media pose a problem for the situationally lonely, however, because they
replace other activities, and offer a new and relatively stress-free style of relating to others as
well as to internal emotions. If a television or a record collection is used “instrumentally” to help
extricate one from loneliness, the media may in fact end up produce the opposite result in the
long term. “It is feasible,” Spitzer and Canary suggest,” that as social skills deteriorate, people
engage in reutilized behaviors that exclude, inhibit, or diminish functional behaviors. As
loneliness persists, people become more habituated and less instrumental users of media.” 445
The use of electronic media, on the rise for a number of “instrumental” reasons at home and
work, holds the potential to damage or distort the social fabric.
Systematic psychological inquiry into television’s relationship to loneliness began in
earnest in the 1970s, when researchers revealed that television had replaced a number of social
activities and seemed to have degraded the expression of the affect in the American household.
Not only did television lead to less conversation, but it reduced the number gestures and
behaviors normally associated with sociability: smiling, eye contact, “forward lean,” touching,
and conversation. By 1978, television owners reported spending more than 10 to 15 percent
more time watching television than engaging in conversation. Time spent on household rituals,
from family meals, to bedtime activities, and holiday celebrations similarly declined. Television
viewing in this context could be regarded as an addiction, a compulsion not unlike alcoholism. 446
Along with deteriorating interpersonal bonds, the social disconnection associated with
using electronic media – again television – has weakened the nation’s political culture. Robert
Putnam has argued television arrived in the postwar era and ensured that Americans stayed put in
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their new suburban homes. Television not only ended nightly visits, it turned the outside world
into an abstraction, privatized leisure and civic activity, and encouraged the formation of
“pseudo connections” that required little effort and dissolved all too easily. By watching
television – no matter its content – Americans learned how to cultivate loneliness, and hence
community and civic institutions withered along with everyday civility. As television viewing
replaced social and civic activities, it led inevitably to a diminution not only of the viewer’s
social skills but also his political inclinations. A chronic television viewer, Putnam maintained,
became passive and convinced of his own powerlessness. After its effects had been internalized
by the baby boom generation by the 1970s, the consequences of television viewing manifested
themselves in numbers that showed skyrocketing rates of depression, falling rates of voter
participation in national elections, and individual engagement in local government. Television,
along with suburbanization, provided the context in which a political culture dominated by fear,
apathy, and well-funded corporate interest groups developed: a culture of lonely and alienated
individuals. For Putnam, the future of American democracy depends upon Americans changing
their present relationships to the electronic media and with each other. 447
As noted above, television was not the medium of choice of the baby boom generation in
its coming of age. Radio and recorded music were far more important. This is not to deny that
television may have had a hand in producing the socially poor environment of the 1980s and
1990s Putnam describes, but to call for attention to be paid to the role played by popular
recorded music. Music and politics in the 1960s, then, might not be linked in the traditionally
way they have been with the rock bands constituting the sonic wing of the new left, but as omens
of future political alienation. Likewise the do-it-yourself ethos of 1970s punk rock looks more
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and more like a precursor of up-by-the-bootstraps mentality of the resurgent right of the Reagan
eyes.
Outside of McLuhan, few observers placed any great social value in television, but the
same cannot be said for personal computing and information technology. According to their
progressive advocates, computers would empower individuals and the web would bind them
together in voluntary and democratic associations creating a revolutionarily holistic social
ecology. 448 A counter-critique, however, also exists. In a pioneering and provocative study of
the subcultures that developed around personal computing, Sherry Turkle argued that the
individual personal computer of the 1970s and 1980s offered disillusioned 1960s male seekers a
realm in which they gained the power realize their social and personal visions on their own
terms. Theirs was a style of computing “characterized by transparency, simplicity, and a sense
of control…The computer clubs that sprang up all over the country were imbued with excitement
not only about the computers themselves, but of the new kind of social relationships people
believed would follow in their wake.” 449 Yet, just as with music and television, the obsession
with control would produce more social distance.
Echoing the early Rolling Stone at its most messianic, the organs of the early computer
movement adopted as an article of faith that information technologies associated with the
Internet would create “knowledge cooperatives,” which would induce an inner revolution among
the technologically linked up, bringing into existence participatory democracy and a postmodern
and enlightened community. The missionary zeal of men like Apple founder Steve Jobs, whose
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company would in 2000 release Ipod – a Walkman for the twenty-first century – stems from the
channeling of their disillusionment with long-player style social renewal into the equally solitary
pursuit of building hardware and writing software. 450
The actual communities that sprung up organically around computers and connected
themselves together in the Web were quite different than the dreams in Byte or Whole Earth
Catalog. The young men who came of age in the 1970s and 1980s and became enamored with
computing technologies and used their understanding of and control over computers as markers
to set them apart. These young men were more familiar with machines and, perhaps as a result,
less at ease with other people. Their mastery of the computer, though it often blocked them from
the majority of the peers, allowed them entry into the community of “hackers.” Unlike the
disillusioned revolutionary but similar to Canary and Spitzberg’s chronically lonely individual,
the hacker put little faith in restored social relationships, but invested himself in the machine
itself. Most of the hackers Turkle encountered were socially awkward and feared the
unpredictability of social situations over which they had less than absolute control, as one hacker
concluded about he and his companions failures in dating,

I think computer hackers tend to get very strongly involved in relationships. This is
because they are used to having this very close, clear, intimate relationship with the
computer and they expect to have the same kind of relationship with a girl. They expect
to understand the other person more than is reasonable. People just don’t work like
computers. 451
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Not only did hacker culture contain within it antisocial and anti-romantic elements, but it
was distinctively anti-sensual. In the same way television reduced reality to an “abstraction,” 452
and recording technologies reduced the performance and to sound waves. Computing when
combined with the Web reduced experience to information and offered in its place “virtual
reality”– a life on the screen. For Turkle, however, the hackers did not represent an isolated
group of cultish individuals, but a canary in the cultural coalmine.
… [T]he computer offers hackers something for which many of us are hungry. Hysteria,
its roots in sexual repression, was the neurosis of Freud’s time. Today we suffer not less
but differently. Terrified of being alone, yet afraid of intimacy, we experience
widespread feelings of emptiness, of disconnection, of the unreality of the self. And here
the computer, a companion without emotional demands, offers a compromise. You can
be a loner, but never alone. You can interact, but never feel vulnerable to another
person. 453
The computer, by being personal and by at least mimicking the most rudimentary aspects
of thought was an acceptable stand-in for human contact. It also possessed the important virtue
of being under the user’s control. It was a machine that would not expose or hurt the user. Like
the well-set up rig or the Walkman it was a sanctuary where the self could feel more itself and
allow it to connect. It’s anti-sensual nature, however, and its relentless reductionism only
exacerbates the anomie Turkle describes.
The World Wide Web, which enjoyed a great deal of favorable press and some wild-eyed
utopian dreams, has also exhibited the same pattern as the television, the computer, and
recording technologies. The act of learning how to use the Internet and the Web has been shown
to increase loneliness, even if the users were directly communicating with another person over
the Web. “…[E]ven social uses of the Internet were associated with negative outcomes,”
concluded a famous 1998 study of the Internet and loneliness, “for example, greater use of
452
453

Putnam, Bowling Alone, 242.
Ibid., 215.

231
electronic mail was associated with increases in depression.” The Internet, the researchers
discovered, substituted weak ties in place of strong ones, where on-line associates, detached from
the day-to-day environment of each other, cannot effectively connect or sympathize with each
other. Despite the disturbance it had caused in their lives, most of the study’s Internet users
returned to the technology because of the ease of escape and connection it seemed to offer. 454
The personal listening devices that became common consumer items by the 1980s are a
key element in a much larger history. Postwar Americans, living under the threat of atomic
annihilation and often in subdivisions of strangers, desired a safer world in which uncertain
human relationships that were ever more distant, were held at arms length. The individual having
lost connections to others, sought technological empowerment. Music listening devices offered,
just like the computer, the personal control that seemed to be rapidly disappearing in all other
areas of their lives. Shielding the user from social obligations even down to the innocuous
“hello,” and by bestowing upon the listener the power to bring into existence a unique sonic
environment, personal listening devices seemed to satisfy the late twentieth-century’s radical
individualism. The problem was they also only made the desire for empowerment and control
stronger.
Musical performance continues, of course, but it is safe to say that most of the time
Americans do not hear music from other human beings, but call it into being from a host of
different technological devices. Cheerful Luddites, such as Jonathan Richman, still travel from
place to place performing for small audiences, but his music, like that of other popular
musicians, is much more accessible as digital information on iTunes. Opportunities for
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collective experiences remain, but most Americans opt for the solitary or the technologically
mediated. In the spirit of Todd Storz, the music and electronics industry have given them what
they demanded. That demand will remain strong for the foreseeable future because the social
anxieties and anti-sensuality of the current culture show no signs of abating. It would seem that
the psychological ill health of Americans is one of the key elements powering economic growth,
technological innovation, and musical artistry.
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